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A bstract
This thesis is divided into three paxts, all related to matching models of the 
labour market. In the first part, I analyze wage determination in search 
equilibrium. In the second part, I study human capital acquisition and de­
preciation when the labour market contains frictions. In the last part, I 
discuss various issues related to search and matching. Below follows a brief 
description of each paper.
P a r t  1: W age D eterm ination  In A Matching Model with Wage An­
nouncement, I study a matching model where heterogeneous firms publicly 
announce wage offers. I derive a Walrasian type of equilibrium, which is 
constrained efficient. In Bargaining Over the Business Cycle, I assume that 
wages axe determined by strategic bargaining. This makes wages more and 
unemployment less volatile than when the conventional Nash solution is ap­
plied. In Bargaining and Matching, I design an alternative extensive form 
bargaining game, where a third agent may arrive and Bertrand competition 
take place. The resulting wage schedule is of the same form as the one that 
prevails from Nash baxgaining.
P a r t  2. H um an C apital and M atching In Human Capital Investments 
and Market Imperfections, I analyze how frictions in the labour market can 
distort the incentives to invest in human capital, and lead to sub-optimal 
investments and multiple equilibria. In Education and Competition for Jobs, 
each vacancy can get more than one applicant, and several workers may 
compete for the same job. Depending on parameter values, workers may or 
may not diversify and choose different levels of education. In Loss of Skills 
During Unemployment, workers gradually lose skills during unemployment. 
As a result, multiple equilibria may exist, and unemployment benefits to the 
long-term unemployed can reduce unemployment.
P a r t  3. O th e r Topics In Optimal Unemployment, I study the efficiency of 
matching models using techniques from optimal control theory. In A Search 
Model with Hiring Costs, I introduce hiring costs in the model, and show that 
this makes the vacancy rate less volatile and the adjustment process after a 
shock smoother.
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Introduction
Matching models are models where the focus is on market frictions. In match­
ing models of the labour market, both unemployed workers and firms with 
vacancies have to undertake costly and time-consuming search to find a trad­
ing partner. These frictions can be due to informational imperfections about 
the existence and location of potential trading partners, and to the fact that 
announcing jobs, producing and processing applications, selecting the right 
applicant etc axe time consuming activities. All factors are summarized in 
the matching function, which maps stocks of searching workers and jobs into 
a stream of new matches.
In models with frictions, the concept of market clearing is not well-defined, 
and the usual ’’supply equal demand” rule for determining wages does not 
apply. The reason is that when finding new trading partners are costly, it 
is mutually beneficial for a worker-firm pair to stay together rather than 
to continue searching. Thus there is a surplus associated with each match, 
and how to split this surplus between the worker and the firm is a bilateral 
decision.
In the literature on matching models of the labour market, it is common to 
assume that the match surplus is shared according to the (asymmetric) Nash 
sharing rule. The disagreement points in the Nash bargaining is then the 
agents’ outside options, i.e. their expected income with no trading partner 
at hand. The agents’ bargain power, or their shares of the surplus, are ex­
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ogenously given. However, there also exists a separate and distinct branch of 
the literature, dealing with more theoretical issues concerning decentralized 
trade, where wages are determined by strategic bargaining between workers 
and firms. The key element in these models is the Stal-Rubinstein bargaining 
game, where the opponents alternate to make proposals on prices /  wages.
When wages are not determined by market clearing, the welfare proper­
ties of the market solution become an open issue. Since this receives much 
attention, both in the literature and in my thesis, I will discuss it here in 
some detail. I focus on the question of whether the private and social gains 
by opening new jobs coincide. Entry of a new job creates positive exter­
nalises for workers and negative externalities for other searching firms, since 
it increases the unemployed workers job-fining rate and reduces the rate at 
which each job is recruiting. If wages are high, the positive externality for 
unemployed workers is strong, since the value of finding a job is high, while 
the negative externality is weak, since the value of an occupied job is low. 
Thus the positive externality dominates, the private benefits of opening a 
job is smaller than the social benefits, and we get suboptimal entry and too 
high unemployment rate. On the other hand, if the wage rate is low, the 
negative externality dominates, and we get over-optimal entry and too many 
resources used on the search process. Optimality is achieved when the wages 
are such that the positive and the negative externality exactly balance.
When wages are determined by Nash bargaining, there is a one to one 
correspondence between the workers’ share of the surplus created by the job 
and the wage that prevails in the market. There exists a value of this share 
that leads to an efficient wage. However, since the share is exogenous, there 
are no reasons to believe that the actual and the optimal values of the share 
will coincide.
In the first part of my theses I address this and other questions, by studying
12
alternative ways of determining wages. In the second part, I endogenize 
the workers’ productivity by introducing human capital. Finally, in a third 
part, I study various topics on matching models, including the efficiency 
properties of the standard matching model, and also the effects of introducing 
convex hiring costs. In most of the papers, the starting point is the search 
equilibrium model presented in Pissarides (1990). I first briefly summarise 
the main features of this model and then discuss the points of departure 
taken in each chapter.
Pissarides’ model is set in continuous time, and the labour market consists 
of a continuum of homogenous workers and firms. The agents are modeled in 
a rather unsophisticated way, workers axe either unemployed and searching 
for a job, or employed and working, while jobs are idle and searching for a 
worker or occupied (by one worker) and producing. To ensure that there is 
unemployment in steady state, job matches are destroyed at a constant and 
exogenous rate.
The most important innovation in the model is the matching function, 
which gives the number of matches as a function of the number of unem­
ployed workers and vacant jobs, and thus captures the frictions in the market. 
The matching technology is assumed to be concave, and, like the aggregate 
production technology, to exhibit constant returns to scale. Workers exit 
unemployment at random, and their exit rates are thus constant (in steady 
state), and depends (positively) on the relative number of vacant jobs to 
unemployed workers, or the labour market tightness, but not on the size of 
the market. For vacant jobs, the arrival rate of workers depends negatively 
on the labour market tightness.
Workers thus move between unemployment and employment according 
to a Poisson process, with endogenous transition rate form unemployment to 
employment (depending on the labour market tightness), and an exogenous
transition rate from employment to unemployment. Analogously, jobs moves 
between the states of being occupied and vacant. Since the transition rates 
are constant in time, this makes it relatively straightforward to calculate the 
expected discounted incomes for the agents in the different states using the 
Bellman equation (or the asset value equation). Wages are determined by 
decentralized Nash bargaining. The match surplus is defined as the difference 
in the joint expected income when matched and when unmatched for a job- 
worker pair, and is divided according to the Nash sharing rule.
The only decision that is made in the standard model is the firms’ de­
cision whether or not to open vacancies. Free entry of firms ensures that 
the value (or expected income) of a vacant job is zero. The value of a va­
cancy depends on the labour market tightness; if it is high, the arrival rate 
of workers is low. Furthermore, since high labour market tightness means, 
ceteris paribus, a high expected income for unemployed workers, the match 
surplus and thus the value of an occupied job is low as well. The value of 
a vacancy thus falls with the labour market tightness, and the free entry 
condition determines it so that a vacancy has zero value. Given the labour 
market tightness, the transition rate from unemployment is known, and the 
steady state unemployment rate is easy to calculate.
The first part of the thesis concerns wage determination, and consists of three 
papers. The titles are ”A Matching Model with Wage Announcement”, ’’Bar­
gaining over the Business Cycle” , and finally ’’Bargaining and Matching”.
In ”A Matching Model with Wage Announcements”, which is the main 
paper in this part of thesis, we assume that wages are not set by Nash bar­
gaining after the firm and the worker meat but that they are announced 
publicly by the firm before workers arrive. Consequently, workers know the 
wages in the jobs they are applying for. The main source for frictions in the 
model is not imperfect information about the location of jobs, but rather
14
the costs and time lags associated with producing job advertisements, pro­
ducing and processing job applications, selection of workers etc. When firms 
announce different wages, we can think of the labour market as divided into 
submarkets, with different wages in each submarket. Since all workers axe 
homogeneous, they must be indifferent between which of the (non-empty) 
submarkets to enter. Submarkets with high wages therefore face lower labour 
market tightness than those with low wages. A vacant firm faces a trade-off 
between wage costs and search costs, and chooses the submarket that maxi­
mizes value of the vacancy. Since the opportunity costs of searching is higher 
the higher the productivity is, high-productivity firms join submarkets with 
higher wage than low-productivity firms do.
Hence when a vacant firm decides on wages, it chooses the one that maxi­
mizes profit, contingent on providing a certain level of (expected) income for 
the workers. As a result, the announced wages are optimal in the sense that 
they yield an efficient allocation of searching workers on submarkets and the 
vacancies the right incentives to enter the market.
It is not trivial to define the equilibrium of the model since almost all sub- 
markets typically are empty. However, by using a refinement of the rational 
expectations equilibrium concept along the lines of Gale (1994), I am able to 
pin down the expectations about arrival rates of workers in empty submarkets 
uniquely. As a result, I obtain a Walrasian type of equilibrium, where firms 
maximize profit given their beliefs about the relationship between wages and 
search costs.
In the two other papers on wage determination, I retain the assumption 
that wages are determined after workers and firms are matched. However, 
instead of applying the Nash solution, I assume that wages are determined 
by strategic bargaining.
In the first paper, ’’Bargaining Over the Business Cycle”, my main goal is
15
to study whether the results derived in the literature on decentralized trade 
mentioned above can give new insights when applied to matching models of 
the labour market. My analysis focus on the effects of productivity shocks. 
I assume that wages are determined by a bargaining game with alternating 
offers of the Stal Rubinstein type. The outcome of this game depends on 
the arrival of new trading partners to the players. If the arrival rate of 
job offers is high, the risk is high that the worker abandon the incumbent 
firm. This increases the workers bargaining power, and vice versa for the 
firm. As a result, the share of the surplus allocated to the worker is an 
increasing function of the labour market tightness, and since the tightness is 
higher during booms than during recessions, the worker’s share of the match 
surplus fluctuates pro cyclically. Thus the model predicts wages to be more 
volatile and the unemployment rate to be less volatile than when the wages 
axe determined by Nash-bargaining.
I also analyze the effects of the shocks being anticipated. My main finding 
is, that if we allow for renegotiations of the wage after a shock, this typically 
increases the volatility of wages even further. After say a negative shock, the 
firm finds itself with higher bargaining power, and starts to renegotiate the 
wage. This is anticipated by the worker, who is compensated by getting a 
higher wage before the shock.
In the third paper, ” Bargaining and Matching”, I introduce a new ex­
tensive wage bargaining game. I assume that firms and workers can write 
binding contracts. In the bargaining game, the firm has all the bargaining 
power, in the sense that it makes all the proposals. However, the worker can 
delay the response to an offer, hoping that a second firm shows up. If this 
happens, the two firms compete in a Bertrand fashion for the worker. On 
the other hand, if a worker shows up, the two workers engage in Bertrand 
competition for the job. I show that all equilibrium wage offers are accepted 
immediately, and that the solution is similar to the solution of the alternating
16
offer game described above.
The second part of the thesis, where I focus on the role of human capital, 
consists of three papers: ’’Human Capital Investments and Market Imper­
fections”, ’’Education and Competition for Jobs”, and finally ”Loss of Skills 
During Unemployment”.
In ’’Human Capital Investments and Market Imperfection”, I show how 
frictions in the market can create hold-up problems and lead to under­
investment in general human capital. The wages are determined by Nash 
bargaining. Since the match surplus depends on the productivity of the 
worker in question, the workers bears all the costs of education, while they 
only receive parts of the return. As a consequence, we get under-investments 
in education. Furthermore, this positive externality from education for firms 
can lead to multiple equilibria; the more firms that enter the market, the 
more profitable it is for workers to invest in human capital. This again may 
increase the incentives for vacancies to enter the market. I also study in­
vestments in general human capital undertaken after workers and firms are 
matched (training). When there is turnover in the market, for instance due 
to on-the-job search, similar results are obtained.
However, these inefficiency problems can be resolved by allowing for non­
standard debt contracts, where repayment is contingent on the worker in 
question being employed. In this case, the repayments become a part of the 
match surplus, and the firm in effect pays the same share of the investment 
costs as it receives from the return. The externality is thereby eliminated, 
and the level of education and training become optimal.
In the second paper, ’’Education and Competition for Jobs” , I also study 
the incentives to invest in human capital. In addition, I alter the matching 
technology, and allow for more than one applicant per vacancy. Applicants 
for a job thus compete ’’face to face”, and since the absence of binding
17
contracts rule out Bertrand competition, a worker can be turned down for 
a job he strictly wants. Now more education speeds up the transition to 
employment. Furthermore, an agent’s investment in human capital creates 
a negative externality for other workers, as it reduces their transition rates 
to employment. I show that the equilibrium of the model can take different 
forms, depending on parameter values. If the competition effect is not too 
strong, ex ante homogeneous workers diversify and choose different levels of 
education. If the competition for jobs is very strict, all workers again behave 
equally, and choose a level of education above the socially optimal level. 
At this point, the hold-up problem described above is eliminated, while the 
negative externality from education on other workers prevails.
In the third article, I assume that workers loose skills during unemploy­
ment. The idea is not new, Pissaxides (1992) makes the same assumption. 
What is new is to implement loss of skills into a standard matching model. 
I show that the model may exhibit multiple equilibria, and that the unem­
ployment rate tends to be over-optimal. Furthermore, as unemployed work­
ers stay too long in the market, unemployment benefits directed exclusively 
towards long-term unemployed can reduce overall unemployment.
The last part of the thesis consists of the two articles ’’Optimal Unemploy­
ment” and ”A Matching Model with Hiring Costs”. The first one gives an 
analysis the welfare properties of matching models, more thorough and gen­
eral than the existing literature provides, using optimal control theory. I 
show that the optimality rule derived in Pissarides (1990) and other places 
(that optimality is achieved when the workers’ bargaining power is equal 
to the elasticity of the arrival rate of workers with respect to the labour mar­
ket tightness) holds out of steady state and for time dependent exogenous 
variables, but not if the agents are heterogeneous or if workers do on-the-job 
search.
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The free entry of vacancies described above implies that the vacancy rate 
is extremely volatile, and substantially overshoots its new equilibrium value 
after a shock. In ”A Matching Model with Hiring Costs”, I deal with this 
by assuming that expanding a firm by employing more workers is costly, and 
that the costs are convex in the rate of change. I show that this alter the 
dynamic properties of the model substantially, the vacancy rate becomes less 
volatile and the transition after a shock to the new steady state equilibrium 
goes more smoothly and slowly.
Although most of the chapters in the thesis are interrelated, they are pre­
sented as autonomous papers. Thus they can be read independently of each- 
other, an advantage I think that more than outweighs the costs of some 
repetition.
19
Part I 
W age D eterm ination
20
C hapter 1 
A  M atching M odel W ith  W age 
A nnouncem ent
1.1 Introduction
Search models are widely used as an example of how decentralized markets 
may fail to produce an efficient allocation of resources. When wages are 
determined by ex post bargaining, a wage which yields the correct incentives 
ex ante exists (Hosios 1990), but in general there axe no mechanisms, or 
’’forces”, which lead to the optimal wage. Hence the equilibrium wage is 
typically inefficient.
In this article I assume that firms are able to communicate wage offers to 
potential workers before they are matched. More specifically, I assume that 
a firm, when advertising the vacancy, also announces the offered wage. Thus 
workers know the wages in the jobs for which they apply. This turns out 
to resolve the inefficiency problems described above: the equilibrium wage 
offers lead to (constrained) optimal allocation of resources.
Compared to the early search literature, publicly available information 
about wages may seem a strange assumption. In early search theory (Mor-
21
tensen 1971, Phelps 1971), the main reason for search activity was the col­
lection of information about wage offers in different firms. Diamond (1971) 
was the first to show that wage posting with sequential search leads to a 
unique equilibrium wage, removing the information gathering role of search. 
In Pissarides (1985), (1987) the role of search in revealing information about 
wages is also removed; firms and workers axe homogeneous, and in equilib­
rium all firms pay the same wage. The costs and time delay associated with 
the search process are due to unmodelled frictions and costs when trading, 
represented by the matching function. Costs and time delay due to informa­
tion gathering about wages or to costly wage negotiations are not part of the 
trading frictions underlying the matching function. This point is made clear 
in Pissarides (1990).
In this paper I explicitly remove the information-gathering function of 
search by assuming that all wages are publicly announced and so available 
to all workers prior to search. This is motivated by the fact that public wage 
announcement is common in parts of the labour market. Often job adver­
tisements for low-skilled workers (and high skilled as well) give information 
about the wage offered.
The idea that information gathering about wages plays a minor role in labour 
market search is consistent with the description of the search process given in 
Layard et al. (1991). They argue that a worker’s job search can be divided 
into two parts: First he collects information about vacancies, which come 
with different pre-assigned wages and conditions. Then he applies for some 
of the vacancies he has heard off. In general the worker accepts the offer for 
any job for which he has applied1.
I focus on the second part of the process (writing and processing of appli­
1Akerlof et al. (1988) finds that only 8 percent of job-seekers have rejected a previous 
job offer.
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cations, interviews, time lags due to selection by the firm etc.) as the main 
contributor to costs and time-delays. I therefore assume that information 
collection about wages happens instantaneously and without any costs.
Note also that similar assumptions can be found in the search models of 
the retail market, see f.i. Butters(1977) or Robert and Stahl(1993). Here the 
shops can, through (costly) advertising, give potential customers information 
about their price. The buyers thus receive price information prior to search.
A  brief description o f th e m odel
I use a standard search model, where the basics are taken from Pissarides
(1990). Each firm has either one worker and is producing, or one vacancy and 
is searching for a worker. Firms may differ in productivity, while all workers 
are equally productive. Workers axe either employed and not searching, or 
unemployed and searching. There is a fixed cost k > 0 associated with the 
opening of a vacancy, and the productivity of the vacancy is drawn from a 
distribution F  after the cost k is incurred.
The main innovation in this paper is in the wage setting process. In 
Pissarides’(1990) model, as in the models of Diamond(1982) and Morten- 
sen(1982), wages are set after the firm and the worker meet, so as to split the 
surplus from the job match. There is then a unique wage outcome for each 
match productivity, which is in general inefficient. In my model the firms 
choose the wage and announce it before workers arrive.
If different vacant firms announce different wages, we can think of them 
as separating the labour market into submarkets. In each ”submarket” the 
announced wage is the same, while it differs between submarkets2. The num­
ber of matches in each submarket is determined by the number of jobseekers 
and vacancies in each market. In equilibrium unemployed workers must be
2The term submarket is more fully defined below.
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indifferent between submarkets, so, because they know the wage associated 
with each submarket, the labour market tightness must be higher in markets 
where the wage is higher. Thus, when deciding its wage, the firm faces a 
trade-off between search costs and wage costs.
I show that the equilibrium is separating, high productivity firms always 
offer strictly higher wage than low productivity firms. If the firms are homo­
geneous, they generally announce the same wage. Furthermore, the wages 
announced are optimal in the sense that they give an efficient allocation of 
unemployed workers across submarkets, and also give vacancies the right 
incentives to enter the market.
Discussion
Most retail market search models with price advertising are different from 
my model, since they do not have congestion effects on both sides of the 
markets. The suppliers (who advertise) are typically ready to satisfy any 
demand. Hence, customers always visit the supplier who announces the 
lowest price. In my model this does not hold because frictions are present on 
both sides of the market, and the well-paid jobs are more difficult to get.
An exception is the model by Peters(1991). Here a non-stationary market 
with a continuum of homogeneous agents is studied. There is no entry, and 
matched agents leave the market. His focus is on the construction of a 
matching technology when the agents are matched randomly, but when the 
match probability for a seller is influenced by the price that he advertises.
To achieve this, Peters partitions the sets of agents into a finite numbers 
of subsets. In each time period, a two-stage matching game between the sets 
of buyers and sellers is constructed, where the ’’sellers” first announce prices, 
and the ’’buyers” decide which ’’seller” to visit. A matching technology 
is constructed, which for a given "seller” gives the probability of getting
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matched as a function of announced price, given the other (symmetric) price 
announcements.
In contrast, my paper follows a Walrasian approach. The atomistic firms 
choose the wage to announce given their beliefs about the relationship be­
tween the wage and the arrival rate of workers. The beliefs are exogenous to 
the firm.
However, in order to obtain a reasonable outcome, we must restrict 
the firms’ out-of-equilibrium beliefs (i.e. the beliefs about the arrival rates 
of workers in empty submarkets). We therefore proceed along the lines 
of Gale (1992,1994), and apply a refinement of the rational expectations 
model similar to his concept of a stable walrasian equilibrium. This refine­
ment resemblances the stable equilibrium concept derived in Kohlberg and 
Mertens(1986). In our context, an equilibrium is stable (loosely speaking) if 
any deviation from the equilibrium wage, announced by a tiny set of firms, 
only has a small impact on the equilibrium.
The walrasian approach simplifies the analysis, and enables the treatment 
OF wage announcements in A stationary and continuous time search model 
with entry, commonly used in labour economics. The simplicity of the model 
also makes efficiency considerations tractable, both with respect to the dis­
tribution of searching workers over firms with different productivity, and to 
the entry decision of vacancies. This is absent in Peters’ model.
Wage announcement in models of the labour market is rather uncommon. 
An exception can be found in Montgomery (1991). In a different setting, 
Montgomery uses wage announcement to explain inter-industry differences 
in wages.
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Efficiency wages
The idea that firms may increase the wage to attract more workers is com­
monly used as a rationale for efficiency wages, see for instance Layard et al.
(1991). The issue was important in early search theory, and is also central in 
for instance Burdet and Mortensen(1989). In this literature the workers typ­
ically have different reservation wages, and therefore the number of workers 
accepting a job increases with the posted wage (although the arrival rate of 
workers is independent of the wage).
As already mentioned, empirical findings suggest that there is very little 
rejection of job-offers. Another empirical finding is that higher wages do 
attract more applicants. Holzer et al. (1988) finds that higher wage leads to 
more applicants per vacancy (although the effect is weak). Kaufman(1984) 
finds that employers certainly believe there is a relationship between the wage 
and the arrival rate of workers.
In my model, firms are able to manipulate the arrival rate of workers 
through the announced wage. The efficiency wage argument thus holds even 
with homogeneous workers. The model is also consistent with the fact that 
workers rarely reject jobs.
1.2 T he M odel
I assume that all workers are identical and risk-neutral. The number (mea­
sure) of workers is constant and normalized to 1 . The number of jobs are 
endogenously determined through entry, with a sunk cost k > 0 associated 
with the opening of a vacancy. When the cost is incurred, the productiv­
ity of the vacancy is drawn from a discrete probability distribution F  with 
mass points at t/i,, ,yn. Firms are risk neutral, and the free entry condition 
therefore implies that the expected value of a vacancy equals the creation
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cost.
Let x(u , v) denote the stream of new worker-firm matches, where u is the 
measure of unemployed workers searching for a measure v of (advertised) va­
cancies. The matching function x(u,v) captures the frictions in the market. 
As described in the introduction the sources of the frictions are time delays 
when producing and proceeding applications etc., and to unmodelled hetero­
geneities and information imperfections (though not concerning wages).
Following standard assumptions, let x be concave, and homogeneous of 
degree 1 in (u,u). We also assume that x has continuous derivatives. Let 
p =  x(u , v)/u  =  x(l, 6) = p(6) denote the transition rate from unemployment 
to employment for an unemployed worker, and q =  x(u ,v)/v  = q(6) the 
arrival rate of workers for a vacancy, where $ is the labour market tightness 
v/u. Let
limp(0 ) =  lim q(9) =  0
6—+ Q  O —+ 0 0
and
lim p(9) =  lim ?(0) =  oo0—+CO P—+U
When the labour market tightness goes to zero, the arrival rate of trading 
partners for firms and workers go to infinity and zero respectively. When 6 
goes to infinity, the opposite holds.
When matched, the worker-firm pair start to produce immediately, and 
the worker receives the announced wage. Following Pissarides (1990) there 
is a constant and exogenous probability rate s of match destruction. When 
separated, the worker joins the unemployment pool, while the remaining 
vacancy is worthless and therefore destroyed.
Before we continue to study the behaviour of the firms and the workers, let 
us define a submarket in the following way: A submarket is defined in the 
following way:
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Definition 1 A submarket with wage W{ (or submarket i) consists of all 
firms announcing wage W{ and all workers that apply for jobs with this wage.
1.2.1 Workers
In this subsection we study the workers’ behaviour in steady state when the 
announced wages are given by a finite-dimensional vector (u71?, , ,  wm).
Let Ui denote the expected discounted income (or asset value) for an 
unemployed worker in submarket i. Then we have that
rUi = z + p(0i)(Ei — U%) (1 .1)
Here z denotes the unemployment income, 6{ the labour market tightness 
in submarket i, r  the discount factor, and E{ the expected income when 
employed at wage i. The latter can be written as
rEi —Wi — s(Ei — U) (1.2)
where s denote separation rate. Substituting out E  gives
=  (r +  s)z +  W,p(6A  
r +  s + p($i)
for w > z. If w < z the workers do not search, and rU =  z.
The workers enter the submarkets that yield the highest expected income. 
All submarkets that attract workers must therefore give the same expected 
income. Denote this income by U. Substituting in for U in (1.3) and rear­
ranging gives
\ rU — z . .
p^  = ^ u (r + s) 
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(1.4)
For a given U the equation defines a unique relationship between the wage 
and the labour market tightness in each submarket. We write this relation­
ship as 8(w; U). For later reference we also define the correspondence G(U) as 
the set of pairs ( id , I/O)3 which give workers an expected utility U. Formally, 
G(JJ) is defined by
Vl J    z
G - . R + ^ R l ,  G{U) =  { K 1/9) :  p(9) = r  +  s); w > U] U (rU,0)w — ru
(1.5)
In the appendix we show that G(U) has the following properties:
Lem m a 1 G(U) is continuous, bounded, and non-empty
1.2.2 Firms
As already mentioned, the productivity of a vacancy is determined after the 
fixed cost is incurred. The vacancy is maintained (and announced) if and
only if the is profitable, if not it is destroyed immediately. Below I first
calculate the value of an announced vacancy.
Denote by V(yi,w ,) and J (?/,-, w) the expected discounted value, or asset 
value, of an announced vacancy and a filled job with productivity t/t- respec­
tively, when the posted wage is w. Let qe(w) denote the firms’ beliefs about 
the arrival rate of workers when announcing w. The (perceived) asset value 
equation for a vacant job is then
rV(yi,w) = - c  + qe[J(yi,w) -V (y i,w )]
The (perceived) asset value equation of a filled job is
rJ(y{, w) = y{ -  w -  sJ(j/t-, w)
3It turns out that some of the proofs are simpler when working with 1/0 
than 6.
(1.6) 
=  u / v  rather
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If we substitute the expression for J  into the value equation for V  we get
(r +  q)V(yi,w) = r s — c (1.7)
The question is now how the expectations qe(w) are formed. For all wages ac-
implies that qe(wi) =  q(0(wi)), where is defined by (1.4). However, this
is not enough to give the model predictive power. With no restrictions on 
the out-of-equilibrium beliefs, any wage can be optimal to announce if the 
beliefs are ” right”. We therefore make the following assumption, rationalized 
in the next section:
F irm s beliefs’: The firms’ beliefs are such that
tually announced in equilibrium, a standard rational expectations argument
q(w) =  q(6( w))
for all tu, where 6(w) is defined by (1.4)
An equivalent way of expressing this is to say that (w,q~1(qe(w)) £ G(U). 
The arrival rate of workers to firms and the arrival rate of jobs to workers 
are linked through the matching function. The assumption therefore implies 
that the firms expect to give potential applicants an expected income U also 
if they announce an out of equilibrium wage.
The firms’ maximization problem can be written as
max V(yi,w) =  max
w  V '  (w ,1 /6 )£G (U )
(1.8)
For all w , V(yt-, w) < y ,/r, so Vi is bounded for all i. Let Vi denote the 
supremum of V(?/,-, w). We then get the following result:
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Proposition 1 When Vi > 0 and c > 0, there exists a solution w* to the 
problem given by (1.8), with rU < w* < yi. When c =  0, the result holds iff 
Vi>  0.
Proof: For all w > yi we have that V(w) < — c/(r +  q). For all w < rU 
we have that V  =  — c/r, since the firm then search forever without getting 
a worker. Since V  > 0 , this implies that V  =  su p ^ ^ y ^ V f jw ) .  Since 
the interval is closed, V(yi,w) is continuous and V > 0, we know that an 
optimum exists and lies in the interior of [rU, yi]. The argument runs in the 
same way when c =  0 and V > 0
□
Since all firms with the same productivity face the same optimization prob­
lem, they choose the same wage unless (1.8) has more than one solution. In 
the appendix I give sufficient conditions for uniqueness of the optimal solu­
tion, but I do not assume uniqueness in the exposition below. However, to 
simplify the analysis I assume that if there is more than one optimal solution 
for vacancies with a given productivity, all the firms with this productivity 
still choose the same wage4. Hence, for a given value of U, the number of 
announced wages can at most be equal to the number h of different produc­
tivity levels among operating vacancies. The following proposition ensures 
that we get exactly h different wages:
Proposition 2 Let W{ be a solution to (1.8) when the productivity is ?/,•. 
Then W{ > Wj if and only if yi > yj
1.2.3 Entry
From (1.8) it follows that we can write the maximum value of a maintained 
and announced vacancy as a function V(yi,U). The vacancy will be an-
4Note, however, that since the functional forms in the maximization problem are ex­
ogenous, more than one solution is in some sense ”unlikely”.
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nounced if and only if V(yi, U) > 0, otherwise it is destroyed. The value of 
any vacancy can therefore be written as
V(y,U) = max[0 ,V(y,U)]
Let i denote the cut-off productivity for destruction of the vacancy, so that 
V (?/,-, U) > 0 for i > i and V(yt-, U) < 0 for i < i. The expected value of 
opening a vacancy is then given by
n
V(U) = Y ^ V ( y i,U )fi
i=i
where /,■ =  Pr[y =  yt]. Since k denotes the cost of creating a vacancy, entry 
implies that
V{U) =  k
Intuitively, the value of an (announced) vacancy decreases with U, since by 
(1.4) higher U means higher labour market tightness and thereby higher 
search costs for all w. This and some other important properties of V  axe 
stated in the lemma below. The proof is given in the appendix.
Lem m a 2  V (y, U) is continuous, strictly increasing in y for y > rU and 
strictly decreasing in U on the interval (z ,y]. V(U) is strictly decreasing in 
U on the same interval.
1.3 Equilibrium
To close the model we must include the steady state relationship between the 
stock of unemployed and the streams into and out of the various submar­
kets. This gives a multi-dimensional version of the Beveridge curve. Note 
that in steady state, the stream of workers entering the unemployment pool
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is given by (1 — u)s, and is equal to the stream of vacancies entering the 
market. Furthermore, the inflow of vacancies must be equal to the outflow 
in each submarket, the latter given by where ut- denotes the measure of 
unemployed in the submarket in question. We therefore have that
Uip(0i) =  (1 -  u)sfi
where =  /* /(l — F;_i), with Fj =  Pr[y < Together with the fact that 
=  u, this equation determines tq,...,u„ and u given 0j , . . . ,0n.
An equilibrium E* of the model is defined in following way:
D efinition 2  An equilibrium of the model is two scalars U and u, and vec­
tors ...,tun), (0j , ...,0n) and (iq ,...,un) such that
V{U) =  k (1.9)
Wi =  argmaxweG(u)V(yi,w) i > i  (1-10)
rU  =  ( r  +  ^  +  M K  f >  ; (1 n )
r +  s + p(9i)
Ui&iq(0i) =  fi( 1 — u)s i > i  (1-1 2 )
n
=  u (1.13)
i=i
where G(U) is defined by (1.5) and i is the smallest i such that V(yi, U) > 0 .
P roposition  3 I f  max[yt- — ^,0]/t/( r  +  s) > k, the equilibrium defined 
above exists.
Note that the structure of the equilibrium is quite simple, since it is almost 
recursive. The key variable U is determined in the first equation by the entry 
condition. Given £/, the second equation determines the announced wages, 
and the third equation the corresponding values of 6. The two last equations 
determine the unemployment rate and the distribution of unemployed over
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submarkets given the labour market tightness in each submarket. Note also 
that although the equilibrium is not necessarily unique (since (1 .1 0 ) for each 
i can have more than one solution), the value of U is, i.e. in all equilibria 
the unemployed workers get the same expected income.
1.3.1 Characterization of Equilibrium
If we substitute p(9) =  0q(O) into (1.4) we get that
t TJ — ■ z
$(w)q{0(w)) =  +  s) (1-14)
Since the maximization problem always has an interior solution, the optimal 
w must be such that V^iu)!$(„,) =  0. Taking the derivative of (1.7) with 
0e =  0(w) gives:
•’< * > £ < 7 T 7 -v‘> - £ £  (1-1»aw r + s r  +  5
The left hand side gives the value of increased q when w increases, the right 
hand side the costs of increasing the wage as a result of lower profit when a 
worker is found. Taking the derivative of (1.14) with respect to w gives
d9 . rU — z
where q =  q(9i) =  —9q,(9)/q and so 4s9q{9) = q{ 1 — q)- Substituting outde
by virtue of (1.14) gives
dw w — rU
Inserting this into (1.15) yields
qi w — rU
1 -  qi V i - w - ( r  + s)V(yi)
(1.16)
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-  I f f  < - >
Where, as before, J  and E  denote the asset value of an occupied job and 
of an employed worker, given by the equations (1 .2 ) and (1 .6 ) respectively. 
Defining the match surplus Si as 5, =  «/, — K + Ei — U, we find that J  — V — 
(1  — T)i)Si and E — U = rjiSi. Thus the division of surplus between the 
worker and the firm is the same as when the wage is determined by ex post 
bargaining and the worker’ bargaining power is 77,-.
The equilibrium can thus be characterized by the following equations 
(with rji =  rj(9i))
n
k = Y , f ‘V< (1-18)
i=i
rU =  z +  0iq(6i)rjiS{ i > i  (1*19)
rVi =  c “f- ^(0j)(l — Vi^Si i > i  (1 .2 0 )
Si =  l U H - U - V  i > l  (1.21)r +  s
where the last equation is derived from the asset value equation for S. In 
addition the equilibrium must satisfy the equations (1.12) and (1.13). Note 
that the equilibrium is equivalent to the corresponding equilibrium with ex 
post bargaining when the workers’ bargaining power in a firm of type i is 77*.
1.3.2 Rationalization o f th e out-of equilibrium  beliefs
The equilibrium defined above rests heavily on the assumptions about the 
out-of equilibrium beliefs. Clearly other beliefs lead to a different equilib­
rium. In this section I show how a refinement of the rational expectations 
equilibrium concept, similar in spirit to Gale’s(1992) concept of stable equilib­
rium, rationalizes our out-of equilibrium beliefs and delivers the equilibrium 
determined by (1.9)-(1.13) as the only equilibrium.
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The idea is to study the effects of exogenous deviations by small sets of 
firms. This has strong bite in the model. If some firms deviate and announce 
a wage that was not announced in the original equilibrium, the labour market 
tightness in this submarket ’’becomes observable”, and this effectively rules 
out ’’crazy” beliefs.
A (unrefined) rational expectations equilibrium E T is defined by the equa­
tions (1.9)-(1.13), but with G(U) substituted out with an arbitrary relation­
ship qe(w) between q and w. The only restriction we pose on qe is that 
qe(w) =  q(w) for all wages announced in equilibrium.
A deviation is any finite dimensional5 vector (wd, , , ,  a x , , , , a m,e)
such that 0 < a,- < £ and a* = A rational expectations equilibrium 
with deviations E r(wd,a) is a rational expectations equilibrium with the 
restriction that wd is announced by at least a  firms. We now define stability 
in the following way6:
D efinition 3 A rational expectations equilibrium E r is stable iff, for all se­
quences {(wffQi, e«}£o such that lim(-_»0o £t- =  0 we have that
lim E r(wd, a, h) = E r (1.22)
We get the following result:
P roposition  4 1. The equilibrium defined by (1.9)-(1.13) is stable.
2. All other rational expectations equilibria are not stable.
Proof: The proof of the first part is simple, since the existence of deviating 
firms only influence the equilibrium in the sense that the submarkets with
5For technical reasons we do not require that the tremble includes all possible wages.
This contrasts Gale(1992) and Kohlberg and Mertens(1986)
6In the definition below I implicitly assume that when considering entry, the potential
vacancy does not take into account that it may ’’tremble”
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wage wd are non-empty, with labour market tightness given by the corre­
sponding element in G(U)7. The firms’ maximization problem is therefore 
unaltered by the deviating firms, and thereby also V(U).
To prove the second part, let E T be a rational expectations equilibrium 
that does not satisfy equations (1.9)-(1.13). Let wr denote the vector of 
announced wages, and Ur the equilibrium value of U. Furthermore, let wG 
denote the vector of wages that maximizes V(wG,y ,U r). Clearly, for some 
i we must have that w\ w f , and therefore also that EV( wG UT) > 
E V  (wi,yi, UT). Define UG to be the solution to the equation EV(w G, yi, UG) — 
0. Then UG > UT.
Now we study deviations from the rational expectations equilibrium of 
the form (wG,a /n ,a )  with a > 0. In any such deviation equilibrium the 
value of U must be at least UG, and hence the deviation equilibrium does 
not converge to E T as a  —► 0. Therefore the rational expectations equilibrium 
is not stable.
□
1.4 O ptim ality
In this section we look at the welfare properties of the model, and analyze 
whether the equilibrium gives a socially optimal number of vacancies en­
tering the market, and an optimal allocation of unemployed workers across 
submarkets. The optimality criteria we use is the same as in Pissarides(1990), 
maximizing the discounted aggregate production net of search costs.
Let a denote the stream of new vacancies created. The social optimum then
7This is of cause only the case if the value of U, given that only the deviating firms are 
in the market, is lower than the equilibrium value U*. However, this is always the case 
for small enough values of a.
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maximizes
W
poo n
= J  e~rt 'E 'INm  +  zui — cvi — ak]dt (1.23)
with respect to a,z, and uj, ...,un, given that the paths of the state variables 
A T j ,Nn, u j , vn are are governed by the differential equations
Ni =  Viq(vi/u{) — 5(1 — Ni) i > i (1-24)
Vi = aFi — Viq(v{/ui) i > i  (1.25)
and given the constraint
n
+ Ni) =  1 (1.26)
t=t
We now get the following result
P roposition  5 All equilibria satisfying (1.9)-(1.13) are optimal.
The proof is given in the appendix. Note that if there is more than one 
equilibrium solution, the proposition implies that they are equivalent from 
a welfare point of view. To get some intuition why the model leads to an 
optimal allocation, first notice that in sequential search models with ex post
bargaining, the incurred search costs are sunk when bargain takes place.
Thus the costs will not influence the bargaining game directly, and there are 
no reasons why the bargaining outcome should reflect the expected search 
costs ex ante and thereby lead to the optimal number of vacancies.
In my model the wage determination is centralized in the sense that 
all wage offers are evaluated simultaneously by the workers before they are 
matched. When the firms choose the wage, they maximize profit given the 
worker’s indifferent constraint, and thereby internalize the effects of their 
own decision for the unemployed workers.
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1.5 Exam ples and extensions
In this section we first study the relationship between productivity and wage 
(insider-outsider effects). Then we extend the model to allow for heteroge­
neous workers.
1.5.1 W age distributions
We can write the optimal wage announcement for a firm with productivity y 
as w =  8(y;U). The function 8 relates the exogenous distributions of produc­
tivities over firms and the distribution of wages. We know from proposition 
2 that 8 is strictly increasing in y. We can also show the following result:
Lem m a 3 limy_ 00 8(y; U) — oo. When c = 0 we also have that 
l im ^ y  8{y; U) -  rU
For a general functional form of the matching function we can not say much 
specific about the properties of 8. It might even be discontinuous in y, since 
(1 .8 ) can have more than one solution.
In the literature, the matching functions are often assumed to be Cobb- 
Douglas, a functional form that fits data reasonably well. Therefore let 
x(u ,v ) =  Then q = O'13, rj =  (3 (since 77 is the absolute value
0
of the elasticity of q with respect to 6), and finally q = p i-e. Since 
E — U =  (w — rU)/(r  + s) = (3S (where E  still denote the expected dis­
counted income when unemployed), (1.19) gives
w(y) = rU + (r + s)(3S(y) (1-27)
Taking the derivative of V  with respect to y in (1.8) using the envelope 
theorem, gives V'(y) =  q/[(r +  s)(r-|-g)]. Taking the derivative of S  in (1.21)
Since the announced wage increases with y, so does q. We therefore imme­
diately get that the effect on the announced wage of increased productivity 
y is decreasing in y, i.e. S'(y) is decreasing in y. Further, by the virtue of 
Lemma 3 we find that lim^oo 6'(y) = 0. In the case with c = 0 we find 
that lim1/_*r£/+ £(y) =  ft (since 0 in the two cases goes to infinity and zero 
respectively). Thus, loosely speaking, we can say that the ’’insider effect” 
(the effect of a firm’s productivity on the wage) is stronger for low values of 
y than for high values of y.
For the special (but interesting) case where (3 =  1/2, we can easily calculate 
6 by solving for S  in (1.28). We then find that the announced wage is a 
function of the square root of the productivity y.
1.5.2 E xtensions
In this section we extend the model to allow for heterogeneous workers. More 
specifically, we assume that the workers differ in z , their income (or utility) 
when unemployed. We also assume that 77 is non-decreasing, which implies 
that the equilibrium is unique in the previous model with homogeneous work­
ers.
Denote each worker’s unemployment income by zt-, i =  1 ,,,&, with zt- 
increasing in the index z, and let Ui denote the expected discounted income 
for a worker of type z. Then Ui is increasing with z. Define Gi(U) and 
&i(U) for each z in the same way as we did in (1.5) and (1.4). Finally define 
G(U\ , ..., Uk) as the set of pairs (1/0, w) where for each w, 6 =  mint-0t(u;).
We extend the equilibrium given by (1.9)-(1.13) in the obvious way, such 
that the firms choose w to maximize profit given G(U\ ,..., Um), and each type 
of unemployed enters the submarkets that maximize their expected income. 
In addition, we have to equal flows of workers into and out of unemployment
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for each type of workers.
P roposition  6  1. With homogeneous firms, the equilibrium described ab­
ove is unique. The equilibrium vectors (inj,..., luj), (t/*,..., £/J), are 
such that for all i, (w*,U*) corresponds to the (unique) equilibrium 
values in the original model with workers of type i only.
2. In any equilibrium with heterogeneous firms, all w announced by firms 
with productivity yt- are strictly greater than all w announced by firms 
with productivity yj < ?/,•.
Furthermore, workers with unemployment income i apply for jobs with 
strictly higher wage than workers with unemployment income Zj < Z{.
The first part of the proposition says that with homogeneous firms, the 
equilibrium with heterogeneous workers can be obtained by pooling the cor­
responding set of homogenous-worker equilibria. Since the labour market 
tightness in each submarket is socially efficient (and this is the only allocative 
variable in this case), the allocation for the economy as a whole is also effi­
cient. Note also that since the wage in the homogeneous workers equilibrium 
is increasing in z , the workers with high unemployment income get higher 
wages than the workers with low unemployment income. The intuition is 
clear, it ” hurts” more for the worker with low unemployment income to stay 
unemployed than for the worker with high unemployment income. Therefore 
the former is relatively more concerned about getting a job quickly than the 
latter is.
The last part of the proposition says that with both heterogeneous firms 
and workers, the market is still completely separating. This implies that an 
unemployed with high z always apply for jobs with at least as high produc­
tivity as workers with lower z. In other words, workers with low waiting costs
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enter the submarkets with productive firms and therefore low transition rate 
to employment. This seems reasonable from an efficiency point of view.
1.6 Conclusion
In this paper I studied the effects of wage announcements in the context 
of a simple search model. The solution I obtained is different from Dia­
monds^ 1971), who also studied a search equilibrium with wage announce­
ments. In Diamond’s model, a firm announces the wage after it is matched 
with a worker. The firm then has an ” advantage” compared to other firms, 
since the worker must incur search costs to get another job offer. Therefore, 
the firm can offer the worker a lower wage than offered by other firms, driving 
the wage down to the monopsony wage in symmetric equilibrium.
In my model this mechanism does not work, because the wage is an­
nounced prior to the match. Each firm, when deciding a wage to announce, 
faces competition from other firms on equal terms to obtain workers. The 
solution that I obtain in symmetric equilibrium is constrained-efficient.
Burdett and Mortensen(1989) study a search model with wage announce­
ments and find a nondegenerate wage distribution in equilibrium. The reason 
is that in their model the announcements are made after the contact, but the 
workers may have more than one job offer at one time.
I have treated the wage offers as binding, and excluded that workers may 
start bargaining with the firm when they are matched. Note however that the 
announced wage is equal to the Nash bargaining solution when the workers’ 
bargaining strength (3 equals 77. If /? < 77, the announced wage is higher than 
what the worker can obtain by bargaining, if (5 > 77, the opposite holds. This 
suggests that wage announcement is more likely to occur in labor markets 
where the workers’ bargaining power is relatively small.
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A ppendix
P ro o f o f Lem m a 1
Define 0 =  1/0, and let 9(w,U) be defined by (1.4) for yn > w > rU. For 
w — rU, let 0 =  0. Note that since
lim 0(w, U) = lim 0(tu, U) =  0
iu—*tU+ U —*w / t~
this implies that 9{w, U) is continuous at [rU, yn\. In addition, 9 is decreasing 
in £/, increasing in w , bounded, and non-empty for yn > w.
We know that G(U) is continuous if it is lower hemicontinuous and has 
closed graph. To show lower hemicontinuity, let {Un} be an arbitrary se­
quence in [z,yn] which converges to {/, and let (tu,8) be an element in 
G(U). We have to show that there exists a sequence {(tun,0n)}, where 
(it>n,0n) G G(Un) which converges to
The proof is done by construction. First assume that w > rU . Then 
there exists an n such that for all n >  fi, rUn < w. Fix wn = w for n > h, 
and define 0n = 9(w,Un). Since 0() is continuous at (w, £/), the sequence 
(wn,9n) converges to (u>,0).
If w = rU we know that 0 =  0. Define the sequence {rUn, 0}, which 
obviously converges to (rU, 0) when Un converges to U. This shows lower 
hemicontinuity.
To show that G(U) has closed graph, let {Un} be a sequence in (z, y] which 
converges to a point U* in the same set (i.e. not to z). Let {(u?n,0n)} 
be an arbitrary sequence with (u;n,0n) G G(Un). We have to show that if 
{(wn, 0n)} converges to (iu*,0 *), then (tu*,0*) G G(U*). Rewrite (wn,0n) 
to (wn,0(wn, Un)). Since 0(,) is continuous in wn and {7n, we have that 
0 =  9(w*,U*), and by definition (w*,0*) G G(U*). This shows that G(U)
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has closed graph.
P ro o f o f Proposition  2
Let 7/1 > 7/2 and Wi > w2, and define A; =  V(wi,yi) — V(w2,yi), i =  1,2. 
Then we have
A l ~  Az =  TTT ~ y‘2^ ('r + s^~ TTV (Vl ~ y2^ ^T +  s ) >  0 r +  qi r + q2
where ^  =  g(0(tut-)) and thus qi > q2. This means that a firm with high
productivity allays earns strictly more than a firm with lower productivity
when increasing the wage, thus 6(y) is nondecreasing in y. Further, since by
assumption the derivative of V  with respect to w is continuous, the optimal
wages cannot be equal, and hence 6(y) is strictly increasing in y.
P roof o f Lemm a 2
V (U ) is continuous in U Define
v M )  =  (i.29)
r +  q(0)
which is continuous for all w,0 > 0. V(U) can then be written as
V(U) =  max V(w,6)
(w ,8 )eG {U )
Since G is continuous, bounded and nonempty we know that V(U) is con­
tinuous in U (See Stokey and Lucas (1989) lemma 3.6)
V (U ) is strictly decreasing in U Let U1 > U2, and denote by w1 the 
optimal wage to announce given U1. Since 0{w,U) is strictly decreasing in 
U and V(w,9) is strictly increasing in 6 we thus have that
ViU1) < V ( w \0 ( w \U 2)) < V{U2)
and hence V  is strictly increasing in U.
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P ro o f o f proposition 3
It is sufficient to show that equation (1.9) is well-defined, i.e. that there 
exists a value of U such that V(U) =  k. The existence of optimal wages then 
follows from proposition (1), and the rest of the equations are well-defined 
by definition.
First, note that for any y and any w > z we must have that 
linvc/-** V(io, 6(w, U)) =  (y — w)/(r  +  s), and therefore that limrj j^ z V(y) — 
(y — z)!(r  +  s). Thus we have that
lim V(U) =  Em&x[y — z, 0]/(r +  s)
rU —*z+
Then if i?max[y — z ,0]/(r +  s) > k, there exists an U such that V(U) > k. 
Since obviously V(yn) < k, the continuity of V(U) and the fact that V(U) is 
strictly decreasing in U implies that there exists a unique U solving V(U) =  
k. Thus equation (1.9) is well-defined. For a given value of U, proposition 1 
tells us that equation (1 .1 0) is well defined.
U niqueness o f th e optim al solution:
The right-hand side of (1.16) is increasing in w. Since 6 is decreasing in 
w , (1.16) is unique if is nondecreasing in 0. Hence a sufficient (but not 
necessary) condition for uniqueness is that 77 =  is nondecreasing in 0.
This holds for the Cobb-Douglas matching function, where 77 is constant.
P roof o f proposition 5
I first show that the market solution satisfies the necessary conditions for 
optimality in the special case where the elasticity of 77 is non-decreasing. 
Then I show necessary conditions in the general case. Finally I give sufficient 
conditions.
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Let i denote a given cut-off level, so that a vacancy is announced iff 
2 > i. The current value Hamiltonian associated with the maximization of 
(1.23) subject to (1.24)-(1.25) is then given by ( where A, and 7 ; are the 
adjoint functions corresponding to Ni and V{ respectively, and a  denotes the 
multiplier for the constraint (1.26)):
71 71 71
H  =  ^ 2  NiUi +  z  Ui -  v { -  ak
t=t i= i t=t
n
+ Ai{viq(vi/ui) -  sNi)
t=t
n
+  ^ 2  l i ( aFi -  Viq(Vi/Ui))
i= i
n
+  a ( l  -  £ ( « , •  +  Ni)) (1.30)
i—i
Necessary conditions for the steady state optimal solution are given by
Ui =  arg max H(u,  a, v , N)  Vi (1-31)Ui
a =  arg max H(u, a, v , N)  (1.32)
a
dH /dN,  =  rA; => (1.33)
r -+■ s
dH/dvi  =  j*7 i => =  - c  +  q(l -  r})(\i -  7 ,-) (1-34)
When 77 is non-decre£Lsing in 0, (1.31) is determined by the unique set of first 
order conditions. Since H  is linear in a we can thus write (remember that 
77 =  —qr(0)0/q, and thus dv^ J u^  =  0q(9)rf etc.)
n
dH/da = 0 =*• * =  ] T  7 , ^  (1.35)
1 = 1
dH/dui =  0 => 2 +  rji9iq(0i){Xi — 7 *) =  aVi (1.36)
To determine i, note that the derivative of W  with respect to ut- is given by
7 therefore we must have that a vacancy is announced if and only if
7 ,- > 0 => - c  + #(1 -  77,)(At- -  7 ,-) > 0 (1-37)
46
The set of first order conditions is thus equivalent to the equilibrium 
conditions (1.19)-(1.21), with a, 7 ,- and A; substituted in for rU, Vi and +  
7 i. Since we know that the equilibrium is unique when 77 is non-decreasing, 
this means that the market solution satisfy the first-order conditions.
□
The proof in the general case follows the same lines as in the case when 
77 is non-decreasing. However, a solution to (1.36) is not necessarily solving 
(1.31) and we therefore have to work with (1.36) directly. Thus
m = arg max H  => Ui = arg max[zui +  (A:- — 7 i)v»9 (v«,/ it,-) — qu,-] (1.38)Ui Uj
We want to show that this problem is equivalent to the problem facing the 
firm when choosing wage to announce. The firms problem can be rewritten 
to
max —c + <?(0 )(1  — 77)5 v
subject to
rU =  z +  6q{0)rjS
where the last equation is the workers’ indifferent constraint. Since there 
is a one to one relationship between 77 and 0, we can substitute out 77 from 
the maximand, and maximize with respect to 6 instead. The maximization 
problem can thus be written as
max(—c + q(9)S — (rU — z)/6 (1.39)
6
which can be rewritten as
—cvi + ut-(max[zift- +  ViqS — ittr?7]
Ui
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Note that the problem has the same form as (1.38) The set of first order 
conditions is therefore the again equivalent to the market equilibrium con­
ditions. Therefore all market equilibria satisfies the necessary conditions for 
optimality.
To show sufficiency, we use Arrow’s sufficiency theorem (see Seierstad 
and Sydsaeter(1987), theorem 6 , page 289 for details). Write H (N ,v)  =  
H (N , v, A*, 7 *), where the star indicates that we are using the values derived 
by the necessary conditions. It is then sufficient to show that H  is concave 
in iV,u. First note that H  is linear in N  and that Hnv =  0. Further we 
know from (1.34) that Hv is positive, and (since vq(6) =  x(u, v)) Hv =  
—c +  xv(uj u)(A* — 7 *). Since x is concave in v this gives sufficiency.
□
P roof o f lem m a 3
We want to prove that lim^,*, S(y) = oo and that lim ^^t/ S(y) = rU. First 
assume that the set of announced wages is bounded from above. We will 
utilize the first-order conditions given by equation (1.16) to show that this 
leads to a contradiction. Let w denote the supremum of the announced 
wages.
Further, let
min _ n 7/ = mm  ---------—— > Uw€[w—a,w] 1 — qyoyWJj
where a is an arbitrary value such that w — a > rU . From the first order 
condition (1.16) we then have that for all V > a
V < - ^ F P L k < (1-40)y — o{y) — k y — w — rv  
We want to show that lim^oo y — rV  =  oo i.e. that the denominator in the 
last expression goes to infinity when y does. Let q =  <7(0 (u>)) < oo. Then
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y t y )  = ,(y -  %))/(r + * )  i_  < , y / ( r  +  s )
r +  q r + q r + q
Thus we get
T,/ \ - 2/ / ( r  +  5) r
2/ -  rV(y) > y -  rq-----—— > y-r + qq r + q
Hence y — rV  goes to infinity when y goes to infinity, and the right hand side 
of (1.40) converges to zero when y goes to infinity. Hence the inequality is 
violated and we have a contradiction.
The proof of the claim that infy€{2)00} S(y) =  rU is simpler. Let c =  0. 
We know that V(y) > 0  for all y > rU. Assume that the infimum over posted 
wages w is greater than rU. Then there exists an y such that rU < y < w. 
But then V(w,y) < 0 , and we have a contradiction.
P ro o f o f Proposition 6:
PART 1. First we show that the proposed equilibrium actually is an equilib­
rium. Notice that in the proposed equilibrium, all the firms maximizes profit 
given G(Ui, „Uk)- To see this, note first that since V(w*) =  k for all z, 
the firms are indifferent between which of the equilibrium wages w* to offer. 
Suppose now that a wage w ^  w* gives higher profit. Then (0(u?, w) € G{ 
for some i. But since w* is the unique wage that maximizes profit given Gt, 
this leads to a contradiction.
Assume now that a worker of type i gets higher expected income by going 
for wage Wj, j  /  i. Since the firms are indifferent between which of the wages 
to announce we get by arguing as above that it;* can not be the unique wage 
that maximizes profit given G(Uj). We know from proposition 3 that the 
equilibrium exists, so the only thing left to prove is uniqueness.
In another equilibrium, at least some workers of one type i must apply 
for jobs that offer a wage w' different from w*. These workers must get at
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least U*, if not a profit oportunity would arise by announcing slightly less 
than w*. But since the firms, when announcing w* maximizes profit given 
U* this means that the firms announcing w' gets negative profit. Therefore 
this can not be an equilibrium.
PART 2: Let yt- > yj. By the revealed preference argument given in the proof 
of proposition 2 we know that vacancy of type i never announce a lower wage 
than the vacancy of type j .  Suppose they announce the same wage. Then 
this wage must maximize the value of both sorts of vacancies given Gi(Ui) 
for some I. But then we know by apply proposition 2 that the vacancy with 
the higher productivity announces a strictly higher wage.
To prove the last part of the proposition, note that if a worker of type i 
prefers w2 to w1, u>2 > w1, any worker of type j  > i prefers w2 to it;1. We 
therefore only have to prove that in equilibrium, different types of workers 
never enter the same sub-market. Assume that workers of types I and m do, 
with I ^  m. The wage w in this submarket must then maximize V(w ; y,-) for 
some i subject to both G\(U\) and £ 2(^2)? which is impossible since the two 
indifferent curves have different slopes.
□
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C hapter 2 
B argaining Over the B usiness  
C ycle
2.1 Introduction
Equilibrium models with frictions, or matching models, are widely used to 
explain various features of the labour market, see Pissarides (1985), (1987), 
1990, Diamond (1981), Mortensen(1982 a and b) and others. Lately, such 
models have also been used to explain and predict the dynamics of aggre­
gate variables over the business cycle (Mortensen and Pissarides (1994)). In 
matching models, the wages are determined by bargaining between workers 
and firms. Since it is costly to find trading partners, there is a surplus associ­
ated with each match, and the surplus is split according to the Nash sharing 
rule.
There also exists a distinct literature on decentralized trade, where wages 
(or prices) are determined by strategic bargaining. A key element here is the 
Stal Rubinstein bargaining game, where the agents in question give offers and 
counteroffers as to how to share the surplus. It is shown that market condi­
tions, such as the availability of alternative trading partners, strongly influ­
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ence the outcome, see Rubinstein (1982), Rubinstein and Wolinsky (1985), 
Binmore and Hererro (1988 b), Osborne and Rubinstein (1990).
In this article, we combine these two branches of the literature. We intro­
duce strategic form bargaining in a matching model, developed by Pissarides 
(1990) and Mortensen and Pissarides (1994), and show how this alters the 
effects of aggregate shocks to the economy. We find that the workers bar­
gaining power (his share of the surplus) fluctuates procyclically. This implies 
that the wage rate is more and the unemployment rate less volatile over the 
cycle than is predicted when the wage is determined by the Nash sharing rule. 
Our results suggest that matching models may not explain sticky wages to 
the extent suggested in Pissarides(1987).
The intuition behind the result is clear. Both discounting, and the pos­
sibility that his partner switch partner, makes an agent want to settle the 
negotiations quickly. A worker is more likely to be rematched in a boom 
than in a recession, and vice versa for the firm. As a result the workers’ 
bargaining power vary procyclically, and this increases the wage flexibility.
We also study the effects of the shocks being anticipated. We show that 
this tends to make the worker’s bargaining power less volatile. However, 
wages tend to be even more volatile. This is to compensate for renegotiations 
after a shock, at which stage the bargaining power of the agents have changed.
2.2 The M odel
Our matching framework is standard, and can be described like this: There 
is a continuum of homogeneous workers with constant measure normalized 
to one. Workers exit the market at a constant and exogenous rate s. New 
workers enter the economy at the same rate, and join the market as unem­
ployed.
Firms axe either vacant and searching for a worker, or occupied (by one
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worker) and producing. All jobs are homogeneous. Firms are free to enter 
the market at any time to search for workers, and in equilibrium the value 
of a vacancy is zero1. When a worker and a firm meet, they start to bargain 
over the wage. We model the wage bargaining game as an alternating offer 
game of the Stal rubinstein type. The bargaining game is studied in the next 
section. In equilibrium, the negotiations settle immediately, and production 
starts. The match then lasts until the worker exits the market.
The economy is in one of two states: boom or recession. The economy 
moves between these to states according to a Markow process. The transition 
rates between the states are the same in both directions, and given by a 
parameter A. All firms’ productivities are yh during booms and yl during 
recessions. After a transition, all wages are renegotiated.
The number of matches in the economy is given by a concave, constant 
returns to scale matching function x(u,v). The transition rate to employment 
for a searching worker is given by p = x(u, v)/v — p(0), where 6 denotes the 
labour market tightness 0. The arrival rate of workers to firms is given by 
q =  x (u ,v )/v  =  q(0)-
Let E l, U* J 1, and V * denote the expected discounted income (asset 
values) for employed and unemployed workers and searching and occupied 
jobs, respectively, where i € {A, /} indicates boom and recession, respectively. 
The associated asset value equations are given by
(r +  ajtf1' =  z + r t E T - U ^  +  XiU’ - I T )
(r +  s)E* =  w +  X(Ej -  E')
rV  =  - c + (J i - V )  = 0 
(r +  «),7*‘ =  y* -  w{ +  X(Jj -  J*) (2.1)
1This is not important for most of the analyses, but simplify the expressions (which
actually become quite long
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where i E {/i, /} and j  E {/, h} and where z denotes the unemployment 
benefits.
To close the model, we have to determine the unemployment rate. Equal­
izing flows to and from unemployment we get the Beveridge curve
u =  —-— (2.2)
Finally, denote by M  the joint expected income for a worker-firm pair. It 
follows that
(r +  s)M i = y{ + \ (M j -  M ') (2.3)
It follows that M h decreases and M l increases in A.
Wages axe determined by a modified version of the bargaining game in Os­
borne /  Rubinstein (1990). Workers and firms bargain over how to share the 
expected discounted income M. We first model the game in discrete time, 
and then take the limit as the length of the periods converges to zero.
Matching takes place in the beginning of each period. A random device 
determines who is going to give the first offer, assigning a probability ir to 
the event that it is the worker. If the offer is accepted the game ends, and 
production starts immediately. If the opponent rejects, a new offer can not be 
made before the next period. In the mean time, the agents can be rematched. 
If this happens, they abandon their former opponents and start bargaining 
with a new one. The match can also be resolved for exogenous reasons 
(the production opportunity or the demand for the good may disappear). 
If nothing like this happens, the worker and the firm in question continue
to bargain. A random device chooses a proposer, with the same assigned
probabilities, and the game continues in the same way as described above, 
potentially forever.
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2.3 N o anticipated shocks
In this section we assume that there are no anticipated shocks, so that A =  0. 
The superscripts on the variables are thus superfluous, so we write E  instead 
if E h etc.
2.3.1 W age determ ination
Let E * and E e denote the share the worker receives when the firm and 
the worker proposes respectively, and let E  =  irEe 4- (1 — tt)E^ represent 
the expected value of E. Furthermore, let A  denote the probability that 
the worker is matched in the next period, given that he has not exited the 
market, and let B  the probability that the firm is matched next period.
The expected income for a worker if he rejects an offer by the firm is 
6(1 — 5)(A F+(1 — A)U), where 6 is the discount factor and S  the probability 
that the worker exits the market between the periods. Thus the worker rejects 
all proposals that give him less than this. By a similar argument, we find that 
the expected income for a firm if the firm rejects an offer is SB( M  — E)  (since 
V  =  0). Hence the firm rejects all offers less than this. The equilibrium of 
the game is, therefore, given by the equations2
E* =  ( l - S )6 { A E  + { l - A ) U )  + b 
M  — E e = S B ( M - E )
E =  irEe +  (1 -  ir)Ef 
J  +  E  =  M  (2.4)
2In equilibrium, it is always better for the firm to make a proposal the worker accepts, 
rather than waiting one period, and vice versa for the worker. Hence the equations below 
follows.
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where b denotes the worker’s income during the bargaining process. Substi­
tuting in for E e and E * in the expression for E  gives
t M( 1 -  SB) +  (1 -  *)b +  S( 1 -  A)( 1 - S ) ( 1 - t )U
1 — xSB  — (1 -  5r)(l -  S)6A { 1
Let P  and Q denote the probability of finding a new trading partner before
the next period for the worker and the firm, respectively. Further, let X
represent an exogenous probability of job destruction. Then
A = P + ( 1 - P ) ( l - X ) ( l - Q )  (2.6)
B  =  Q +  (1 -  P )(l -  X )(l -  Q )(l -  S) (2.7)
We assume that the arrival rates of trading partners for agents that bargain is
the same as for idle agents. We thus write P  =  1 — e~pAt, Q =  1 — e~gAt, 6 =
e“ (r+s)At, X  =  1 — e"xAt, 5  =  1 — e~sAt, and b = bAt, where A t  is the time
lag between two wage offers in the bargaining game. Inserting this into (2.5)
and taking the limit as A t —* 0 gives, using l’Hoopital’s rule:
;r(r +  s +  x -f p)M  +  (1 -  tt)(x +  q)U +  (1 -  tt)6 -  k(x +  q)V
b> =  --------------------------------------------------r r- ; ----------------r-----------------------  (" -o j7r(r +  s-|-a;-|-p) +  (l — 7r )(r -f x -f q)
Thus the following holds:
1. If the main driving force in the bargaining game is the exogenous risk 
x of job destruction, i.e. if q «  p «  r «  0, we find that
E  =  7rM + (1 — 7T )U
The solution corresponds to the Nash solution when the workers bar­
gaining power equals 7r.
2. If the main driving force in the bargaining game is the impatience, that 
is if r > 0,p 0, then the expected income for the worker is
E = 7T M
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In this case, the worker’s outside option (his expected income when 
unemployed) does not influence E.
3. If r  > 0 and £ - f p « £ - f g  = x, the worker’s expected income is
XE  =  7r M  +  (1 — tt)- x +  rx +  r
This is equal to the Nash bargaining solution when the worker’s ’’dis­
agreement point” is a fraction x /(x  +  r) of U and V  respectively.
When using that w = (r -+• s)E  and that M  = y /(r  +  s), the wage equation 
(2 .8 ) can be written as
w =  /3sy +  PuU(r +  s) (2.9)
where
0  _  ^ ________________________ (r +  p + a + x)________________________
s 7r(r -bp + s + x) + (1 — 7r)(r -f q + s + x)
Pu =  (1 ~ 7r) / -.wr . _ . I \ (2*10)7v[r +  5-}-p +  x)-l-(l — Tr)[r +  s +  q -f- x)
We call f$s the worker’s bargaining power, and /3U the influence of the outside 
option. We note that B u + B s < 1 , with strict inequality if s +  x > 0. By 
inspecting (2 .10), we obtain the following result:
P roposition  7 The worker’s bargaining power /3S increases with 9, while the 
influence of the outside option fdu decreases in 6.
The proposition follows directly from equation (2.10) and the fact that p 
increases and q decreases in 6. Hence fds increases and f3u decreases in 6. 
It is therefor natural to ask whether the decrease in j3u can outweigh the 
increase in /3S so much that the worker’s expected income decreases with
0. By inspecting (2.10), we find that /?'(#) < P'u{0) when 717? +  (1 — ir)q is
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increasing in 9, which may well happen. Therefore we can not rule out a
priori that E  increases in 6 unless r  + s is small compared to p and q, in
which case Pu 4- ps ^  1 (see below).
2.3.2 Equilibrium
In this subsection we incorporate the wage formulas in the matching model 
described in the previous section. To simplify the analysis, we assume that 
both p and q are large compared to r  -f s, and that 7r =  1/2. We then get 
that
A  =  p / ( p  +  <i)
Pu =  1 ~ P M  = q/(p + q) ( 2 .1 1 )
From Pissarides (1990), we know that the equilibrium value of w is given by
w =  (3y — (1 — P)z + fiOc 
Inserting this in the asset value equations for J  thus gives
c(r + s)/q = ( l - P ) ( y - z ) - P 9 c  (2 .12)
and inserting P = p/(p +  q) thus yields
c(r +  s)/q = V ~ Z+~ / C (2-13)
Assume now that p  =  Ps initially. Then the right-hand side of (2.13) falls 
more quickly with 9 than does the right-hand side of (2.12). Consequently, a 
positive shock in y gives a bigger response in 9 when the equilibrium is given 
by the first equation in (2.12), rather than by (2.13). We get the following 
result:
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Proposition  8 Suppose the situation is as described above, with /d =  /3S 
initially. Then a shift in y implies a bigger response in w and a smaller 
response in 6 and in the unemployment rate when the worker}s bargaining 
power is given as in (2.11), rather than as an exogenous and constant
Proof: That the response in 0 is smaller when the worker’s bargaining power 
is ps rather than a constant ft is shown above. Now
(r + s)c/q — y — w
In the model with an endogenous (d, the left hand side increases less when 
y shifts (since 0 shifts less), and it follows that w must change by more in 
order to restore equality. Finally, since 0 shifts by less, it follows from the 
beveridge curve that u shifts less as well.
□
2.4 A nticipated productivity shocks
In this section, we assume that the productivity shocks are anticipated by
the agents in the model, i.e. we assume that A > 0. The analyses is only
partial, in the sense that all market parameters are treated as exogenous.
The bargaining game proceeds as in the last section. However, the agents
now have to take into account that the economy can be hit by an aggregate
shock between two successive offers. We assume that the aggregate conditions
axe determined just after the matching process has taken place and just before
the new offer is to be made3. Let A denote the probability that a shock occurs
before the next offer is made. By arguing as in the last section, we find that
the equilibrium of the game is given by
3As we will see, the timing here is actually irrelevant in the limit when the time lag 
between the offers converges to zero.
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E 1 =  (1 -  A)<5(1 -  S)(A E h +  (1 -  A)Uh) 
+  A(5(l — S)(AE l + (1 — A)Ul)
M  — E ‘ =  (1 -  K)6(B(Mh - E h) + (1 -  0)V h)
+ A5(/J(M' -  E l) +  (1 -  P)Vl 
E h =  *E e + (1 -  *)Ef  (2.14)
Solving for E, this gives
%M(1 -  6(1 -  A)B) +  5(1 -  A)(l -  5)(1 -  A)(l -  t )U
E  =  -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
X
+ A[(l -  *)(A&  + (1 -  A)U') +  (1 -  -  E l)
X
where ^  =  1 — 7r£(l — 5)(1 — A)A — (1 — ic)8B. The first term corresponds 
to the right-hand side of (2.5) (with A taken into account), while the last 
term incorporates the effects from the shocks. Now we proceed as above, and 
define A  and B  as in (2.7). However, to simplify the expression slightly we 
assume that x =  0. In addition we write A = 1 — eAAt. Inserting this and 
taking the limits as A t goes to zero gives
E h _  *(r +  * +  P +  x)Mh +  (1 -  *)<lUh + x lE ‘ +  *M>) /2 16\
7r(r +  s +  q) +  (1 -  x)(r +  s +  p) + A
which we can rewrite as
h 7r(r + s +  p)M h +  (1 -  ir)qUh -  A(Eh -  E l -  *(M h -  M l)
7r(r + s + p) + (1 -  7r)(r -f s +  q)
By using the equations in (2.10) we can express this as
E  =  +  pJJ  -  - ( E h - E 1-  t ( M h -  M'))  (2.18)
P
with /9 =  7r(r + s- |-^ )-f( l — 7r)(r +  s +  p). The last term captures the effects 
of the potential shocks to the worker’s bargaining power (the effects of the
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shock on the joint expected income is already captured in E ). Note that we 
can write the last term as
—A[(l -  r)(E h -  E ‘) -  x (J h -  J 1)
Since the worker loses relatively more by the negative shock than the firm 
does (since his bargaining power falls when 0 falls), we would expect this 
expression to be negative. However, if the firm loses more in absolute terms,
E  may still increase. It turns out to be difficult to give sharp results as to 
when this will happen. Note, however, the following:
Lem m a 4 Suppose a negative shock reduces the labour market tightness, and 
that this ceteris paribus increases E. Furthermore, assume that ^  > t , or 
equivalently that ph > qh. Then, for a given M  and given market parameters 
$ and U, E h falls with A.
Proof. Suppose the presence of the shock increases E. Then we know that 
E l > and, by symmetry, that E l < P[Ml -f (3luUl. This gives
E h - E l -  7r(Mh - M l)
> M hp hs -  M lp[ +  fcU h -  /3luUl + tt( Mh -  M l)
> ( f t  -  f t)M ' + ( f t  -  f t )U ‘ +  ( f t  -  *)(M h -  M ‘) +  f t (U h -  U‘)
> 0
But then an increase in A reduces E , and we have derived a contradiction
□
The lemma is not very sharp, the result obviously holds in many other situa­
tions as well. More precise results may be possible to obtain if we endogenize 
the market parameters U and 0, but we leave this issue aside for future work.
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Hence, for given market parameters, the worker’s share of the expected in­
come falls with A.
Finally, we want to analyze how the anticipation of shocks influence the wage 
rate, and compare this with results obtained when wages are determined by 
Nash-bargaining. To simplify the exposition, we assume that r -\-s are small 
compared to p and g, so that we can write f t  =  (1 — ft*).
To get an expression for the wages, we use the equations for E , M  and 
U given by (2.1). When the wages are determined by Nash-bargaining, we 
find that
Wn = (r +  s)0M  +  (r +  s )( l  -  0)U + X(Ek -  E ‘)
= 0y -  (r +  s)/3X(Mk -  M 1) + (1 -  0)[z + p(E k -  E 1)
+ X(Ek - E ' ) )  + X[Ek - E l)
=  py + (l -  0)[z + p(E k -  Uk)] (2.19)
where E h, Uh, p and q are perceived as exogenous variables for the worker- 
firm pair in question. Note that A does not alter the expression for wn.
Now we turn to strategic bargaining. The last term in (2.18) can be 
ignored when p and q are large compared to r +  s. The expression for the 
wage is then still given by the second line in (2.19). However, since ^  ft, 
the expression does not simplify in the same way. Instead we get
w = 0 hy + ( l - p k)[z + p(E -  t/)] +  \(P k -  p‘)[Mk - U k -  (M ‘ -  U‘)] (2.20)
The last term is strictly positive and increasing in A. Hence we have shown 
the following proposition:
Proposition 9 Suppose r + s is small compared to p and q. Then anticipa­
tion of a negative shock shifts the wage schedule (2.20) up.
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The worker knows that if the economy is hit by a negative shock, the firm 
will start renegotiating the wages downward. In this renegotiation game the 
worker’s bargaining power is lower than it was before the shock, and he ends 
up getting a lower fraction of the surplus. The wages before the shock have 
to compensate for this.
2.5 Conclusion
We have studied wage determination by strategic bargaining in the context 
of a matching model of the labour market. We find that the worker gets 
a bigger share of the surplus during booms than during recessions. Thus, 
wages become more and unemployment less volatile compared to the model 
where wages are determined by the Nash bargaining solution. We also study 
the effects of anticipated shocks. We show that the anticipation of shocks 
tends to make the worker’s bargaining power less volatile. Still the wages 
tends to be even more volatile, to compensate for the effects of renegotiation 
after a shock has occurred.
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C hapter 3 
Bargaining and M atching
3.1 Introduction
In models of decentralized trade, where wages axe determined by strategic 
bargaining, the agents are assumed to switch trading partner if they are 
re-matched during the negotiations. After the switch, they start the bar­
gaining game over again with the new partner (Binmore and Herrero (1988), 
Osborne and Rubinstein (1990), Rubinstein and Wolinsky (1985)). Similar 
assumptions can be found in matching models of the labour market, where 
workers do on-the-job search. A worker then accepts job offers from all firms 
where he is more productive than he is in his current job. After a job-switch, 
the wages are determined by Nash bargaining, independently of the worker’s 
wage and productivity in his previous job (Mortensen and Pissarides (1994), 
Pissarides (1994))1.
Since an incumbent agent is willing to offer the entire match surplus to 
prevent his trading partner from quitting, a more plausible assumption can 
be that Bertrand competition takes place when a third agent appear. With
1This contrasts Bertola and Felli (1993), where wages are determined by Bertrand 
competition at any point in time.
64
on-the-job search, this would mean that the worker in his new job receives a 
wage equal to his net productivity in the previous job.
Mortensen and Pissarides rule this out by assuming that contracts are not 
binding, so that all wage agreements costlessly can be renegotiated. Since a 
worker seldom has two job offers for a long period of time, any wage offer 
above the wage that prevails in a bargaining game between the two will be 
renegotiated later.
However, it seems to be a fact that a worker increases his wage if he 
is in contact with more than one employer during the wage negotiations. 
Furthermore, job contracts do contain agreements on wages, and are often 
legally enforceable. Therefore, firms seem to be able to commit to wage 
offers, at least to some extent and in the short to medium run.
In this paper, we assume that workers and firms are able to write binding 
contracts, so that Bertrand competition can take place. However, the model 
is set in continuous time, and the arrivals of trading partners are modeled 
as Poisson processes. Hence an agent never find two new trading partners at 
any one time.
When a worker and a firm are matched, the bargaining game proceeds 
like this: The firm proposes a wage, and the worker accepts or rejects the 
offer. First we assume that the worker responds immediately to an offer, but 
that a fixed amount of time elapses between two successive offers. Then we 
assume that the worker can delay his response as long as he wants (which 
is essentially the same as letting the delay between two successive offers go 
to zero). When agreement is reached, binding contracts are written, and 
production starts immediately. If the worker rejects the offer, or delay the 
response, a new trading partner may arrive and Bertrand competition takes 
place.
We find, that although the firm has all the bargaining power, in the
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sense that it makes all the proposals, the equilibrium wage is generally above 
the monopsony wage. Hence the famous Diamond paradox is absent in our 
model (see Diamond (1971)). Furthermore, under reasonable assumptions, 
the wage schedule has the same form as when the wages are determined by 
conventional Nash bargaining.
The analysis is partial in the sense that arrival rates of trading partners 
are exogenous. Our exposition is informal, and focus on the ideas rather 
than on technicalities. We do not specify the agents strategy sets, and in the 
proofs some details are omitted.
3.2 H om ogeneous firms
Assume first that all workers are equally productive and have the same pro­
ductivity in all firms. If a worker is in contact with two firms, and Bertrand 
competition takes place, he receives a wage y (equal to his productivity). If 
a firm is in contact with two workers, the wage is bid down to z < y, the 
expected discounted per period income when unemployed (hence z =  rU, 
where U is the expected discounted income and r the relevant discount fac­
tor). For simplicity we assume that when a contract is written, workers and 
firms stay together forever.
3.2.1 F ixed tim e delay betw een offers
First we assume that there is a fixed time delay between two successive wage 
offers. Let P  and Q denote the probabilities that the that the worker and 
the firm is matched with a second trading partner during the time delay 
respectively. Let E  denote the worker’s expected discounted per income if 
he rejects all offers until a new trading partner arrives. We ignore all terms 
containing PQ , and find that
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E  =  S [ E ( l - P - Q )  + Py/ r  + QU]
iy
r E  = Py + Qz
1 - 8 ( 1 - P - Q )
This suggests the following result.
P roposition  10 The wage-setting game described above has a unique equi­
librium outcome, where the firm proposes w* given by
=  (3-1)
and the worker accepts the proposal.
Proof: Suppose the firm’s strategy is to offer w* in every period. Then it is 
optimal for the worker to accept the offer, and we have a subgame perfect 
equilibrium. Furthermore, the worker will never accept a wage below w*. 
Thus the best the firm can achieve is agreement in the first period at this 
wage. Since the firm is the proposer, uniqueness of the outcome follows.
Hence if (Py +  Qz/(  1 — 6(1 — P — Q) > z, the Diamond paradox is vio­
lated. With homogenous firms and no unemployment benefits, this is always 
satisfied in equilibrium.
Assume now that we can write P  =  1 — e“pAt, Q =  1 — e~qAt, and
8 =  e~rAt. Then we find, using l’Hopitals rule, that the equilibrium wage
converges to
PV  +  <1* / o  o nw = ------------  (3.2)p q r
as At goes to zero.
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3.2.2 Endogenous tim e delay betw een  offers
Assume now that the worker can choose to delay his response to the firm’s 
wage offer. The expected income for the worker if he always rejects all offers 
is given by:
rE  = p(y/r — E) — q(E — U)
I
E = ---- -^--- y/ r  + -----? U
r +  P + tf r +  p +  g
where p is the arrival rate of jobs, and q the arrival rate of workers. We get 
the following result:
Proposition 11 The wage setting game has a unique outcome, where the 
firm offers the worker a wage
w" =  max[z, y P + (3-3)r +  p +  g r + p + g
which is accepted immediately.
Proof: The proof follows the same line as the proof of the first equilibrium. 
The worker accepts w*, but never anything less. Thus the best the firm can 
do is to propose w*, which is accepted immediately.
□
The equilibrium outcome is thus the same as in the previous model, when 
the delay between the wage offers goes to zero. Note that if q and p are large 
compared to r, the wage can be written as
p qw =  y H------- zp +q  p +  g
This solution is equal to the Nash bargaining solution when the worker’s 
bargaining power is equal to p j (p +  g). It is also equal to the solution to the
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alternating offer game in Chapter 2, (when workers and firms have propose 
with the same probability). Note also that with this solution the Diamond 
paradox is always violated.
3.3 Extensions
In this section we assume that different worker-firm pair have different pro­
ductivities. First we assume that the differences are due to match-specific 
factors, i.e. that all agents are identical ex ante, before they are matched. 
Then we briefly discuss a model with heterogeneous firms. The wage setting 
game is like in the previous section, where a worker can choose to delay his 
response to a wage offer. To simplify the analysis, we assume that only the 
worker can switch partner, and that he has to accept the Bertrand wage if 
he decides to change trading partner. Finally we assume that no on-the-job 
search takes place after an agreement is reached.
3.3.1 M atch-specific differences in productivity
In this subsection we retain the assumption that the value of a vacancy is 
zero. All matches with productivity less than z thus dissolve immediately. 
Let y denote the productivity for the match in question. We assume that the 
value of a vacancy is zero. If Bertrand competition takes place, the worker is 
allocated to the firm where his productivity is highest, and receives a wage 
equal to his productivity in the other firm. Let F  denote the cumulative 
distribution of match-specific productivities, and /  the corresponding density. 
The expected discounted income when the worker delay the response until a 
second trading partner arrives is thus given by
f ylrE(y) = p  (min[y,y]/r -  E{y)f(y)dy (3.4)
J e
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where y1 is the top of the support of F.  Taking derivatives with respect to 
y yields
rE \y )  =  p( 1 -  F(y))( 1 -  E\ y) )  (3.5)
or
r p l _ _  p ( i - F ( y ) )  ,o c \
r + p ( l - F ( y ) )
It follows that E f is positive but decreasing, and 0 at the supremum of the 
support. Thus if rE(y1) > z  while rE(y°) < 0 (where y° is the infimum of 
the support of F)  there exists a unique y* G (z^y1) which solves E(y*)r =  z. 
This leads us to the following result:
P roposition  12 Assume that E(y1) > z/r,  and that y° < z. Then the 
wage setting game described above has a unique equilibrium outcome. For 
matches with productivity on the interval [z, y*], where y* is defined above, 
the firm offer a wage z. The worker immediately accepts the offer. I f  the 
productivity is above y*, the firm offer the worker a wage rE(y), which the 
worker immediately accepts.
Proof: From the calculations above, it follows that the worker always can 
obtain max[z/r,E] by not accepting the firm’s offer. By arguing as in the 
proof of the previous proposition the result follows.
□
Hence the model predicts a distribution of wages among workers, with an
atom at w =  z. For matches with productivity above y*, wages are strictly
increasing in the match productivity, although the derivative decreases in y 
and is zero at the top of the support.
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3.3.2 H eterogeneous firms
Now we assume that the firms are heterogeneous. This makes the analysis 
more complicated, since the value of a vacancy then depends on its produc­
tivity.
Let V(y) denote the value of a vacancy with productivity y. We assume 
that V(y) =  a(y —w)/ r , where a is strictly less than one2. The highest wage 
a firm is willing to offer in Bertrand competition is then g(y) =  y — rV(y).  
The expected income for a worker who delays his response until a second 
firm turns up is thus
f ylrE(y) = p  (min[g(y),g(y)]/r -  E(y))dF (3.7)
Jg- 1 (E)
For simplicity we assume that E(y) > U for all y. By arguing as above we 
then find that
9{y)  = y - a ( y - w ( y )
= (1 -  a)y -  w(y)
Now g~x(w(y)) =  (1 — a)y, which gives 
[ylw (y) =P  (min[(l -  a)y -  w{y), (1 -  a)y -  w(y)]/r -  w(y)/r)dF (3.8) 
J (l—a)y
Thus the wage schedule w(y) is a fixed-point of the mapping given by (3.8). 
Although the solution is generally not analytic, it can be solved numerically 
on a computer.
Before we conclude, we also discuss briefly the situation where a potential
2This is typically the case if the firm faces no direct search costs. If the arrival rate of 
workers to a vacant job is q, and the discount rate is r, we find that a =  q/(r  4- q).
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second firm has imperfect information about the incumbent firms’ produc­
tivity. We assume that the new firm only can make one wage offer, and the 
incumbent firm choose whether or not to match it.
Like in the previous models, all equilibrium wage offers are accepted im­
mediately. The new firm’s beliefs about the incumbent firm’s productivity 
is therefore an open issue. Here we assume that the beliefs are given by the 
original distribution F(y).  For simplicity, we also assume that the value of 
any vacancy is zero3. If the new firm offers a wage w , the probability that 
he gets the worker is thus F(w).
The wage offer w(y) by a third firm with productivity y is thus given by
w(y) = argmax(y — w)F(w)
y - w ( y )  = F(w(y))/ f(w{y))  (3.9)
If F / f  is non-decreasing, this equation has a unique solution. The lowest 
initial offer the worker accepts is thus given by4.
w* = 6{p J  w(y) -  w*(y))dF(y) (3.10)
In equilibrium, all firm’s offer and the workers accept this offer immedi­
ately. Thus the workers’ wages are independent of the employers productiv­
ity.
3Now this is an innocent assumption since, as we will see, the equilibrium wage is 
independent of productivity. Thus if V(y)  =  a(y — w), the maximum wage the firm will 
match is (1 — a)y — aw,  which is just a linear transformation of y.
4A11 firms in equilibrium are willing to offer w*, if not they will never find a worker.
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3.4 Conclusion
In this paper we have studied wage bargaining games between workers and 
firms. The firm makes all wage proposals, while the worker can choose to 
delay a settlement. If he does so, new trading partners may arrive, and since 
we allow for binding contracts, this leads to Bertrand competition among the 
agents. If the new agent is a firm (worker), the wage is bid up (down). In 
all the models, equilibrium wage proposals are accepted immediately.
We first study a model with homogeneous firms, and find that the out­
come of the game is similar to the Nash bargaining solution. We then proceed 
to allow for heterogeneous firms, under the simplifying assumption that only 
workers can meet new trading partners if agreement is delayed. If the firms’ 
productivities are observable, high-productivity firms offer higher wage than 
low-productivity firms. If the productivities are not observable, all firms offer 
the same wage.
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Part II
H um an C apital and M atching
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C hapter 4
H um an C apital Investm ents  
and M arket Im perfections
4.1 Introduction
When the labour market is competitive, workers receive a wage equal to their 
productivity. If a worker’s stock of general human capital increases, this is 
fully reflected in his wages. Since the worker in question receives all benefits 
from education, a socially optimal level prevails if he also carries all costs. For 
the same reason, firms are never willing to finance the investments. These 
results where first shown in Becker (1964).
With relationship-specific investments the situation is different since hold­
up problems may occur. Hold-up problems are studied by Grout (1984) 
among others. Grout constructs a model with a single firm and a trade 
union, where the wages are determined by bargaining. Irreversible invest­
ments are undertaken prior to the wage determination by one (or both) of 
the agents. The investor therefore pays all the costs of the investments, 
while only receiving a share of the return. As a result we get sub-optimal 
investments, and in the case of human capital acquisition too little education.
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In the present article we study human capital investments in an equilib­
rium model with frictions. Following Pissarides (1985, 87) and Mortensen 
(1986) among others, we assume that the agents have to do costly and time- 
consuming search to find a trading partner. When a worker and a firm are 
matched, the wage is determined by Nash bargaining.
A worker’s productivity can be increased by investments in human capital. 
As in Becker, we focus on general human capital, i.e. skills that increase 
productivity by an equal amount in all firms. However, we show that the 
frictions in the market give room for hold-up problems. When a worker and 
a firm are matched, they have a mutual interest in staying together, since 
finding new trading partners is costly. Furthermore, the size of the rent 
depends on the worker’s productivity. Since this happens in all firms, even 
small frictions can imply that the firm gets a substantial fraction of the gains 
from education if the workers’ share of the surplus is low.
We study two different situations, where workers undertake the invest­
ments prior to entering the labour market (education), and where they are 
taken after the workers are matched and have formed relationships with 
firms. In both cases, the equilibrium depends on the way the investments 
are financed. In the first two sections we study investments in education and 
training when the costs are covered by equity or by standard loans. In the 
last section we allow for state-contingent debt contracts, where repayment 
depends on the worker’s status in the labour market. Before we give a formal 
presentation of the model, we briefly discuss some of the results obtained.
Education
As mentioned above, the frictions in the market imply that there is a rent 
associated with a match, and the size of the rent depends on the worker’s
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productivity. This gives rise to hold-up problems, workers pay for all the 
investments, while they only receive a share of the surplus. The situation is 
similar to the one with relationship-specific investments, and we get under­
investment. The extent of the underinvestments is smaller than in Grout’s 
model though, since higher productivity increases a worker’s outside option 
and thereby his bargaining position. This feedback effect through the market 
becomes stronger when the frictions in the market are reduced. When the 
frictions vanish, any increase in productivity is fully reflected in the outside 
option, and the hold-up problem disappears.
Since firms receive some of the gains from education, we have positive 
externalities in the model, and this gives rise to multiplier effects and possibly 
multiple equilibria. If the labour market tightness is low, the transition rate 
out of unemployment is low. Hence the returns from education are low, and 
the workers that enter the market have low productivity. As a result, firms 
have low incentives to open vacancies, and the labour market tightness and 
transition rate from unemployment stay low. Similarly, high labour market 
tightness leads to high education, productive workers, and strong incentives 
for firms to enter the market. Hence the labour market tightness stays high, 
and we have multiple equilibria. The different equilibria axe Pareto-rankable, 
with the high-education equilibrium as the superior one 1.
Training
When the investments axe undertaken after the match, the level of human 
capital is determined so as to maximize the firm’s and worker’s joint expected 
income. If the worker’s productivity only influences the agents involved in
*A similar result, though in a different setting, is conjectured in Acemuglu (1993). The 
mechanism that leads to multiple equilibria are similar to mechanisms found in Pissarides 
(1992), who studies loss of skills during unemployment.
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the bargaining game, the efficiency properties of the Nash bargaining solu­
tion implies that the level of training is both privately and socially optimal. 
However, this does not hold if there is turnover in the market. Potential new 
employers are influenced by the investments, and since they are not present 
when the decisions are made, their profit is not taken into account. The 
situation is similar to the one above where the investments are undertaken 
prior to the match, and we get underinvestments in training.
We focus on the effects of endogenous turnover due to on-the-job search. 
We model on-the-job search in a similar way to Pissarides (1994) and Mor- 
tensen and Pissarides (1994), but deviate from them when we assume that 
on-the-job search is unobservable. This implies that wages can not be con­
tingent on workers’ search behaviour, and on-the-job search may take place 
even when it reduces joint expected income.
The effect of on-the-job search on the investments in training is ambigu­
ous. If a worker quits for a better job, this increases his own income and 
reduces the income in the initial firm. If the difference in marginal produc­
tivity of training between the firms is high enough, the first effect dominates. 
Then on-the-job search increases the joint expected return from training, and 
therefore increases the investments. If the difference between the new and 
the old firm is small, on-the-job search reduces the gains from training and 
thereby the human capital investments. In other words, low unemployment 
means more training.
T he role o f financing
In the two first sections we assume that the costs of education are financed 
by equity or by standard loans, where the repayments are independent of 
the lender’s status in the labour market. In the last section we change this 
assumption, and introduce debt contracts where repayment only takes place
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when the worker is employed. This means that the repayments are included 
in the match surplus, and reflected in the wage.
We show that if education is financed with this sort of loan, the hold-up 
problem is resolved and social efficiency restored. Since the repayments axe 
included in the match surplus, the firms in effect pay a share of the costs equal 
to the share it receives from the returns. A similar result holds for training. 
Joint surplus is now maximized when the worker finance the investments, 
and the level is socially optimal even in the presence of turnover. Hence 
Becker’s (1975) results are restored.
With this in mind it is interesting to note that repayments of student 
loans in many countries are contingent on employment (f.i. in Great Britain 
and in Scandinavia).
4.2 The M odel
In this section we present the basic model. Workers are unemployed and 
searching for a job, or employed and working (and eventually searching for a 
new job). All workers are identical and face an exogenous probability rate s of 
exiting the market. Firms are homogeneous, and either vacant and searching 
for a worker at a cost c > 0 or occupied (by one worker) and producing 
a stream of H  units of output. Both firms and workers are risk neutral, 
and have identical discount factors r. In addition , jobs are destroyed at an 
exogenous and time independent rate t (In most of the paper, t =  0).
To determine the transition rates to employment, we introduce the stan­
dard matching function x(u,u), which maps stocks of unemployed (u) and 
vacancies (u) into a flow of matches. We follow standard assumptions, and let 
x be increasing, concave and homogeneous of degree one in the two dependent 
variables. Let 0 denote the labour market tightness v/u. We can then write 
the transition rates for unemployed and vacancies as p =  x(tt, v)/u =  x(l, 9)
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and q =  x(u ,v)/v  =  z ( l / 0 , 1) respectively, the former increasing and the 
latter decreasing in 6 . We also assume that p(0) approaches infinity when 9 
goes to infinity and zero when 0 goes to zero, while the opposite holds for 
q(9).
We want to derive the wage for a worker with productivity H. Let p denote 
the transition rate from unemployment to employment. Furthermore, let 
E  and U denote the expected discounted income for an employed and an 
unemployed worker respectively. The corresponding asset value equations 
are then given by
(r +  s)U = z + p ( E - U )  (4.1)
(r +  s)E = w — t(E — U) (4.2)
The equations, which can be derived from the Bellman equation, determine 
the expected discounted income (asset value) when unemployed and em­
ployed respectively, by comparing the actual return to the return of assets 
with a value equal to the discounted income. The return on the assets (com­
pensated for risks) are given by the left hand sides of the equations. The 
right-hand sides give the actual returns. For an unemployed worker, the re­
turn consists of the income when unemployed z and the expected capital gain 
associated with finding a job. For an employed worker, the return consists 
of the wage, and the capital loss associated with job destruction2.
The expected income V  for a vacant and J  for a filled job axe calculated
in the same way, leading to the asset value equations
2 Below we are only interested in the difference between E  and U . Therefore the ex­
pected income when exiting the market is irrelevant, and we set it equal to 0. Furthermore, 
the relevant unemployment income is the income (or value of spare time) that is lost when 
becoming employed.
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rV  =  - c  + q { J - V )  
r j  =  H  — w — (s +  t)J
(4.3)
(4.4)
where H  denotes production per unit of time. The equations can be 
interpreted in a similar way as we interpreted E  and U above. Adding the 
asset equations for J  and E  now gives
T H + tUJ  + E  = r +  s + t
We follow standard assumptions in the literature, and let the expected income 
when a trading partner is not present be the agents’ threat points in the 
bargaining game. Thus the workers’ and the firms’ threat points are given 
by U and V  respectively. The match surplus S  is then E + J —U — V. Denote 
by /? the worker’s share of the surplus. Then E  — U = j3(J + E  — U — V), or 
when substituting in for E  +  J:
E  — U = _  /3V  (4.5)
r -f s +  t
which inserted into the asset value equation for U gives
U -
r +  s +  pf}( 1 -  t)
where H  =  H /(r  +  s + t) and t =  t /(r  +  s + 1). When z =  V  =  0 this gives
U = kH  (4.7)
with k =  /3p/(r +  s + Pp( 1 — t)-
The worker’s productivity H  depends on his investments in education or
training. If we denote by k the amount (or the value of the effort) invested, we
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write his productivity as H(k). We assume that H  is increasing and concave, 
with # (0 ) = 0? ^(O ) =  °°> H'(oo) = 0. Investments in human capital are 
assumed to happen instantaneously, or the time spells are independent of k3.
4.3 Education
In this section we assume that the investments are undertaken and financed 
by the workers before they enter the labour market. We axe employing a tra­
ditional matching framework, where the number of contacts between workers 
and firms only depends on the labour market tightness. Furthermore, since 
applicants arrive to a vacancy according to a Poisson process, two workers 
never show up at the same time. This implies that the arrival rate to em­
ployment for an unemployed worker is independent of his education, as long 
as his productivity is above the reservation productivity of firms.
We assume that workers finance the investments by equity, or alterna­
tively by a contract neutral with respect to the outcome of bargaining with a 
future employer. This holds for all debt contracts where the annual payments 
are independent of income and employment status. The workers’ objective 
is then to maximize U(H) — k , where H  = H(k)i where U(H) is given by 
(4.6). To simplify some of the expressions we assume that t =  0. The first 
order condition for the workers is then given by
H \k )  =  (r +  s ) k  (4.8)
where, as before, k = p/3/(r + s + p/3). This gives us our first result:
Lemma 5 For a given value ofp, the unique equilibrium value of k is given 
by (4 -8)
3This is the case if k represents effort at school.
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Proof. First note that since H  is concave and H'(0) =  oo,H'(oo) =  0, we 
know that (4.8) has one unique solution k*. We only have left to show that 
U(k*) — k* > 0 .  Suppose not, i.e. that V  was sufficiently high to make 
U(k*) < k*. Then no workers would take any education, in which case the 
equilibrium value of V  is zero, a contradiction.
□
Since k increases with p, so does the optimal investment level k*. The 
reason for this is twofold. Firstly, higher p means that a worker gets a job 
and thus receives the return from the investments more quickly. Secondly, 
increased p means that the share k of the return allocated to the worker 
increases as well. When p goes to infinity, equation (4.8) converges to (r -f 
s)H ' =  1 , the competitive solution.
Note that, for a given p, neither the asset value V  of the firm, nor the 
unemployment benefit 2 , influence the choice of k. Higher investments in 
human capital only influence the wage, not the unemployment spell, so 2  
and V  have no impact on the return from education.
Optimality of the market solution
We want to compare the market solution k* derived above with the socially 
optimal level of investment. First we hold the labour market tightness 6 
and hence also the transition rate p constant. Optimal investments are then 
obtained when the workers receive all the benefits from the investments. This 
happens when j3 = I. The optimal k , ks, is thus given by
H'(k‘)/(r + s) = — (4.9) r +  s +  p
By comparing (4.8) and (4.9) we get the following result:
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P roposition  13 Suppose the human capital investments are undertaken prior 
to search, and financed by the workers as described above. Then, for a given 
value of 9, the investments are too low compared to the optimal level
The intuition is clear: The worker bears all the costs of the investments, 
while the firm receives a part of the benefits. The worker does not take the 
positive externality for the firm into account when the decision is made, and 
as a result we get suboptimal investments.
We have already seen that k approaches 1 when p goes to infinity. By 
comparing (4.8) and (4.9) we then find that k* approaches ks. In the limit, 
when the frictions are zero, the market solution and the optimal solution 
coincide.
T he effects of en try
In the rest of this section we assume free entry of vacancies. New vacancies 
enter the market until all profit opportunities are exploited, and the value V  
of a vacancy is zero.
With free entry the welfare analysis above is more complicated. The 
aggregate level of human capital influences the firms’ entry decisions and 
hence the labour market tightness. This can give second best effects.
From Pissarides (1990) and Hosios (1991) we know that the social and 
private benefits from entry coincide in the special case where the workers’ 
bargaining power is equal to rj. Here rj denotes the elasticity of q (the 
arrival rate of workers to firms) with respect to the labour market tightness 
6 . In this case the results above carry over to the model with entry.
However, if (3 is different from 77, so that the social value of entry deviates 
from the private value, ks given by (4.9) is no longer optimal. Suppose (3 < rj. 
Then the firms’ private gains from entry outweigh the social benefit, and we 
get overoptimal entry. Suppose initially that k =  ks. A small reduction in
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k s only leads to a second-order effect on production less investment costs for 
a given value of 0. However, this has first order effects for firms’ profit, since 
they only receive the benefits. We thus get first order (negative) effect on 
entry as well, and since entry is superoptimal initially this gives a first order 
positive effect on social welfare.
Note, however, that even when the effect on entry is taken into account, 
the market solution k* is suboptimal. A marginal increase in k has only 
a second order effect on workers’ income (for given p), while it has a first 
order effect on firms’ profit and on entry, and hence on p. This again has a 
positive first order effect on workers expected income. Hence an increase in k 
increases the expected income for unemployed and employed workers and for 
filled jobs, while the expected income for vacancies remain constant (equal 
to zero). It follows that k* is suboptimal.
M ultiple equilibria
When entry is included, the positive externalities from workers’ education on 
firms profit give rise to multiplier effects and possibly multiple equilibria. The 
relationship between positive externalities and multiplier effects and multiple 
equilibria in macromodels is analyzed in Cooper and John (1988).
To see why we have multiplier effects, consider a small shift in the marginal 
cost of education, for instance due to a subsidy. This leads to an increase 
in H. It becomes more profitable for firms to enter the market, and 6 and 
hence also p increase. This again leads to a new increase in H  and then in 6 
etc. If the model exhibits multiple equilibria, the process may not converge: 
an infinitesimal shift in k may change the equilibrium substantially.
To be more specific, note from (4.8) that we can write k* =  # /-1((r +  s)/c), 
and hence H * =  H(k*) =  f f ( # /_1(/c(r + s)). Since k = p/3/(r +  s +  p(3) we
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can write k = k(0), and thus H = H{0). By taking derivatives of k in (4.8) 
with respect to 0 gives us that
H'{6) = - ( r  +  a ) f fIH "  * p'(0 )( 1 -  > 0
Recall that J  =  (1 — f3)(H/(r +  s) — U(H)). In equilibrium all workers are 
equally productive, and the Nash sharing rule thus gives that E — U = (J  — 
V){3/(1— /?). Since V = 0 implies J  =  c/q, we get (r + s)U = z + 0c/3/(l — (3) 
when utilizing that p{6) = 6q(0). Inserted into the equation for J  gives
[i-fltw-' -y o .., (4 ,10)
The equation determines the values of 0 which make firms indifferent between 
entering or not, i.e. which imply V  =  0. The first term is increasing in 
0 , reflecting that higher labour market tightness leads to more productive 
workers, which ceteris paribus is good for the firms. The second term is 
decreasing in 0 (increasing in absolute value), and reflects both higher search 
costs and a better bargaining position for the worker.
Since H(0) =  0, we trivially get multiple equilibria. If H  =  0 no firms 
enter the market, and 0 = 0. When 0 = 0 we know that p(0) = 0, and 
from (4.8) we know that this implies k = H(k) = 0. Since H(k) — k > 0 for 
some values of k there also exists at least one equilibrium where k* > 0 , and 
we have multiple equilibria. Since we have not imposed any restrictions on 
neither the second derivatives of the transition rates nor the third derivative 
of H , non-trivial multiple equilibria may occur as well.
The intuition why we may have multiple non-trivial equilibria is similar to 
the intuition behind the multiplier effects. If 0 is high, the expected return 
from education is high, and the workers invest much in human capital and
86
are productive. This makes it profitable for the firms to enter the market, 
since high profit when matched makes costly search worthwhile. When 0 is 
low , the workers’ productivities are low as well, and more vacancies do not 
enter even though search costs are low.
Since the multiple equilibria result is driven by a positive externality, the 
equilibria can be pareto-ranked, with high-activity equilibria dominating low- 
activity equilibria. In the former, both employed and unemployed workers, 
and also occupied jobs are better off in expected terms than in the latter, 
while the expected incomes for vacancies are unaltered.
4.4 Training
Now we assume that the investments in human capital take place when work­
ers and firms are matched. We call this sort of investment training. We still 
assume that the human capital is completely general, the increase in produc­
tivity due to training is the same in all firms of the same type.
Since workers and firms bargain efficiently over the joint expected income, 
and have access to perfect capital markets, they choose the level of training 
that maximizes joint expected income. The costs are included in the match 
surplus, which is shared according to the Nash bargaining rule.
Since the Nash solution implies that the joint surplus is maximized, the 
amount of training chosen is optimal if and only if only the training decision 
has no external effects. However, if there is turnover in the market, exter­
nalities are typically present. A third party, typically a future new employer, 
also gains from training. Since his profit is not included in the match sur­
plus the level of training in equilibrium is too low compared to the socially 
optimal level.
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4.4.1 T he m odel w ith  on-the-job search
In this section we focus on the impact of turnover due to on-the-job search 
on the level of training. We assume that firms’ productivity differ, and since 
wages are determined by bargaining, workers in high productivity firms axe 
better paid than workers in low productivity firms. Hence the latter have 
incentives to do on-the-job search. When the search is successful, the worker 
changes job, and the old employer loses his part of the match surplus.
The search framework we employ is similar to the framework in Mort- 
ensen and Pissarides (1994) and in Pissarides (1994). We assume that all 
new vacancies have the same productivity indicator yh. There is a constant 
probability y. that a filled job is hit by a negative productivity shock. When 
this happens, the productivity indicator falls to yl. The output for an occu­
pied job is equal to yH. Hence we assume that the marginal impact from 
training on output is proportional to the productivity indicator (hereafter 
productivity).
In contrast with Mortensen and Pissarides, we assume that the workers’ 
search activity is unobservable to the firm. Contracts can therefore not be 
contingent upon the workers search behaviour. When on-the-job search costs 
are zero, a worker can credibly promise not to search only when his expected 
income is as high as in the high-productivity firms.
After a negative shock, a firm is willing to pay the worker sufficiently to 
prevent him from searching if the cost of doing so is less than the expected 
loss from on-the-job search. The worker always accepts such an offer, since 
it gives him more.
Alternatively, the firm and the worker can start bargaining over the ex­
pected income in the usual way. The expected income must then incorporate 
the effects of the worker’s on-the-job search.
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Let J(y) and E(y) denote the asset value of an occupied job and an em­
ployed worker respectively, as a function of the productivity indicator. De­
fine M(y) — J(y) +  E(y) to be the joint expected income. To simplify the 
analysis, we assume that a vacant job only can advertise once (for instance 
due to reputation effects), so that the firms’ threat points in the bargaining 
game with the worker is always zero, hence the asset value of a vacancy is 
zero. We also assume that t is zero. Let s denote the workers’ exit rate as 
before, and A the arrival rate of jobs when doing on the job search. If the 
worker do search, the joint expected incomes are determined by the asset 
value equations
(r +  s +  7  )M h =  yhH  +  7  M l
(r -j- s)M l = ylH  + \ ( E h - M l) (4.11)
where E h = E(yh) etc. When using that V  = 0, and for the moment 
assuming that z =  0 (no unemployment benefits), we show in the appendix 
that E  =  PM , where P =  ft +  (1 — P)pP/(r +  s 4 - p/3). Note that ft is
the fraction of the joint income received by the worker. When we insert
E h =  fiMh into (4.11), we get two equations and two unknown variables M h 
and M l. Solving them gives:
where4
M h = yhH  
M l =  ylH
„h _  yh +  i y l!(r +  s + A)
V r +  s +  7(1 —
, =  !/ +  W  (412)
y r - f s  +  A v '
4To see this, note that M l =  (yl +  A@Mh)/ (r  + s +  A). Hence (r +  s +  7(1  — /?A/(r +  
s +  A) ) M h =  M l} and the expression follows.
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If the worker is not doing on-the-job search the asset value equations for the 
joint expected income are
(:r + s)M h = Hyh — ~/(Mh — M l)
(:r + s)M l = Hyl (4.13)
Hence we can write M h -  Hy, where
• yk +  i y lH r  +  s )y  =  ---------------------------------------------
T +  S +  7
A comparison of (4.11) and (4.13) immediately gives that on-the-job search 
increases the joint expected income if and only if E h > M l. Hence the 
surplus increases if the expected income for a worker in a high-productive 
firm is higher than the joint expected income in the low-productivity firm. 
The next lemma expresses this in terms of the exogenous variables in the 
model, the proof is given in the appendix.
Lem m a 6  On-the-job search increases the joint surplus if and only if yl is 
lower than y*} the latter given by
.h
y ' =  P   ------------------------------------- (4.14)
where 7 ' =  7 / ( r  +  s)
As we have discussed already, a firm may want to increase the wage after a 
shock to prevent the worker from doing on-the-job search. If yl is close to 
yh, the costs of increasing the wage is low, and losses caused by on-the-job 
search are great, hence we would expect the firms to go for this option. On 
the other hand, if yl is close to y*, the opposite holds, and we would expect 
the firm to ignore the worker’s search behaviour. The intuition is confirmed 
in the next lemma:
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L em m a 7 There exists a value y ', y* < y' < yh such that firms choose the 
bargaining solution if and only if yl < y’, where y' is given by 
y h — y l 1 - P  A(r +  s +  7 )
y l - y *  P  (r +  s)(r + s +  A) 
where y* is given by (4.14).
(4.15)
The lemma states that if the productivity after a shock is relatively close to 
the productivity before the shock, the firm offers the same wage after the 
shock as before, to prevent the worker from doing on-the-job search. Hence 
the worker gets more than his share after a shock has occurred. This will 
be taken into account in the wage bargaining before the shock. Hence the 
worker’s wage is reduced before the shock to compensate the firm for the 
losses after the shock5.
If the productivity of the firm after the shock is below y', the wages 
are reduced after the shock, and the worker starts on-the-job search. If 
y* < y < y', on the job search reduces the joint expected income, and we 
are in a prisoners dilemma situation. As already discussed above, the worker 
cannot commit not to search. Since the wage is continuously renegotiated, 
the firm cannot commit to a contract giving the worker a high wage after 
a shock either. These inabilities to commit creates inefficiencies in terms of 
reduced joint surplus.
4.4.2 Training and turnover
The level of training is set to maximize M h — k. Since the critical values 
y' and y* are independent of H , the optimal value for k is characterized by
5The presence of shocks thus reduces the wage in high-productivity firms, and increases 
the wage in low-productivity firms. The model thus predicts that the wages are indepen­
dent of the firms’ productivity on some intervals. Note the similarity with implicit contract 
models of the labour market, see f.i. Hart (1983).
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H'{k) =  1 /y »  if y1 < y1 and H'(k) =  l / y  for yl > yf. Hence we can show the 
following proposition:
P roposition  14 Given that on-the-job search is unobservable, the following 
holds (for a given value of 6):
1. I f y l € [ y \ y h], H  is independent of X
2. I f  yl E [y*,y ' )} H is decreasing in X
3. I f  yl < y*, H  is increasing in X
The proof follows directly from the discussion in the last subsection together 
with the fact that the marginal return on investments in human capital is 
proportional to M h.
Note that if on-the-job search increases joint expected income, both the 
worker and the firm are better off in terms of expected income. The Nash 
bargaining solution implies that the expected gain from on-the-job search 
is included as part of the pay-off for the worker. In other words, more on- 
the-job search means a lower wage. If the expected income increases with 
on-the-job search, this means that the gain for the firm due to the lower wage 
is higher in expected terms than the loss if the worker quits6.
We know that /? is increasing in p, and converges to 1 when p goes to infinity. 
By inspecting (4.14) and the definition of y we get the following result:
Lem m a 8  The level of human capital investments are increasing in p. Fur­
thermore, for all yh, yl such that yh > yl, there exists a p such that on-the-job 
search increases M  for all p >  p
6In an earlier version of the paper, the wages where explicitly calculated. Since the 
wages are not directly relevant for the solution of the model the calculations are now 
omitted
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The intuition for the proposition is that the higher is p, the higher is the frac­
tion of M  that goes to the worker, and therefore the higher is E h compared to 
M l. Note also that high p in steady state is equivalent to low unemployment. 
The lemma thus states that lower unemployment means more training.
We want to find the share of the investment costs carried by the worker. 
We know that his expected income when matched, investment costs included, 
is given by 0(M h* — k*), where k* is the optimal k and M h* the correspond­
ing value of M h. His expected income after the investments is 0 M h*. By 
comparing the two we get the following lemma:
Lem m a 9 The worker’s share of the investment costs is 0 < 1 . The share 
is increasing in p, and converges to 1 when p goes to infinity
The last proposition states that the level of on-the-job search is too low
compared to the socially optimal level.
P roposition  15 For a given value of 0, and given that the workers do on- 
the-job search, the market solution described above gives a level of training 
that is too low compared to the socially optimal level.
Proof: The optimal level maximizes M h for 0 =  1 , which also implies 0 = 1.
Since M h and thereby k increases in 0, the result follows.
□
As with education, free entry may lead to multiple equilibria in the model. 
If yl < y* we know that on-the-job search increases the incentives to in­
vest in human capital. This increases firms’ incentives to open vacancies, 
which increases the incentives to do training etc. Note also that on-the-job 
search may increase unemployment if the search for employed and unem­
ployed workers goes through different channels. If y* < y' < y', increased
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turnover reduces the value of finding a worker, fewer firms enter the market, 
and hence unemployment rises.
4.5 Optim al D ebt Contracts
In the analysis above we have assumed that the costs of education were 
financed in a neutral way, by equity or a standard loan contract. In this 
section we alter this assumption, and assume that all investments are financed 
by loans where repayment is contingent on the status in the labour market7. 
More specifically, we assume that the worker is responsible for all loans, 
and that loans axe infinitely long-lived, with constant repayments when the 
worker is employed and no repayments when he is unemployed8.
4.5.1 Education
First we study the model from chapter 3, where the worker makes investments 
prior to search. In order to highlight the generality of the results, we allow 
for job-separations due to productivity shocks (t > 0 ).
Let a denote repayments per unit of time when employed for a one unit 
loan. Since the worker only repays the loan when employed, it reduces the 
match surplus. The effects of an increase in a on match surplus is equal to 
the same reduction in productivity H. The workers’ objective function can 
thus be written as (from equation (4.6)):
.  (4.16)
r  +  s -j- p/3( 1 — t
7Strictly speaking it is sufficient that the investments are financed this way on the 
margin.
8We have assumed that the unemployed workers’ search intensities are exogenous and 
homogenous firms, and thereby ruled out moral hazard problems that otherwise can arise
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where still H  =  H /( r  +  s -f t) and t = t/(r  + s + t). The first order condition 
for optimal human capital investments is thus
H'(k)/(r + s) = l /a  (4-17)
Now we turn to the determination of a. We assume that the capital market 
is perfect, and the lenders risk neutral. The expected discounted value of the 
repayment must then be equal to the amount lent. Let A  be the asset value 
of a loan when the worker is employed. A  and a are then determined by the 
asset value equations
r -f s = p(A — 1)
(r +  <s)A =  a — t(A — 1)
Solving for a gives
a =  r  +  J +  p(1- * } (4.18)
P
We are now able to show the following result
P roposition  16 With the loan contract described above, and for a given 6 , 
the investments in education are socially optimal.
Proof: The optimal value of k maximizes U — k when /3 =  1. From (4.6) we 
therefore find that the first order condition for optimality is given by
tfW/(r + 5) = L±±±£(!zi)
P
which is the same as (4.17). Since the solution is unique, the result follows
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4.5.2 Training
Now we return to investments made after the match has occurred. We still 
assume that the loan follows the worker. We then has that9 a =  r  +  s. The 
joint expected income can now be written as
M k _  H(k)yh - ( r  + s)k + i M ‘ 
r +  s + 7  
M , =  H(k)y< — a + \ E h 
r +  s +  A
We can now show the following proposition:
P roposition  17 Suppose the worker searches on the job after a negative 
shock. Then the loan contract specified above leads to a socially optimal level 
of training.
Proof: M h is maximized when M h\ k ) = 0. Since E h =  /3Mh, we know that 
this is equivalent to E h> being zero. Hence
M ‘\ k )  = y‘H'{k) ~  {\ + S) v ' r + s + A
Taking the derivative of M h> and setting it equal to zero thus gives
0 =  yhH'(k) + 7  y'g '(fe) ~  (r +  
v ;  ' r + s + A
or
imk)= yh+™‘ttr + s + A)
r + s +  7 (r +  s)/(r  +  s +  A)
9When a worker is matched, he does not become unemployed later. However, it is cru­
cial that the contract specifies zero repayments during unemployment, since this influences 
the worker’s outside option in the bargaining game.
96
The right-hand side of the expression is equal to yh when 0 = 1. Since the 
socially optimal value of k is given by l /H '(k) = yh for 0 =  1, this completes 
the proof
□
Since maximizing E h and M h leads to the same value of k, the training 
decision can be decentralized to the worker. If the worker decides k , and 
finances the investments by a loan of the type described above, optimality is 
obtained, and the division of the surplus corresponds to the Nash-solution. 
This is similar to Becker’s results stating that optimality is achieved when 
the worker pays for all the training.
4.5.3 Discussion
To get intuition why we get optimality, note that when the investments are 
financed by equity, and the costs are sunk, the usual hold-up problems known 
from the literature arise. Since the costs do not influence the investor’s ex 
ante gains from trade, they do not influence the bargaining outcome either.
If the costs are financed by a loan, this may be looked upon as a delay 
in the payment of the investments. The investor may then end up paying 
for the costs after he is matched (or has found a new partner after successful 
on-the-job search). This does not help, however, if the repayments are inde­
pendent of whether the agents are matched. What matters for the outcome 
of the bargaining game is the difference in income when matched and un­
matched, a neutral loan reduces expected income both when employed and 
when unemployed, and leaves the difference unchanged.
This is not the case when the repayments axe contingent on employment. 
The repayment is then a part of the match surplus. Hence the bargaining 
solution implies that the repayments are shared. The costs of the investments 
are split between the worker and the firm. The firm thus pays the same
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share of the costs as he receives of the benefits. The externalities from the 
investments are internalized, and optimality achieved.
Formally, this is equivalent to the situation where the human capital is 
rented, and where the rental price (in the case of education) also covers the 
costs that arise because the capital is idle before the worker is matched.
4.6 Conclusion
We have studied the implications for education and training of frictions in the 
labour maxket. We have seen that with normal loan contracts, the presence 
of frictions creates hold-up problems and suboptimal investments. Education 
and training create positive externalities which may lead to multiple equilib­
ria. In the case of training, a lower unemployment rate increases the level 
of investments. If we allow for loan contracts where repayments are contin­
gent on the worker’s status in the labour market, the hold-up problems are 
resolved, and the level of investments becomes socially optimal.
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A ppendix
P ro o f of th e  claim  th a t  E = 0M  When V = z = 0 E h is given by
E h =  0{M h - U )  + U (4.19)
Thus
(r +  s)U = p(Eh - U ) =  p0(M k -  U) 
since only high-productivity firms open vacancies. Hence
U =  ^ — s M hr + s + pp
Which gives E h =  (/? +  (1 — (3)pf3/(r +  s +  pfi))Mh =  p M h
e h =  m h
where $  =  +  (1  — P) r+£.p0 < 1 is the share of the expected income the
worker receives .
P ro o f of Lem m a 6  First insert E h = M l into (4.11) to obtain M l = 
yl/(r  +  s) and
M k _ y k +  i y ' H r  + « )
r + s +  7
We know that E{y*) =  p M h =  M l, which then gives
f  + rrnr + .) m
r -f s +  7
Rearranging gives
r +  s +  7  (r +  s)(r +  s +  7 ) 
Hence E h > M l if and only if
yl < 0 -------------—  (4.21)
1 +  (1 — 0 )l'
□
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P ro o f of lem m a 7 For a given set of parameters, let y* denote the value 
of yl which makes the expected income independent of whether the worker 
searches. Then we know that on-the job search reduces the joint expected 
income if and only if yl > y*. Denote by M ln the joint income when the 
worker does not search and M ls the joint income when he does. Then
M ,n -  M ,s = XH-.  i t(r +  s)(r +  s +  A)
To prevent the worker from searching, the firm must offer him an expected 
income E h. Let M ln and E ln denote joint expected income and the worker’s 
expected income after a shock if the worker does not search. Then
M h -  M in =  H yK~-yl 
r + 5 +  7
The firm chooses to offer the worker E h if this increases his profit, or if 
P{Mh -  M l) = E h -  E ls < (1 -  j3)Mln -  M l9, or if
y h - y ‘ 1 -  P A(r +  s  +  7 ) . .
yl - y *  P {r +  S)(r +  s + A
and the lemma follows.
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C hapter 5 
E ducation  and C om petition  
for Jobs
5.1 Introduction
A well-known result in the literature is that hold-up problems can distort 
the incentives to invest, and lead to underinvestment. Hold-up problems 
arise when the agents that form a relationship and bargain over the output 
undertake relationship-specific investments before the bargaining takes place. 
Since sunk investment costs do not influence the game, the investors must 
bear all the costs, while they only receive a fraction of the return from the 
investments. As a result, we get underinvestment (see Grout(1984) for an 
example from the labour market).
In the last section we studied investment in general human capital when 
the labour market contains frictions. The frictions are captured by the match­
ing function, as in Mortensen(1986) and Pissarides (1990), and wages are 
determined by Nash bargaining. Since the costs of education are sunk before 
wage bargaining takes place hold-up problems arise, and we get underinvest­
ment in education.
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What analyses of hold-up problems typically fail to consider is that ex ante in­
vestments may influence the likelihood of finding a trading partner. Because 
the investments benefit a trading partner, they can increase the probability 
of finding one. In Grout this is not an issue, a trading partner is always at 
hand. In our analysis in Chapter 2, the costs of finding a trading partner 
(a job) play an important role. However, there we assume that the transi­
tion rate to employment is independent of a worker’s productivity. Hence, 
investment in human capital does not speed up the process of finding a job.
In almost all of the literature on matching, the arrival of trading partners 
are modelled as Poisson processes. Thus a firm never gets more than one 
applicant at any one time, and a worker never experiences face to face com­
petition with another worker for the same job. Any match that is mutually 
beneficial is therefore sustained.
As pointed out in Blanchard and Diamond(1994), this may not be an ac­
curate description of the labour market, where competition between workers 
for the same job seems to be the norm. Firms usually get more than one 
applicant per vacancy, and the difficult task for unemployed workers is not 
to find jobs to apply for, but to be accepted for the jobs they are applying 
for.
Blanchard and Diamond derive a matching technology that allows for more 
than one applicant per vacancy. However, their technology implies, among 
other things, that the workers transition rates to employment are not time 
invariant. In this paper, we first derive a new matching technology. Like 
Blanchard and Diamond, we start out with the urn-ball process. By mod­
elling the frictions differently we obtain constant transition rates. Further­
more, the transition rate to employment in our model depends explicitly on 
the productivity of the worker in question. Finally, our framework makes it
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possible to parameterize the degree of competition for jobs.
Thus, in our model, a firm that announces a vacancy can get more than 
one applicant. If it does, it chooses one of them and starts bargaining with 
him over the wage. As in most of the literature, we assume that all wage 
contracts must be renegotiation proof. That is, workers cannot commit to 
accept a lower wage in order to get the job. The absence of binding contracts 
thus prevents Bertrand competition among the applicants.
Workers invest in general human capital (education) before they enter the 
labour market. We show that if the competition for jobs is not too severe (i.e. 
not too many applicants per job on average), firms strictly prefer workers 
with high education to workers with low education. Having a marginally 
higher education than the other applicants then gives a discrete increase 
in income. We show that as a result, workers diversify and choose various 
levels of education. Therefore, we obtain a non-degenerate, continuous and 
connected distribution of investment in education.
Ex ante identical workers thus become heterogeneous ex post, after the hu­
man capital investments are made. The logic (though not the model) resem­
blance that in Burdet and Mortensen (1989) (who obtain a non-degenerate 
distribution of wages) and in Butter (1977) (who obtains a non-degenerate 
distribution of prices).
If the competition for a given job is sufficiently fierce, firms do not always 
choose the most productive applicant. If this where the case, the expected 
the wage would increase faster than the productivity, due to a strong effect 
of productivity on the expected income for an unemployed (which influence 
the Nash solution). Hence, firms select randomly among applicants with 
education on certain intervals. In this case, we find that the distribution 
of educations contains an atom. If the competition for jobs is sufficiently 
fierce, the atom has mass one. The wages then fully reflect any increase in 
productivity, and the hold-up problem described above is eliminated.
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Competition among applicants for the same job has interesting welfare im­
plications. With competition for jobs, we have introduced a new, negative 
externality from education, since it has a negative impact on other workers’ 
transition rates to employment. We also have a positive externality from 
education on firms’ profit (the source of hold-up problems). However, which 
of the two externalities is stronger is, in general, ambiguous.
Note, however, that firms around the atom are indifferent about whom to 
hire. The positive externality from education on firms profit is internalized 
at this point, and the hold-up problem is eliminated. Only the negative 
externality prevails, and we have over-optimal investment levels. Workers at 
the atom have too much education compared to the socially optimal level1.
5.2 T he M atching Function
Butters (1977) and Hall (1979) are the first to use the urn-ball process to 
derive a specific matching function. Blanchard and Diamond (1994) show 
how the um-ball matching process can be interpreted in a continuous time 
setting. Their basic assumption is that vacancies are pending a on a fixed 
amount of time, but are evenly staggered. The pending time is the only 
source of frictions in the model.
We start out with a simple random matching model set in discrete time. 
We partition each unit of time into n periods. In each period, a fraction 
7 /n  of the vacancies advertise for one period only, and a fraction ajn  of 
the workers responds and apply for one of them at random. The continuous 
time version of the model is obtained at the limit, when n goes to infinity.
1 Similar results are obtained in signalling games, where the firms have incomplete 
information about worker productivity (see Spence (1974), Hart and Holmstrom (1987)). 
These models are very different from the present one.
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The parameters a and 7  capture the frictions in the market, a high value 
of a relative to 7  implies that the competition for each job is severe, with 
many applicant per job. If a is low relative to 7 , the model is similar to the 
standard matching framework with at most one applicant per job.
Let the unemployed workers’ productivity be continuously distributed 
and without atoms. We want to calculate the probability that a worker 
who is more productive than a fraction 1r of the unemployed workers gets 
a job when applying, given that firms always choose the applicant with the 
highest productivity. Let u denote the number of unemployed workers, and 
v the number of vacant jobs. In each period, au/n workers apply at random 
for one of the 7 v/n  advertised jobs. Let A =  aufav. Thus A gives the relative 
number of applicants to vacancies. The number of applicants for each job is 
Poisson distributed with parameter A.
First we want to calculate the probability Pr(x ) that an applicant applies 
for a job which receives a total of x applicants. The number of such workers 
is x  times the number of firms that have x applicants. Pr(x) is thus given 
by:
PW ,.’1 -  ..A y AW ”  _P r\x ) — x . . — . ..x\ au/n (x — lj!
With x — 1 other applicants, the probability that the worker in question gets
the job is 7rx_1. The probability of getting a job is thus:
"  AI - 1 e - A 5r*- 1
il= E ^x=l ' '
(A7r)xe~Ax
Xl x=0
Note that Pr(7r) is independent of n. We know that a fraction a/n  of the 
workers applies for a job each period. The probability that a worker apply in a
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small interval At  is thus approximately a/n A t/n  = a At. In the continuous 
time version of the model obtained when n —> oo, the transition rate to 
employment is therefore given by
p ( tt; A, a) = ae~^~^x (5.2)
The derivation of (5.2) is based on one particular matching process, the urn- 
ball process. Still, we think that the resulting matching function possess 
some important properties that we would expect to hold more generally. We 
list them below:
1. p(l; A) is independent of A. This captures the fact that the best worker 
is preferred to all other workers. Hence he does not face any congestion 
effects from other workers.
2. p ( tt) is convex in ir. This makes sense, since the probability of having 
the highest productivity among m  workers is 7rm_1. The derivative 
with respect to 7r is (m — l)7rm-2, which is independent of 7r for m  =  1, 
constant for m  =  2, and increasing in 7T for m > 2.
3. The sign of the cross derivative p^x is ambiguous, but positive for values 
of 7r close to 1. The intuition is again rooted in the fact that the 
probability of getting a job when there are m  competitors is 7r”1-1. 
The derivative with respect to 7r is (m — l)7rm-2, which is increasing in 
m for high values of 7r. This rationalizes the claim, since high values of 
m  are associated with high values of A.
4. p{7r) is finite for 7r =  1. There are ”real” frictions in the model, since 
producing and processing applications are time consuming.
Before we start presenting the model, we want to derive the exit rates for
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workers with identical productivities. If a firm gets many applicants, we 
assume that it chooses one at random. Arguing as above, we find that the 
number of vacancies per applicant is Poisson distributed with parameter A. 
The probability of getting at least one applicant is then one minus the proba­
bility of getting zero applicants. Multiplying by the number of vacancies and 
dividing by the number of workers, then gives the probability that a worker 
find employment. The transition rate to employment is therefore
1 — e“Apa(a ,\)  = a— -—  (5.3)
In (5.2) and (5.3), both parameters A and a influence the transition rate to 
employment. A high value of A means there are many applicants per job. 
The parameter a captures other frictions in the market, low a means large 
frictions.
We want to index the degree of competition for a given level of friction. 
To this end, we define a =  a(A) by the equation
= * (5-4)
where c is a constant Thus (A,a(A)), A > 0 shows the combinations of 
parameters which keep the number of matches constant2. It follows that 
<z'(A) =  (c — ae“A)/( 1 — e-A) > 0 and that liinx_>oo a(A) =  oo. A high value 
of A (and a correspondingly high value of a) means that the competition for
jobs is severe while other frictions are small and vice versa. In the the rest
of the article, we will refer to an increase in A with a =  a(A) for a (balanced) 
increase in the competition for jobs. For later reference we also state and 
prove the following lemma:
Lemma 10 Let p(7r;A,a) be given by (5.2). Then p(0,A,a(A)) is strictly 
decreasing in and converges to zero when A goes to infinity. Furthermore,
2 Remember that the total number of matches is independent of the selection strategies 
used by the firms.
107
p(l,a ) = a is strictly increasing in X and goes to infinity when X does. Fi­
nally, p ( tt, A, A(tt)) converges to p a = c (given by equation (5.4) for all 7r 
when X goes to zero.
Proof. We know that
p(0,A,a(A)) Ae~A 
P«(A,o(A)) 1 — e~x
Obviously, the right-hand side goes to zero when A goes to infinity. Since pa is
constant, this implies that p(0) converges to zero when A goes to infinity. To
prove that p(0) is decreasing in A, note that the derivative of the right-hand
side of (5.5) is
e“A(l — A — e"A)
(1 -  e~A)2
which is strictly negative for A > 0. Again, since pa is constant, the claim 
follows.
Since p(l) =  a, p(l) goes to infinity when A does. Finally, note that
Ppr, A,a(A)) Ae-^1-*)
A (A,«(A)) 1 — e~x (0*>
When A —> 0 we find, using l’Hopital’s rule, that the right-hand side converges
to 1.
Thus, a balanced increase in the competition for jobs reduces the transition 
rate for workers with low education. On the other hand, since p(l) =  a, a 
balanced increase in the competition for jobs increases the transition rate for 
the best educated workers .
5.3 The m odel
Except for the matching function, our model of the labour market is standard, 
and follows along the lines of Mortensen (1986), Pissarides (1985) and (1987),
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among others.
There is a constant number of ex ante homogeneous workers in the econ­
omy. Workers are replaced at a constant exogenous rate s. We normalize 
the number (measure) of workers to 1. Before new workers join the labour 
market, they invest an amount k in education, and obtain a productivity 
jET(Jb), where H ' > 0, H " < 0, H(0) =  0, tf'(0) =  oo and H \ oo) = 0. Then 
they join the unemployment pool and start searching for a job.
The workers are equally productive in all firms. Since the wages are 
determined by bargaining, a worker gets the same wage in all firms, and thus 
accepts all job offers. The match lasts until the worker in question exits the 
market.
For simplicity, we assume that the incomes when unemployed is zero. The 
expected discounted income U for an unemployed and E  for an employed 
worker are then
(r + s)U = p(7r{k))[E -  U]
(r + s)E = w
where, as before, t (k) denotes the distribution of k over searching workers. 
Unless otherwise stated, we assume that p() is a general matching function 
satisfying properties (l)-(4) in the last section.
A constant number of firms are either vacant and searching for a worker, 
or occupied (by one worker ) and producing. The wage w is determined 
by Nash bargaining between workers and firms. Let /? denote the worker’s 
share of the surplus. A firm-worker pair’s joint expected income is given by 
M (H)  =  H / (r +  s). We assume that a vacancy can be advertised only once, 
and therefore its disagreement point in the bargaining game is zero3. The
Alternatively we could have assumed free entry. However, since the effects of education 
on entry is not an issue here paper, we went for the assumption in the text.
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Nash-solution thus implies that E — U = (3(M — U), which inserted into the 
expression for U, gives (after some rearranging):
=  KH{k)/(r + s) (5.7)
where k = p(7r)/?/(r + s +  p(7r)/?). An increase in the transition rate to em­
ployment due to higher education thus increases a worker’s expected income 
both through shorter unemployment spells and through higher productivity, 
and both are reinforced due to higher outside option (expected income when 
unemployed) when bargaining with the firm.
5.4 W age D istributions
In this section, we characterize the equilibrium under the assumption that 
firms, if they have more than one applicant, choose the one with the highest 
education. Conditions under which this assumption holds are derived later, 
together with a more formal treatment of the model. All workers choose a 
level of education that solves the problem
max U(H(k),p(7r(k))) — k (5.8)k
We immediately get the following result:
P roposition  18 I f  all firms prefer to employ the most productive worker 
among its applicants, the distribution t (k) of human capital investment is 
without atoms and has connected support.
Proof: Suppose first that the distribution has an atom. Then, by increas­
ing human capital investment marginally, some workers could get a discrete 
increase in p, thus increasing the expected income.
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Then suppose the support is disconnected, so that no worker invests an 
amount on the interval (&i, k2). This implies p(ki) =  p(k2). Since all workers 
are ex ante identical, we must have that U(ki) — ki = U(k2) — k2. Since 
H(k) is strictly concave in k and U linear in H  for a given p, it follows that 
U(k) — k > U(ki) — k\ for all k 6 {ki,k2), which is a contradiction
To characterize ir, again remember that all values of k in the support give 
the same value of U — k. Thus we must have that:
dU_
dk
U(H(k),p{ir(k)) = U0 + k (5.9)
where Uq is a constant. Given Uq, (5.9) together with (5.2) and (5.7) define 
7r(k) uniquely. To determine f/0, note that the infimum k0 of the distribu­
tion characterized by (5.9) solves the problem max* U(H(k), 0) — k. Hence 
j j jH \k )  =  1, and we can write (with H  =  H/(r  +  s)):
k0 = arg max H(k) — k (5.10)
* k v ' r  +  s +  p(0)/? v '
It turns out to be difficult to give interesting characteristics of the distribution 
7r(k). We know, however, that the density 7r\k) is zero at k =  kQ. To see 
this, we take the derivative of (5.9) with respect to k to get:
UHH \k )  + Upp'(*W(k) = 1 (5.11)
Since the first term is equal to 1 at ko, we find that ^(fco) is equal to zero. 
However, as k grows, H'(k) falls, and p() increases. A higher p means in­
creased returns to investment, so 7r'(k)  may be non-monotonic in k.
I l l
When it comes to the support of 7r, we are able to show the following:
Lem m a 11 A balanced increase4 in A reduces k0, raises ki (the supremum 
of the support) and thus increases the support of n .
Proof: A higher A means a lower p(0) and thereby k0, so that the worker at 
the infimum of the support is worse off. Thus the worker at the supremum 
of the support must be worse off as well. Since p(l) =  a(A) increases with A, 
this means that k\ must increase (since U(kf) — k\ is decreasing in &i).
□
The more competition there is for jobs, the more the workers diversify in 
terms of education. This is intuitive, since more competition means that 
there is more to gain by being on the top of the distribution.
When p(tt) is given by (5.2), we axe able to derive (tt(A:)) explicitly. In the 
appendix, we show that 7r(k) is given by
Now we will show that there is an upper bound on how far the upper tail of the 
distribution of education levels may reach. If the level of education becomes 
too high, firms no longer strictly prefer workers with higher education.
We know that firms strictly prefer the best educated worker if H'{k) > 
w'(k), i.e. if productivity increases more quickly than wages. Since wages 
depend on p as well as on if, this is not necessarily the case. The wages can 
be written as
u;(Jb) =  0H(k) +  (1 -  {3)U(k)(r + s)
4Recall that a balanced increase in A is one where a =  a(A) increases such that the 
aggregate number of matches is held constant, see equation (5.4).
Thus, H'(k) > w'(k) if and only if
H \k )  > U\k){r + s)) (5.13)
Let II denote the support 7r defined by (5.11). Then the following holds:
Lemma 12 Firms strictly prefer a worker with education k' to a worker with 
education k", k' > k”, k” 6 II if and only if the supremum of II is below
k*, where k* is the solution to H'(k)/(r  + 5 ) = 1.
Proof: For all k in the support of 7r, we know that U'{k) =  1. Hence we know 
from (5.13) that H \ k ) > w'(k) iff H'(k) > r + s.
D
We have already seen that the support of the distribution increases with 
a balanced increase in A. We would therefore expect that ki is below k* 
if the competition effect is not too strong. This is confirmed by the next 
proposition:
Lemma 13 Let a(A) be defined by (5.4) for an arbitrary constant. Then 
there exists a A =  A such that ki, the support of the distribution defined by 
(5.11), is less than k* for all (A, a(A)), A
Proof: From Lemma 10 we know that
l im p (7 r )  =  c  
a—0 '
for all 7r, where c is a constant. From (5.11), it follows that k \—kQ — U(p(l)) — 
U(p(0)), and hence ki —► k0 when A —> 0. Furthermore, k0 converges to 
arg max* U(c, k) — k , which is strictly smaller than k*, and the proposition 
follows
□
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The proposition just states that if the competition for jobs is not too fierce, 
the entire distribution given by (5.11) is below k*. We know that k\ < k* 
if and only if a worker is worse off investing k* and facing an arrival rate of 
jobs equal to a than he is investing an amount kQ and facing an arrival rate 
of jobs equal to ae~x. Using (5.2) and (5.7), we find that this holds if and 
only if
W )  a - V <  /3H(ka) _ae' A -  ko (5.14)r + s + pa pae A +  r  -f s
5.5 Random izing equilibrium
In this section, we generalize the analysis above, and allow for the possibility
that firms do not necessarily prefer the best educated workers. We will also
give the equilibrium concept, and specifically the firms’ hiring strategies, a
more careful treatment.
A selection rule applied by a firm with a vacant job is a vector specifying
the choice probability for each worker as a function of all the applicants’
education levels and the number of applicants5. In a selection equilibrium,
we require that the selection rules for all firms are optimal, given the other
firms’ selection rules, for all k undertaken in equilibrium. This is the usual
rational expectations requirement. In addition, we require that the selection
rules are optimal for any deviation by subset of workers with measure zero6.
5Since I do not need it for the analysis, I will not go into technicalities. Note, however,
that a selection rule can be defined mathematically in the following way: If a firm gets n
applicants, define the infinite dimensional vector K  as >&n>0,0...), where the first
n elements denote the education level of the applicants. A selection rule is a functional
P{ K)  : R+ > where element m  in P ( K)  is zero if the same element in R  is zero,
and where the sum of elements in P  is less than or equal to 1.
6The refinement resemblance those in Kohlberg and Mertens (1986), Gale (1992),
(1994), and the one we introduced in Chapter 1.
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As we will see, there exists a continuum of selection equilibria. However, the 
distribution of k that can be sustained by a selection equilibrium is unique.
An equilibrium of the model is a distribution ir(k) of investments in education 
with support n  such that:
1. All k e l l  maximize the workers’ expected income given the firms’ 
selection strategies
2. The firms’ selection strategies form a selection equilibrium
Before we go on to characterize the equilibrium of the model, we show the 
following result:
Lem m a 14 Assume that an atom of workers choose an education k '. Then 
in all selection equilibria there exist an open interval I, containing k', such 
that the firms are indifferent between workers with education k' and k" for 
all k e i .
Proof: Let kn > k' be arbitraxily close to k', and suppose the firms strictly 
prefer a worker with education k" to a worker at the atom. By the defini­
tion of selection equilibria this means that all firms choose the worker with 
education k" if selecting between workers with educations k' and k". Thus 
p(k") — p(k') > e > 0 for some fixed e, and lim*//_>*/ H(k") =  H (k '), while 
lim*//_►*' w(k") > w(k') (since U is strictly increasing in p). But then the 
firms prefer workers with education k ', and we have derived a contradic­
tion. An analogous argument shows that the workers at the atom can not 
be preferred either.
□
Therefore, the selection strategies around an atom must be such that all 
firms are indifferent between workers on some interval containing the atom.
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On an interval where firms select randomly, we must have that J'(k) is con­
stant. Hence
J'(k) =  ( l - P ) ( H ' ( k ) - ( r  + s)U'(k)) = 0
V
H'(k) = U'(k)(r + s) (5.15)
In equilibrium, workers choose k to maximize expected income, and at any 
atom, k maximizes U — k subject to (5.15). This leads us to the next lemma:
Lem m a 15 In equilibrium, the only possible location of an atom is at k* 
defined by H'(k*) =  r  +  s.
Proof: The first order condition for the worker’s problem is that U'(k) =  1, 
and hence H f(k) = r +  s.
□
Before we go on to the main result in this section, we also show the following 
lemma, which states that no workers choose an education above k*.
Lem m a 16 There does not exist any selection equilibria which supports ed­
ucations above k*.
Proof: We know from lemma 15 that there axe no atoms above k*. Thus 
if a positive measure of workers invest more than k*, the support of k is 
connected at some intervals. But then we know from Lemma 12 that firms 
select randomly over this interval in all selection equilibria. Hence optimal 
behaviour of the worker implies that U'(k) = H'(k)/(r  +  s) for all k on the 
connected intervals. Since this is satisfied only for k =  k*, we have derived a 
contradiction.
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Suppose now that a single worker invests k' > k*. If there is not an 
atom at k* this can not be optimal, since {/'(&, a) < Hf(k*)/(r +  s) for all 
k > k*. Suppose there is an atom at k*. Then workers strictly prefer k* to 
any k G 7, k ^  &*, so k" can obviously not be on the interval Furthermore, 
U'{k) is less than 1 for all k on the interval between the supremum of I  and 
kp (since p is constant at this interval). Hence k ' cannot maximize U(k) — k.
□
There exists an infinite set of selection equilibria which support this equilib­
rium. Here we define a simple one: Let a fraction r(k) of the firms draw at 
random when choosing between a worker with education k £ I  and workers 
at the atom. Let the rest choose the worker with highest productivity, r  is 
chosen so that w'(k) =  H'(k). Obviously, r(k) is then 1 at the atom and 0 
at the boundaries of the interval I  where the firms randomize7. Let £ de­
note the mass of the atom at x*. For later reference, we define the set of 
selection rules *&(£) to be as follows: Firms choose the best educated worker 
unless they choose among workers in the interval I  given in lemma 14. If the 
firm chooses between workers at the atom, they pick one at random. If they 
choose between a worker with education k' E /  and workers at the atom, a 
fraction r(k) select randomly as described above.
From Lemmas 15 and 16 and from the analysis in the previous section, 
it follows that an equilibrium must be of one of the following types:
1. A pure distribution equilibrium. The equilibrium is characterized by a 
distribution n  with connected support [fc0,&i], where ki < k*.
2. A hybrid equilibrium. The support of the equilibrium consists of an 
atom at k* and a continuous tail on [fc0, &i], &i < k*.
7Since we are only interested in deviations by one worker, we do not have to specify 
selection rules for two applicants who are in I  but not at the atom.
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3. A one-point equilibrium. The support consists of k* only.
The transition rate to employment for workers at an atom with probability 
mass £ is (by (5.3))
a ( l - e - « A)
P   Tjj  (5-16)
The transition rate is decreasing in £. Hence the expected income of an 
unemployed worker at the atom is also falling in (. The expected income at 
k0 is independent of the mass at the atom . All workers therefore choose the 
atom if it yields higher expected income than at ko for £ =  1, or if
PB(ko) (ei/A(r  3) 0 k»
(5.17)
If the expected income at k0 is lower than at the atom for £ =  1, but higher
than for f  close to zero, the equilibrium is a hybrid with both a tail and an
atom. We thus get the following result
P roposition  19 Assume that (A,a(A)) satisfies (5.4) for a value of c such 
that U(H(k*),c) — k* > 0. Then the equilibrium defined above is unique. 
Furthermore, there exists two values Ai > A2 of and corresponding values 
for a, such that the equilibrium is
• A pure distribution equilibrium for A > Ai
• A mixed equilibrium for X2 < A < Ax
• A one-point equilibrium for A < A2
Proof: Define Ai as the value of A which makes k1 = k*, and A2 as the value 
which makes (5.17) an equality for { =  1. Since U(k0) — k0 decreases and k1
A / ( f f l ;  (1  -  e - * / * )  
r +  s +  fiXj/a (1 — e”6/A) - k m <
118
increases in in A, and since U(k*,c) — k* > 0 by assumption, it follows that 
both Ai and A2 are well defined and unique.
First let A < A^ We want to show that the pure distribution equilibrium 
given by (5.11) is indeed an equilibrium. Let the set of selection rules be 
given by $(0), so that all firms choose the best educated worker. Given \I/(0) 
it follows from the analysis in the last section that (5.11) implies that all 
workers behave optimally, and from Lemma 12 that \£(0) forms a selection 
equilibrium. Hence existence follows.
Now we turn to uniqueness. By construction, we know that the distribu­
tion (5.11) is unique given \P(0). By the definition of A1} it follows that we 
cannot have an atom at k*, and therefore that the equilibrium distribution 
can have no atoms. Suppose T ^  supports a different equilibrium distri­
bution than (5.11). Since $  ^  T, the latter must imply that the firms are 
indifferent between workers with different education levels on some intervals 
below k*. Since this is ruled out by Lemma 12, uniqueness follows.
Now let Xi < A < A2. First note that since the left-hand side is strictly 
decreasing and the right-hand side is independent of £, there exists a unique 
f* € (0,1) which makes (5.17) into an equality. We want to show that a 
hybrid equilibrium exists, where a fraction f  * of the searching workers invests 
k*, while the rest of the distribution is given by (5.11), with (^A;1) =  1 — f*. 
Let the set of selection strategies be given by #(£*). By construction, workers 
then maximize their expected income given the selection strategies. We also 
know by construction that the selection strategies are optimal at the interval 
I  around the atom at which the firms randomize. Because of Lemma 12, we 
only have left to show that k1 is less than the infimum of I. But this follows 
from the fact that, by construction, U(k1) — k1 =  U(k*) — k* > U(k') — k'.
Uniqueness now follows easily. First note that from the definition of A, 
it follows that the equilibrium must be a hybrid. Hence it follows that the
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mass at the atom must be f*. By using a similar argument as above, we then 
find that the tail is unique as well, and the result follows.
Finally, let A > A2. We want to show that f  = 1 is an equilibrium. Let the 
selection strategies be given by \I/(1). By the construction of A2, it follows 
that U(k*) — k* > U(ko) — ko. This proves both existence and uniqueness.
□
The level of education in the model can be overoptimal or suboptimal, de­
pending on the parameter values. As mentioned in the introduction, educa­
tion has a positive externality for firms, which get higher profit when workers 
are more productive. This is the hold-up eifect. At the same time, educa­
tion creates a negative externality for other workers, since it reduces their 
transition rate to employment. Which of these effects is stronger depends on 
parameter values.
If A converges to zero, the model converges to the one in the Chapter 2, 
which yields suboptimal investment in education. This makes sense: when 
the competition effect vanishes, we are left with only the positive externality 
from education. On the other hand, we know that the education level at the 
atom is overoptimal. k* maximizes H — (r + s)k, which means overinvestment 
since there is a time lag between education and production.
5.6 Conclusion
We analyze the incentives to invest in human capital when the labour market 
contains frictions. We develop a matching model where firms can have more 
than one applicant for a vacant job. The equilibrium of the model can take
120
different forms depending on the degree of competition for jobs. If the com­
petition is not to severe, workers choose to diversify, and the distribution of 
education levels among the workers is continuous and without atoms. If the 
competition is severe enough, all workers choose the same education level. A 
hybrid equilibrium exists for intermediate levels of competition for jobs.
We show that when the competition for jobs is stiff, the well-known hold­
up problem that often arises in models with ex post bargaining is eliminated. 
The investments in human capital is then overoptimal, due to negative ex- 
ternalites from education on other workers.
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A ppendix
To get a closed form solution for 7r we first insert (5.7) into (5.9) and get
PpH(k)/(r + s) __
 ;— — z  — U q +  kr + s + pp
Rearranging gives
Pp =  pae-*1-* ^
_  (r + s)(U0 +  k) 
H(k) — Uo — k)
Taking logarithms and rearrange give
jr(Jfc) =  1 -  H a P p ^ ^ - l y X  v '  1 (r + s^Uo + k '1
(5.18)
(5.19)
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C hapter 6 
Loss o f Skills During  
U  nem ploy m ent
6.1 Introduction
A well documented result in applied labour economics is that long unemploy­
ment spells reduce a worker’s prospects in the labour market (see f.i. Layard 
et al (1991) . One possible explanation for this is that long unemployment 
spells reduce a worker’s productivity.
The idea that workers may loose skills during unemployment is not a new 
one. In a resent paper, Pissarides (1992) makes the same assumption. What 
is new in this paper, is that we implement loss of skills in a standard matching 
model of the labour market, with wages determined by Nash-bargaining. 
New workers enter the market as unemployed, and their skills depreciate 
geometrically during the search process.
We show that the model may have multiple equilibria. The reason is, that 
if the exit rate from unemployment is high, the unemployed workers average 
productivity is high. This encourages firms to open vacancies, and the exit 
rate remains high. On the other hand, if the exit rate from unemployment
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is low, the average productivity is low as well, and this discourages firms 
from open vacancies. Hence the exit rate remains low, and we have multiple 
equilibria1.
Thus, if workers loose skills during unemployment, a high labour market 
tightness both increases workers’ productivity and reduces the unemployment 
rate. We would therefore expect the socially optimal level of entry to increase 
(and the unemployment rate to decrease) when we introduce depreciation of 
skills. On the other hand, loss of skills reduce the workers outside option in 
the wage bargaining, and thus reduces his wage (for a given productivity) and 
thus encourage entry of jobs. However, we show that this maxket response 
is too weak to accommodate fully for the increased social gains from entry. 
Thus loss of skills tends to make the labour market tightness too low and the 
unemployment rate too high compared to the socially optimal level.
We also argue that workers continue to search for jobs too long. The 
social gain from a match is low when the worker’s productivity is low, while 
the social cost in terms of congestion for other agents remains constant. 
Unemployment benefits encourage workers to stop searching, and can thus be 
welfare improving. We show that unemployment benefits directed exclusively 
towards long-term unemployed can reduce overall unemployment.
6.2 The m odel
Our matching framework is a simplified version of the one in Pissarides 
(1990). The model consists of a continuum of workers and firms. Both 
workers and firms have to undertake costly and time-consuming search to
1Pissarides(1992) also obtains multiple equilibria. That his result carries over to our 
model is far from obvious. For one reason, the wages in our model are sensitive to market 
conditions through the workers’ outside options in the bargaining game between workers 
and firms. This is not the case in Pissarides’ model.
124
find a trading partner.
When entering the market, all workers have the same productivity, nor­
malized to one. They immediately start searching for a job, and during the 
search process their productivity depreciate with a rate 8. When matched, 
the workers stay with the same firm until they exit the market, which they 
do at a constant and exogenous rate s (both when employed and when un­
employed). New workers enter the market at the same rate, so the size of 
the labour force is constant. We normalize the number (measure) of workers 
to 1. In order to simplify the analysis, we assume that the workers receive 
no income when unemployed2.
Firms are either vacant and searching for a worker, or occupied (by one 
worker) and producing. All firms axe homogeneous. There is free entry in 
the model, and the zero profit condition implies that the expected discounted 
income (asset value) of a vacancy is zero.
The matching technology is characterized by a concave and constant re­
turns to scale matching function x(u, u), where u is the unemployment rate 
and v the vacancy rate. The transition rate from unemployment to em­
ployment for a searching worker is given by p = x(u ,v)/u  =  p(0), where 
6 denotes the labour market tightness v/u. The arrival rate of workers to 
searching firms is q = x(u,v)/v  = q(0). It follows that p is increasing and q 
decreasing in 6.
6.2.1 Workers
Let E(y) and U(y) represent the expected discounted income when employed 
and unemployed respectively, as a function of current productivity y. The 
asset value equation for U is then given by
2In the appendix, the model is solved for a more general version of the model.
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(r-M  )U(y) = p { E (y ) -U (y ) ) -U '( y )y
=  p (E (y ) -U (y ) ) -U '(y )6 y  (6.1)
where r is the discount rate and 6 the rate of depreciation of y. The equation 
is standard except for the last term, which captures the capital loss due to 
reduced productivity. Let S(y) denote the joint match surplus when the 
worker in question has productivity y. Since the value of a vacancy is zero, 
the surplus is given by S(y) =  y/(r  +  s) — U. The worker and the firm split 
the surplus according to the nash bargaining rule, hence E  — U — f3S, where 
P is the worker’s bargaining power. We substitute this into (6.1) to obtain
(r + s+ pfi)U  =  ppy /(r + s) — U'(y)6y (6.2)
This is a first order linear differential equation. In addition we know that 
U(0) =  0. The system therefore has a unique solution, we guess that it is of 
the form U =  Ay. Inserted into (6.2) this gives
(r + s +  pP)Ay =  p(3y/{r +  s) — ASy (6.3)
which is satisfied if A  is given by
A _  PP/{r +  a) 
r 4- s + pP + S
Thus U(y) can be written as
<6 -5 >
The effect of depreciation of human capital on expected income when unem­
ployed is the same as the effect of harder discounting (higher r). Note that
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(6.4)
A  is decreasing in 6 and that £ =  oo implies A = 0 as we would expect. Note 
also that A  increases in p, and p = oo gives U = y/(r  + s), the expected 
income in a competitive market.
6.2.2 D istribution o f skills
In this section we calculate the distribution F(y)  of productivities among the 
unemployed. In steady state F  is constant. Equalizing streams to and from 
the pool of workers with productivity less than y gives (with f (y)  = F'(y))
6yf(y)  =  (s+p)F(y)  (6.6)
or
f ( y ) _ s  + p ,eirt
W)-~sT (6'7)
Integrating and transforming each side, using the exponential function, give
F( y)  =  (6-8)
where C is a constant of integration. Substituting in F(  1) =  1 gives C =  i.
It follows that f (y)  = y 2^ R~1(s + p)/6. Let y denote the expected value of y.
Then
y  =  [  y f ( y ) d y  
Jo
_ f 1 s "b P 
Jo
y  6 dy
S + P (6.9)
S +P + 6
As expected, y increases in p and decreases in 6.
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6.2.3 Firms
Let J(y) denote the asset value of a filled job. Since the asset value of a 
vacancy is zero, we have that J(y)  =  (1 — /?)5(y), where S(y) still denotes 
the match surplus. As we showed above, S(y) =  y/(r  -f s) — U. Substituting 
in for U from (6.5) gives
When we take expectations, using (6.9), this yields
(r +  s)J  =  (1  — ft)— -7 r  +  5+/  t  (6 .1 0 )p + s +  6 r - f s + p / ?  +  6
where J  =  E y J(y).  The first factor increases in p. This reflects that the 
average productivity increases in p. The second term decreases in p, and this 
reflects that higher p increases U and thus improves the worker’s bargaining 
position. If P is low and 6 is high, the first effect will dominate, and J  
increases with p and with the labour market tightness 0.
We now turn to entry. The asset value equation for a vacant job is given by
rV = - c + q { J - V )
where c is search costs while q still denotes the arrival rate of workers. Since 
V = 0 this gives
J  =  c/q
Inserting this into (6.10) gives
( r + * / « - (  <«•»>
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where p =  p(9) and q =  q{9). This equation determines the labour market 
tightness 9.
6.2.4 Equilibrium
The last variable we have to solve for is the unemployment rate. Equalizing 
streams into and out of unemployment gives us the Beveridge curve:
su = ------
p + s
We want to investigate whether or not the model can have multiple equilibria. 
From (6 .1 1 ) we know that both sides of the equation are increasing in 9, and 
this suggests that multiple equilibria may exist in some situations.
To get a sharper result, we assume that the matching function is Cobb- 
Douglas, so that q(9) =  9~v, 0 < v < 1 . Then we can show the following 
proposition:
Proposition 20 I f  v < 1/2, and the workers’ bargaining power f3 not too 
high, some sets of parameters give three equilibria.
To realize this, note first that the recursive structure of the model makes 
it sufficient to cheque that (6.11) can have three real, positive roots. For 
this purpose, assume first that /? =  0. Inserting this and the Cobb-Douglas 
matching function into (6 .1 1) give
01-l/ 4- s
(r +  s)c^  = (6.13)
v ' e1-*  +  s +  s  v '
Rearranging gives
(r +  s)c(s +  S) = s9~v — c(r +  s)B1~v +  91~2v (6*14)
For small values of 0, the first term on the right-hand side dominates (since
v < 1), and the right-hand side falls with 9. For medium sized values of 9,
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the last term dominates (if c(r + s) is relatively small compared to 1 , the 
maximum productivity), and the right- hand side of the equation increases 
in 9. For large values of 9, the medium term dominates, and the right-hand 
side falls in 9. Hence there exist values of r  and 8 such that we get multiple 
equilibria. Since (6.11) is continuous in (3, we also get multiple equilibria for 
values of p  close to 0 .
Note that when P =  0, the last coefficient in (6.10) is equal to 1. Thus 
the expected value of a match is increasing in 9 in this case. In generally, an 
increase in p increases wages and hence reduces profit, but the effect is weak 
when p  is small.
We now turn to the welfare properties of the model. High labour market 
tightness implies high average productivity. Hence we would expect the op­
timal labour market tightness to be higher than in the original model without 
depreciation. On the other hand, the depreciation of human capital reduces 
wages, and hence increases entry.
In order to simplify the analysis, we follow Hosios(1990), and assume that 
r  =  0. The optimal value of 9 then solves the problem
max y (1 — u) — cu9 (6.15)
0
subject to (6.12) and (6.9). We also assume that the matching function is 
Cobb-Douglas, i.e. that x(u,v) = uvvx~v as above. From Pissarides (1990) 
and Hosios (1990) we know that optimality in the original model is obtained 
whenever v = p. We want to find out whether this rule still leads to opti­
mality, and the next proposition tells us that it does not. The proof is given 
in the appendix
Proposition 2 1  Suppose the matching function is Cobb-Douglas, and p  =  u 
as described above. Then (6.11) implies too low 9 when y is given by (6.9).
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From the equations (6.24) and (6.25) in the appendix, it follows that the 
distortions converge to zero when /3 converges to 1 , while they increases as 
/? converges to zero (for (3 — u). Hence, loosely speaking, multiple equilibria 
are most likely when the distortions are large (given that (3 =  v).
6.3 E xtensions
Our assumptions about no unemployment benefits and no cost of creating 
vacancies simplify the analysis, since they imply that the expected income 
when unemployed is proportional to a worker’s current productivity. How­
ever, the simplifications come at some costs, since the presence of especially 
unemployment benefits have interesting implications for the behaviour of the 
model.
If workers are eligible to unemployment benefits, they stop searching when 
their productivity have fallen below a certain cut-off level. Long-term un­
employed workers thus ”fall out” of the market. From a social point of view 
this can be a good thing. The social (and private) value of getting a worker 
matched goes to zero as his productivity vanish. However, the negative con­
gestion effect for other workers stay the same, so after a certain period of 
time (a ”cut-off” time, or alternatively a ”cut-off” productivity), it is socially 
optimal that the worker leaves the market.
In this section we introduce unemployment benefits for the long-term unem­
ployed. More specifically, we assume that workers receive a payment u  when 
y < a;, contingent on not being employed. Hence workers leave the market 
when their productivity falls below u. The unemployment benefit has two 
important implications. Firstly, it increases the average productivity in the 
pool of unemployed workers searching for a job. Secondly, it increases the 
workers’ outside option (his expected income when unemployed) when they
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bargain with their employers, and thereby also the wages.
6.3.1 Workers
The introduction of unemployment benefits for long-term unemployed does 
not influence the differential equation (6 .2 ) determining a worker’s expected 
income when unemployed, only the terminal conditions. In the last section 
we found that 17(0) =  0, now the relevant terminal condition is that U(u) = 
u;/(r +  s). The general solution to (6.2) is on the form
U(y) = Ay + C y-f/s
where p =  r  -f s +  j3p. (see Sydsaeter (1978)). Inserting this into (6.2) and 
rearrange gives
Ay +  zCy~p/s = j ~^ y/ ( r  +  s) + zCy~p/sr + s +  pp +  o
where z is an uninteresting constant3. Hence A is still given by (6.4). Insert­
ing U(u>) = u>/(r + s) gives
a;/(r -f s) = Au  +  C(u)~p/S
Hence
^  r +  s +  <5 £±iC =  7----- 7 7 7------ rW * (6.16)(p +  <S)(r +  s)
6.3.2 Equilibrium
First we want to calculate the distribution F(y; u) of productivities among 
the unemployed, given uj. We again use the fact that workers leave the market 
when y = uj. Now4.
3We have that z =  (r +  s +  p/3)/(r + s + p/3 + 6).
4To see this, recall the expressions for /(y ; 0) and F(y; 0) from the previous section.
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f ( „ - u \  M:°) y * ^ ( ° + p ) / s  ,f l «
f { y 'u ) -  i - f u o )  ~  — r z j p —  (6 -17)
For F (y’u) we thus get (by integration)
y a — uja
F W  =  ( fU 8)
where a = (s +  p)/8.
We want to calculate the expected value of a match for a firm. Since J  = 
P(S — {/), and S  =  y/(r  +  s), we get that
3  =  / ' (1 “  + s '>~ Cy' f/^ T ~ ^ dy (6' 19)J u P + 0 I —LJa
where C is given by (6.16).
P roposition  22 Suppose r -f 6 > (1 ~  P)p- Then there exists an interval 
[0,u>] where J(w) is increasing. Furthermore, if a  =  (s + p)/6 < 1, J'(lo) 
goes to infinity when u  converges to zero.
Proof: Talking the derivative of (6.19) with respect to u  gives (recall that C 
depends on cj):
J \u )  =  - u p!sr +  5 +  & S(r -f s) (i -  «  fJ LJ
- p/s^ va—1
1 -W a
dy
au;a—1
+  ------1 -  LJa (6.20)
If a  — 1 < p/8 we know that lim ^o  wa~l l u pl6 — oo, and hence we know from
(6.20) that there exists an interval (0,o>) where J'(uj) > 0. From this the first 
part of the proposition follows. If a — 1 < 0 it follows that lim0,_fo^~a =  oo? 
and from (6 .2 0 ) we then get that lim ^o  J'{u) =  oo as well.
□
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As we have discussed earlier, the introduction of benefits for long-term unem­
ployed increases the average productivity among unemployed and shifts the 
wage schedule upwards. The first effect is positive and the second negative 
for firms profit. The proposition tells us that the positive effect outweighs 
the negative when 8 + r  > p (  i - 0 )-
The effect of u> on the average productivity is strong if the lower tail of the 
distribution is thick, so that cutting off the tail has a large impact on the 
average productivity. The tail is thick when p and s are small while 8 is 
large.
The effect on workers outside option is strong when the discount rate r 
and the exit rate s axe small. The effects of p is more complex. High p makes 
it less likely that the worker will cash in the unemployment benefit. However, 
if the worker becomes employed, his increased outside option increases his 
wage, and this reduces the negative impact of p on U. Finally high 6 increases 
the value of the benefits to the worker, but the effect is less in relative terms 
than the effects of 6 on the size of the tail. In sum, we find that the positive 
impact dominates whenever (1 — ft)p < r  + 8.
If (s+p)/8  is less than one, the density f(u>) goes to infinity as w goes to zero. 
As a result, goes to infinity as well. Since 6 is given by c/q(6) =  J ,
the marginal impact on 9 is very large for small u>, and the introduction of a 
small benefit for the long-term reduces overall unemployment.
6.4 Conclusion
We have studied a matching model where workers loose skills during unem­
ployment. We calculate the impact of this on the asset value of unemployed 
workers, and find that it is similar to harder discounting. We introduce en­
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try, and show that depreciation of productivity during unemployment leads 
to multiplier effects and possibly multiple equilibria. Furthermore, the num­
ber of firms entering the market tends to be too low compared to the socially 
optimal level. In the last part of the paper, we introduce unemployment 
benefits for long-term unemployed, and show how this can increase welfare 
and reduce unemployment.
In a future work I plan to extend the welfare analysis, and see whether 
centralized bargaining can do better than decentralized. I will also simulate 
a parametrized version of the model on a computer, to find stability proper­
ties of the various equilibria, and to asses the qualitative importance of loss 
of skills during unemployment. Finally, I think it would be interesting to 
estimate an extended version of the model, with endogenous search intensi­
ties included, using unemployment data from U.S., Great Britain, and /  or 
Norway.
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A ppendix
P ro o f of proposition 21 First we rewrite equation (6.11). We have that 
E y(E —U) =  (3/(1 — (3) c/q , and since p =  flgweget ( r + s + £ ) £ /  = (3/(1—/? ) cO. 
Since
J  =  (1  -  /?)y/(r + s) - U )
this gives
c/q = J  =  (1 -  (3)y/( r  +  s) -  (30c/ (r +  s +  £) (6.21)
Now we want to characterize the optimal solution. Substituting (6.12) and
(6.9) into (6.15) gives us
m ax  — - — cO—-— (6 .2 2 )e s + p + 6 s + p
Taking derivative with respect to 0 gives (using that p'(0) =  q(l — v) 
q( 1 — i/)(s +  £) s2c +  vscOq(Q)
(p +  s +  6)2 (s + p): = 0 (6.23)
or
. vOcs s c .  6 x
y i 1 - " ) -  -^ T s -  7 ( (6-24)
Since z/ =  /?, we have that c/q = J  = 1 ^  (£  — 17), and from (6 .1) and (6.5) 
we get that
„  rT s + 6 rT _ s +  6 _.
e - u  = — u  = p o _ r \y sp s+ p /3 + 6
since r =  0. Hence
sc 6 _  (1 —  u)S
q s 4  <5 s +p/? +
Inserted into (6.24) this gives
ff(1 - ^ s +  ^  +  s + ~ JTTgc =  s c /q  (6 '25)
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Since
------- ~a c "I--------------c ^  1S  +  p /3  +  8  5  +  p  +  8
the proposition follows when comparing (6.24) and (6.25)
□
We want to calculate the expected income for an unemployed who receives 
an unemployment benefit 6, when the value of a vacancy is V. The differential 
equation analogous to (6 .2 ) is
(r +  s 4- Pp)U(y) = b + fip(y/(r +  s) - V ) -  U\y)8y  (6.26)
where b is the unemployment benefit when the worker is searching. The
solution to this differential equation is given by
=  I ' ~z ’a l c y/(r  +  3) +  Cy-"!1 - pf i / pv  +  b/p (6.27)r  +  s +  pp +  o
where p =  1 / r  +  s + ftp and C is a constant. C can be calculated when we 
know when the worker stop searching, and what his expected income is at 
that stage. For this end we assume that the unemployment benefit is time 
dependent, and changes to u  when a worker has been unemployed longer 
than t1, and we assume that u  > w^t1) so that the worker stops searching at 
t1. Let y1 =  y{tl ). Then we must have that U(yi) = u>/(r + s), and hence
C =  [u/(r +  s) -  ylp(3/ ( r  +  s + p/9 +  6/p + Vpfi/p ^  +pP/p]Ap/6r  +  s + pp + o
(6.28)
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C hapter 7 
O ptim al U nem ploym ent
7.1 Introduction
The discussion of whether the level of unemployment is socially efficient 
is not new in economics. Since Friedman-Phelps introduced the notion of 
the natural rate of unemployment, a large body of research has developed 
on the subject. As demonstrated by Diamond (1982), Mortensen (1982), 
and Pissarides (1984) among others, matching models with two sided search 
and with wages determined by decentralized bargaining provide a natural 
framework when addressing the issue.
The basic idea underlying the matching literature is that finding a trading 
partner is costly and time consuming. This is captured by the introduction 
of the matching function x(u,v), which relates the number of matches per 
unit of time to the stock of searching workers and firms. Since finding new 
trading partners are costly, the worker and the firm have a mutual interest 
in staying together. Hence there is a surplus associated with the match. We 
study models where this surplus is split between workers and firms according 
to the Nash sharing rule, where the worker gets a share (3 and the firm a
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share 1 — (3 of the match surplus.
The behaviour of the model depends on the size of {3. If (3 =  1 , the workers 
get all the surplus, and no firm has an incentive to enter the market and incur 
search costs to find a trading partner. Hence all the workers are unemployed 
in steady state. On the other hand, if /? =  0 the firms get all the surplus, 
and the wage is bid down to the monopsony price (the Diamond(1971) case). 
Both cases are obviously sub-optimal since they imply that the market does 
not generate surplus1.
Hosios(1990) characterizes the (constrained) optimal allocation of resources 
in steady state. He finds that for a specific value of the workers’ bargaining 
power /?, the decentralized market solution generates the same steady state 
allocation. This happens when is equal to 77, the elasticity of the arrival 
rate of workers to searching firms with respect to the labour market tightness, 
6 =  v/u.
The (3 = rj rule for optimality is frequently used as a valid criteria for op­
timality, although it is derived under rather strong assumptions. Hosios uses 
techniques from static maximization, the interest rate is set equal to zero, 
and the steady state path that maximizes average income is derived. Since 
matching models are inherently dynamic, a dynamic maximization approach 
seems appropriate. In the first part of this paper we show how optimality 
conditions for standard search models can be derived by employing optimal 
control theory. This approach has many advantages compared to the static 
maximization approach. First, it simplifies many of the welfare comparisons. 
Second, it facilitates a more general and rigours analysis of the problem, 
also outside steady state and for positive interest rates. Finally, the disjoint 
functions associated with the Hamiltonian have interesting economic inter­
1When /3 = 0, free entry still implies that the the expected profit when opening a 
vacancy is zero
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pretations since they replicate the asset value equations in the model of the 
decentralized market. As we will see, the set of equations constituting the 
first order conditions for optimality are identical to the equations for the 
decentralized economy with 77 replaced by (3. We find that the optimal path 
is a saddlepath, identical to the market solution when f3 =  77.
Hosios only studies the efficiency of relatively simple models. It is therefore 
of interest to see whether the (3 =  77 rule also holds in more general settings 
and not only as a special case. We look at three different extensions of the 
model. First, we allow the exogenous variables to be continuous functions 
of time. This is a relevant extension since matching models axe frequently 
used to model business cycles. Then we allow for firm heterogenities. The 
assumption about homogeneous agents is obviously to simplify, an optimality 
rule that hinges on it is not very applicable. Finally we introduce on-the-job 
search. Matching models that includes on-the-job search have recently been 
developed (Mortensen and Pissarides(1994) and Pissarides(1994)). On-the- 
job search is highly relevant since it accounts for a substantial part of the 
observed labour turnover.
We find that the optimality rule (3 =  77 are robust to the first exten­
sion, that is, it still holds when the exogenous variables are time dependent. 
However, it is not robust to the other two extensions. With heterogeneous 
firms, the market typically overvalues the low productivity and undervalues 
the high productivity firms when (3 = rj, and this distorts ail decisions made 
during the search process. To achieve optimality the wage must be indepen­
dent of the productivity of the firm in question. On-the-job search typically 
leads to too much entry.
To grasp the intuition behind the results, recall the two sources of external­
ities of entry we identified above. A positive externality for the searching
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workers and a negative externality for other vacancies. In the basic model 
they offset each other when (3 = rj. If the firms are heterogenous, wage 
bargaining implies that the compensation paid to the workers (the positive 
externality) is higher for high productivity firms than for low productivity 
firms. The negative externality on other vacancies is independent of the pro­
ductivity of the firm in question. We find that when =  rj the positive and 
the negative externalities still cancel each other out for the average firm. For 
the low productivity firms the negative externality then has to be greater 
than the positive externality, leading to a market value which is too high. 
For the high productivity firm we get the opposite result.
With on-the-job seaxch, a new externality is present in the model. A 
firm that hires an employed worker creates a negative externality for the 
incumbent firm. The old optimality rule therefore leads to too much search.
7.2 O ptim ality o f the standard m odel
In this section we first present a standard search model of the Pissarides(1990) 
type, and then use optimal control theory to derive efficiency results. Firms 
are either vacant and searching for a worker at a cost c > 0 or occupied (by 
one worker) and producing a stream of y > 0 units of output. There is a 
fixed cost k associated with the opening of a vacancy. Furthermore, there is 
a fixed number R  of workers in the economy which forego an income z when 
becoming unemployed (the unemployment benefit).
Following standard assumptions, let x(u,v) denote the stream of new 
worker-firm matches, where u denotes the measure of unemployed work­
ers and v the measure of unoccupied jobs (vacancies), x is concave and 
homogeneous of degree 1 in (u, u), and has continuous derivatives. Let 
q = x(u,v)/v  =  q(6) denote the transition rate for a vacancy, where $ is 
the labour market tightness v/u. The transition rate for an unemployed
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worker is then given by x(u,v)/u  = 6q(0). We assume that lim^oo <j(0) =  0 
and that
lim q(0) =  oo 
0—0
When the labour market tightness goes to zero the match probability rate 
for firms goes to infinity. When 6 goes to infinity, it goes to zero.
There is a constant and exogenous probability rate s of match destruction 
due to adverse idiosyncratic productivity shocks. When a productivity shock 
occurs the worker joins the unemployment pool. The remaining vacancy is 
assumed to be worthless. The key variable in the model is the labour market 
tightness 6. Given 6, the dynamics of u are given by
it =  6q{0)u — (R — u)s (7.1)
where R  denotes the measure of the work force. In steady state, with u =  0, 
this gives
This last equation is the Beveridge curve, showing the long-run relationship 
between labour market tightness and unemployment.
7.2.1 The decentralized econom y
Denote by U, E, J, and V  the expected discounted incomes (asset values) for 
an employed worker, an employed worker, an occupied job, and a vacant job 
respectively. Then
rU = z + 6q(0){J-U ) + U 
rE  =  w -f s(E  — U) +  E  
r j  =  y — w +  s{J — V) +  j
rV = - c + q ( 6 ) ( J - V )  + V  (7.3)
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The first equation states that the return to a worker when unemployed is 
equal to the current income plus the expected capital gain associated with 
getting a job. The other equations can be interpreted in a similar way.
The wage is determined by the cooperative (asymmetric) Nash solution 
in a bargaining game between a matched worker and a firm, with U and 
V  as disagreement points respectively. Define the match surplus S  as S  — 
E  +  J  — U — V. Then E = U +  0S  where /? denotes the workers’ bargaining 
power. We also know that free entry implies that the value V  of a vacancy is 
equal to the cost k of producing one, and we can thus rewrite equation (7.3) 
to
rU = z + $q(0)pS (7.4)
rV  =  k (7.5)
rV  =  —c -f q{ 1 — j3)S (7.6)
(r -j- s)S  =  y — rU — (r + s)V  (7.7)
Pissarides(1987) shows that the adjustment path of the model is a sad- 
dlepath; the only non-exploding path is such that the asset values are con­
stant along the path. Note the recursive structure of the model. The equa­
tions (7.4)-(7.7) determine the labour market tightness, 0, while the dynamics 
of u are given by (7.1). We end this section by stating the following lemma, 
proved in the appendix:
Lem ma 17 I fy  — z > (r +  s)fc, the set of equations (7.4)-(7.7) has a unique 
solution
7.2.2 T he optim al solution
Following Hosios and Pissarides, we define the socially optimal path as the 
path that maximizes the discounted value of aggregate production less search
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costs and costs of creating vacancies. The welfare function is then
W
poo
= I e~rt[yN + zu — cv — ak]dt (7 .8 )
Jo
where v still denotes the measure of vacancies. W  is maximized with respect 
to a and tt, subject to the differential equations
N  =  vq{v/u) — sN  (7.9)
v = a — vq(v/u) (7-10)
where (7.9) is a redefinition of (7.1). In addition, the solution must satisfy 
the constraint
R > u  + N  (7.11)
The state variables in the problem axe N  and v 2. The current value Hamil­
tonian associated with the problem is given by
H° =  y N  + zu — cv 
+  \[vq(v/u) — sN]
+ 7 [a -  vq(v/u)]
+  a ( R - u - N ]  (7.12)
Here, A and 7  are adjoint functions associated with N  and v respectively, 
while a  is the Lagrangian multiplier associated with the constraint (7.11). 
Necessary conditions for the problem are given by
2Note that v(<) might be discontinuous. However, from Seierstad and Sydsaeter(1987), 
theorem 7, pp 196 we know that this does not influence the first order conditions. In 
particular the adjoint functions are still continous
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in addition to (7.9)-(7.11)3. Hence we get the following, with tj =  0q'(0)lq:
7  =  h (7.14)
a = z + 0q(0)r}(\ — 7 ) (7-15)
(r +  s)A =  y —a  +  A (7.16)
H  =  - c  +  g ( 0 ) ( l - i y ) ( A - 7 )  +  7  (7.17)
The system (7.14)-(7.17) only depends on v and u through 0. When the 
path of 9 is determined, v is determined by v =  6u, and a by the differential 
equation (7.10) (except in the discontinuity points of v). Note also that the 
first order conditions (7.14) and (7.15) for the maximization problems in the 
first two equations in (7.13) are only necessary, so a solution to (7.14)-(7.17) 
does not necessarily satisfy (7.13).
The first lemma shows that the necessary conditions defined by (7.13) are 
also sufficient
Lem m a 18 The first order conditions given by (7.13) together with the tra-
nsversality condition stated above are also sufficient conditions for optimality.
3In addition we have the transversality condition lim*_oo e“rtA =  0, see Seierstad and 
Sydsaeter(1987), Theorem 16, pp 244 for details
Proof: The proof is a straightforward application of Arrows sufficiency the­
orem (see Seierstad and Sydsaeter (1987), theorem 8 , pp 198). Thus it is 
sufficient to show that the Hamiltonian is concave in the state variables given 
the optimal choice of control variables. Since the Hamiltonian is linear in N  
it is also concave in N. Note that vq(v/u) =  x(u,v), which is concave in v. 
Thus H  is concave in v if A > 7 , and this follows from (7.14) and (7.17)
□
The next lemma shows that an optimal solution exists and has constant 
adjoint functions along the adjustment path:
Lem m a 19 I f  y — z > (r + s)k the optimization problem has at least one 
solution. Along all the solution paths the adjoint functions are constant.
Proof: For the first maximization problem in (7.13) to have a solution, we 
must have that 7  = k, and thus 7  = 0 . Thus we only have to prove that 
A =  0 along the adjustment path.
In the first chapter of the thesis we show that a solution with A constant 
exists (see section 3.1). Let 9* denote a corresponding constant value of 0, 
and i>*(<) and u*(t) the corresponding values of v and u.
Let u',v' be another solution to the problem, say with A > 0 for some 
t =  t'. From (7.16) we then find that Ar(tf) > A*(t'). Since A is continous 
there exists an interval [i0, h] such that A' > A*. Without loss of generality 
we assume that t0 =  0 .
Now define a third path u", u", in the following way: Let (u", v") =  {u\ v') 
for t < ti. Then let the path be such that 9 = 9* for t > ti. This path also 
solves the problem, since for all starting times t and all initial values N(t), 
the path associated with a labour market tightness 9* solves the problem of 
maximizing W  from time t onwards. Therefore, any path that switches from
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i f ' ,  v ' to the path associated with constant 9 at any point in time solves the 
problem. But since A is discontinuous at t =  t\, ( i f " , a") does not satisfy the 
necessary conditions.
□
With A =  7  = 0, the set of equations (7.14)-(7.17) are identical to the asset 
value equations (7.4)-(7.7) with /? =  7 , with a  =  rU, A — 7  =  5, and 7  = V. 
Together with the lemmas above, this implies the following proposition:
P roposition  23 Assume that the set of equations (7.13) with A =  0 has a 
unique solution. Let 77* denote the corresponding value ofrj. Then the market 
solution coincides with the optimal solution if and only if (3 =  77*
I f  (7.13) has n > 1 solutions, with n corresponding values of 6 and values 
of 77, they all give rise to optimal paths that are equal from a welfare point of 
view.
Note that since (7.14)-(7.17) may have solutions that are not solutions to
(7.13), /? =  77 is not a sufficient condition for optimality. Note also that if 
there is more than one optimal path, any path which switches between them 
is also optimal.
7.2.3 M ore about th e optim al solution
Let W(N, v ,R ,t)  denote the value function associated with the planners 
problem. From Seierstad and Sydsaeter(1987), pp 210-219, we know that
dW  
dN  
dW  
dv 
dW  
dR
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=  e~rtA
e t*7
= e a /r (7.18)
Thus A, 7  and a /r  denote the shadow price of one more employed (given the 
total number R of workers), a vacancy, and an unemployed respectively.
As we have seen, the expressions for A, 7 , and a  in (7.14) -(7.17) correspond 
algebraically to the asset values S  +  V, rU and V  in (7.4)-(7.7) when ft =  7 . 
Thus U and V  are equal to the shadow price of an unemployed and a vacancy, 
respectively. The agents expected income are equal to their social value.
7.3 Extensions
The model described in the last section is stylised and with many simplifying 
assumptions. In this section we investigate the welfare properties of two 
extended versions of the model.
7.3.1 T im e-dependent exogenous variables
In this subsection we allow for time-dependent exogenous variables. More
specifically, we write y =  y(t),z = z(t), c =  c(t), and R  =  R(t), where all 
the functions are Lipschitz continuous in t. We also assume that there exists 
a t1 > 0 such that y(t) =  y,z(t) =  z etc. for all < > t1. We simplify the 
analysis by assuming that k =  0 .
Firms and workers are continuously renegotiating the wage, with constant 
bargaining power. The modified versions of the asset value equations (7.4)- 
(7.7) are given by
rU(t) = z{t) + e(t)q(${t))(3S(t) + S  (7.19)
rV =  -c(t)  + q(l -  p)S(t) = 0 (7.20)
(r + s)S{t) = y { t ) - r U ( t ) - ( r  + s)V + S  (7.21)
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The structure of the model is still recursive, with 9 determined by (7.19)-
(7.21), and N  by (7.9).
Lem m a 2 0  The function 9(t) satisfying (7.19)-(7.21) is given by the differ­
ential equation
(r +  S)t m j  =  (1 "  m t )  ~  * (<)1 “  + (7-22)
and the boundary condition #(£*) =  9*, where 0* is the unique equilibrium 
value of the static model a t t  > t1.
Proof: Taking the derivative of (7.20) with respect to t after re-arranging 
gives
(7.23)
r { E - U )  = w - z - s { E - U ) - 6 q ( e ) { E  - U )  + { E - U )
and
rJ  = y — w — sJ  + J  
Using that E — U — /?5, J  =  (1 — j3)S, and S  =  E  +  j  — U give
(r + 8)S = y - g - 9 q ( O ) 0 S + S
qc — cq'(9)0
= (i -  f i ) S
We also have that
Substituting S  and S  by the virtue of (7.20) and (7.23) thus gives (7.22)
□
The socially optimal path is determined in the same way as in the last sec­
tion. The Hamiltonian is unaltered, save for exogenous variables now being
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time dependent. Since the first order conditions (7.13) do not involve tak­
ing derivatives with respect to time, necessary conditions are still given by
(7.14)-(7.17).
Since 9 varies along the optimal path, so do in general 77 (0), and a simple 
optimality rule like P =  77 is not fruitful. The exception is when the matching 
technology is Cobb-Douglas. The Cobb-Douglas matching function implies 
that the elasticity of q(9) is independent of 6, and hence also that the first 
order conditions (7.14)-(7.17) also are sufficient. We get the following result:
P ro p o sitio n  24 Suppose that the exogenous variables are time dependent as 
described above, and that the matching function is Cobb-Douglas. Then the 
market solution and the optimal solution coincide if  and only if  P =  77.
Proof. The proof is very similar to the proof of lemma 20. Inserting 7  =  0 in 
(7.17) gives X =  c/q. Taking derivatives with respect to t gives an expression 
like (7.23), with S  substituted out for A. Substituting the value of A into 
(7.16), and substituting out a  by (7.14) then gives (7.22). Thus the optimal 
path for 9 is governed by the same differential equation as in the market 
solution when P =  77. Since the terminal conditions are the same (proved in 
the last section), the proposition follows
□
7.3.2 H eterogeneous agents
In this subsection we assume that the vacancies have different productivity. 
More specifically, we assume that the productivity can take n different values, 
determined after the fixed cost k is incurred. Let the indexation be such 
that the productivity 7/t- is increasing in the index z, and denote by /; the 
probability that the realized productivity is t/,-.
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A vacancy will start searching for a worker if and only if the asset value of 
an operating vacancy is at least 0. If the asset value is negative, the vacancy 
is destroyed immediately. Let y denote the cut-off productivity, and i the 
lowest i such that > ym. Let / t- =  Pr{yi\i > i}. The equilibrium is then 
characterized by the equations
n
rV  = z + 09(0) £ /( /? $
i=i
rVi =  — c +  ^(1 — p)Si i > i 
(r + s)Si = yi — rU — (r + s)VJ i > i
n
=  k  (7-24)
t=t
In addition, the unemployment rate is governed by (7.1) as before.
Now we turn to the planner’s problem. Let i be the lowest i for which it is 
optimal to maintain the vacancy. Define u,-, i =  t , , , ,  n, as state variables in 
the optimal control problem. By reasoning as in the last section we then get 
the following first order conditions for the social optimum:
(r +  s)At- =  yi — at i > i
m  =  - c  +  q(Xi -  j i )
i>t
n
£*; = Z +  9q(0)r)(% 2 f i { A; -  7,)
t=t
n
H =  k (7.25)
t=i
To calculate i, remember that the shadow value of a vacancy with produc­
tivity i is given by 7 ,-. i is therefore the lowest i such that 7 ,• is nonegative.
For later reference we also define ys as the lowest productivity such that a
vacancy with that productivity is not destroyed.
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The interesting equation in (7.25) is the second equation. The expression 
for the shadow value of a vacancy of type i, 7 is different from the corre­
sponding asset value equation even when fd = 77 except when A is equal to 
the average value in the market. We get the following result:
P roposition  25 Assume that /? = rj and that i = i. Then the following 
holds:
1. The labour market tightness and the unemployment rate in the decen­
tralized economy is optimal.
2. The social value of a vacancy of type i is higher, equal to or lower than 
the market value as its productivity is higher, equal to or lower than the 
average productivity among the operating vacancies.
Proof: Substituting the second equation into the last equation in (7.25) gives
n
k =  Y I  f a 1 ~  “  'I'*')
t=i
Thus, when calculating the expected value of a vacancy, the last term in the 
second equation in (7.15) cancels out. The set of equations determining the 
market value and the optimal value of 6 are then identical, and the first part 
of the result follows.
When 9 is the same in the social and the market economy, we find that the 
social value of a vacancy is equal to its market value if and only if the value 
of Ai is equal to the average value. This holds if and only if the productivity 
of the vacancy is equal to the average in the market, and the last part of the 
result follows
□
The first part of the proposition states that if the ”ex post” decision of 
destroying the vacancy is socially optimal, then =  77 still ensures optimal
153
entry. The second part of the proposition implies that the ex post decision 
of whether or not to destroy the vacancy can be inoptimal, since the market 
overvalues low productivity vacancies. When /? =  77, vacancies that would be 
optimal to destroy can still be operating in the market solution.
The fact that the asset values of a vacancy differ from the socially optimal 
value will also distort other types of ”ex post” decision (decisions taken after 
the productivity is realized). For instance, if the cost c is a function c(e) of 
the effort e, and the matching function is of the form x(u , eu), the effort that 
maximizes the asset value of a vacancy is given by4
4(e) =  (7.26)
The corresponding expression for the socially optimal effort is obtained by 
substituting in 7,- for V{. We have already seen that Vi is higher (lower) 
than 7i when y is high (low). Thus when /? =  77, low-productivity firms axe 
searching too hard and high-productivity firms too little compared to the 
socially optimal values.
The intuition here is that the negative externality that a vacancy creates 
for other vacancies is proportional to the average productivity among vacan­
cies, and independent of the productivity of the vacancy in question. Socially 
correct prices in the market solution are obtained when the compensation to 
the workers equals this externality. An optimal compensation rule must im­
ply a wage independent of the productivity of the firm in question. This 
contrasts with the Nash sharing rule, which implies that the compensation 
to the worker is increasing in y. The social optimum can be obtained by 
taxing low-productivity jobs and subsidising high-productivity jobs. Note, 
however, that this has perverse effects when it comes to income distributions.
4To realize this, recall that rV  =  —c(e) +  eq j ,  so that r V ‘ — —d  4- qJ = —d  -I- (r V  — 
c)/e = 0, and the equation follows.
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Finally, note that optimality is achieved when all workers get a a wage cor­
responding to the Nash-solution for the average firm and (3 =  rj. This may 
be thought of as the outcome of centralized wage bargaining.
7.4 O ptim ality w ith  on-the-job search
Recently, matching models with ex.post bargaining and-on -the-job search 
have been developed in the literature, see Pissarides(1994) and Pissarides 
and Mortensen(1994). This encourages an analysis of the efficiency of models 
with on-the-job search.
We introduce on-the-job search in a simplified version of the models above. 
Following Mortensen and Pissarides(1994), we assume that the firms can be 
hit by a negative productivity shock, reducing the productivity from y1 to 
y2 < y1. If this happens, the worker employed by the firm starts searching 
for a better job. We assume that employed and unemployed workers search 
for the same jobs equally efficiently. To simplify the calculations, we assume 
that the cost k of creating a vacancy is zero5.
The decentralized economy Let / j l  denote the probability rate of tran­
sition from the good to the bad state. The asset value equations for the 
surplus in the good and the bad state, respectively, can then be written as6:
5Hence we exclude the situation where y2 is so close to y 1 that on-the-job search not
takes place. See Chapter 3 in this thesis for details.
6To see this, first let 5*, i £ {h, 1} denote the net match surplus. Then obviously
r S  = y — / i(5 x — S 2) — s (S 1 — U) — rU  and thus (r +  s +  r f S 1 = y 1 — rU +  /zS2, and
the first equation in (7.27) follows. To get the expression for S 2, note that (r +  s )S 2 =
y2 — rU + 0q(6){(3Sl — S 2). Since 9q{6)j3Sh =  rU — z, the last equation follows.
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(r + s +  fj,)S' =  y1 — rU + y S 1
(T + s + eq(9))S2 = y2 - z  (7.27)
The free entry condition then gives us that
c/q = { l - /3 ) S 1 (7.28)
When we insert this into the asset value equation for the unemployed worker 
(i.e. rU =  z + 0q(0)/3S1) we get that
rU = z +  0q{0)Sl -  0c (7.29)
The equations (7.27)-(7.29) determine the labour market tightness 0. To 
close the model we include the flow equations:
Ni =  0q(6)(N2 +  u) -  (s +  fi)Ni)
N2 =  — — 5 )-^2 d" fiN -1 (7.30)
and finally the identity Ni + N 2 + u = R.
T he optim al allocation Since there are no costs of creating vacancies,
the welfare function can be written as
w  = +  y2N2 + z u - ( u  + N2)0c]dt (7.31)
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When maximizing W  with respect to 0 and u, subject to the constraints 
above, we get the following first order conditions (with the same notation as 
in the previous maximization problems):
(r +  s +  p )A1 =  y1 -  rU + p \ l 
(r + s +  0q(0))A2 =  y2 -  z
a = z + 0q(0) Ai — 0c 
c/q — (1 — 77)(A17r -h (A1 — A2)(l — 7r)) (7.32)
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where ir =  u/(iV2 +  if) is the proportion of the searching workers that is 
unemployed. Note that when /? =  77, the three first equations in (7.32) 
are equivalent to the respective equations (7.27) and (7.29) for the market 
solution. However, the last equation in (7.32), the entry condition, differs 
from the entry condition (7.28). For given (and equal) values of A and 5, 
the optimal solution implies less entry (or lower 6). More generally, since we 
know that 6 is decreasing in the search cost c, we have shown the following 
result:
P roposition  26 When j3 = rj, the decentralized economy with on-the-job 
search leads to too much entry.
The intuition for the result is the following: We know that when there is no 
on-the-job search, /? =  r\ leads to optimality, with the negative externality 
for other firms when entering is exactly offset by the positive externality 
for the workers. With on-the-job search, a new externality is introduced, 
since low productivity firms looses profit when the worker quits, lose their 
worker. Since the firms do not take this into account when entering, the old 
optimality rule now leads to too high entry and thereby too high turnover.
7.5 Conclusion
Matching models are frequently used to describe the labour market and to 
explain unemployment. Therefore, the efficiency properties of such models 
are of great interest.
In the first part of the paper we studied the efficiency properties of a 
standard matching model using optimal control theory. We found that the 
optimal path is a saddlepath, corresponding to the market solution when 
(3 = rj. Thus the optimality criterium derived in the literature using static 
programming still holds.
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We then moved on to study the robustness of the result to changes in the 
structure of the model. The optimality criterium derived in the literature 
still holds when the exogenous variables of the model vary continuously. 
However, it is not robust to the introduction of heterogeneous firms or on- 
the-job search. When =  7 7 , the market tends to overvalue low-productivity 
firms and undervalue high-productivity firms. The introduction of on-the-job 
search leads to too much search in the economy.
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A ppendix
P roof o f lem m a 17
Substituting in for U and V  from (7.4) and (7.5) in (7.7) gives 
(r + s  + 0q(9)f3)S =  y — z — (r +  s ) k  
Substituting in for S  from (7.6) gives
r ~V(1+-  qp ) ^ (rk +  c) =  y -  z  -  (r  +  s )k (7-33)
The left hand side of the equation is increasing in 9, and goes to zero when 
6 goes to zero and to infinity when 9 goes to infinity. Therefore a unique 
solution exists if and only if y — z — (r +  s ) k  > 0 .
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C hapter 8
A  M atching M odel w ith  
H iring C osts
8.1 Introduction
In the literature on equilibrium search models of the labour market, two 
different strands have evolved regarding how to model labour demand. On 
one hand, Pissarides ((1985) (1987), (1990)) and Mortensen (1986) assume 
free entry of jobs, while on the other hand Diamond (1971, 1982) and others 
keep the number of jobs fixed.
Free entry of jobs makes the vacancy rate extremely volatile. After a 
positive aggregate productivity shock, firms open vacancies until all profit 
opportunities are exhausted, i.e until the expected search cost incurred before 
a vacancy is filled, is equal to the expected profit when a worker is found. 
Since search costs depend on the labour market tightness (vacancies per 
unemployed), the latter (and wages, as we will see) jumps directly to its 
new steady state equilibrium value after a shock. The number of vacancies 
therefore overshoot (undershoot) the steady state level considerably after a 
positive (negative) shock, since the new steady state level of unemployment
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is lower (higher) than the initial level. As a result, the unemployment rate 
starts to fall (increase) quickly immediately after the shock.
On the other hand, the assumption that the number of jobs is independent 
of the overall market conditions, does not seem very appealing and is not 
supported by data. Davis and Haltivanger (1990), among others, shows that 
the number of jobs does increase during booms and fall during recessions.
In this paper, we show how the excess volatility caused by free entry 
can be dampened by introducing convex hiring costs. There is a large, but 
fixed, number of firms in the model. All firms are free to open vacancies, but 
there are costs associated with hiring, training, and equipping new workers 
(i.e. of expanding a firm). We assume that these costs are convex, so that 
the marginal costs increase with the number of new workers entering the 
firm at a given time. If, for instance, the firms have a separate department 
for the recruiting and training of new employees, these may have capacity 
constraints that leads to decreasing returns. The convex costs imply that 
firms are reluctant to hire workers too quickly, and thus open less vacancies 
after a shock than they would have done without such costs. Our model 
can therefore be viewed as a compromise between the two ways of modelling 
labour supply described above.
The effects of the hiring costs axe similar to the effects of convex adjust­
ment costs in investment theory (see Begg (1982)). We find, that the labour 
market tightness, the vacancy rate, and the wage rate are still jump variables. 
However, they do not adjust immediately to their new steady state values, 
but increase gradually along the adjustment path. The unemployment rate 
falls less rapidly, and the adjustment process takes more time.
The paper proceeds like this: First, we analyze the effects of shifts in the 
aggregate productivity level under the simplifying assumption that wages 
only depend on productivity. Second, we study the bargaining game between
161
a worker and a firm when hiring costs are present, and analyze the effect of 
productivity shocks with endogenous wages. Third , we simulate the model 
with different parameter values. In the last section we conclude.
8.2 Exogenous wages
In this section we present the basic model, and solves it under the simplifying 
assumption that wages are exogenous.
8.2.1 The m odel
We apply a matching model similar to the one presented in chapter 2 in
Pissarides (1990). There is a continuum of workers in the market, who axe
either unemployed and searching for a job, or employed and working (no on-
the-job search). The number (measure) of workers is constant and normalized
to one. The production side of the economy consists of a large number of
big, identical firms, each employing a continuum of workers, and each having
a production technology exhibiting constant returns to scale in the number
of workers. All firms can costlessly open as many vacancies as they want1.
The number of matches in the economy is given by a concave, constant
returns to scale matching function r(u, u), where x denotes the number of
matches, u the unemployment rate, and v the vacancy rate. The transition
rate to employment is given by p = x(u ,v)/u  =  p(9), where 6 =  v/u  is
the labour market tightness. We assume that all firms take the aggregate
variable 0 for given. The arrival rate of workers to a firm is vt<7, where is
the number (measure) of vacancies posted, and q =  x(u ,v )/v  =  q{6) is the
arrival rate per vacancy. Thus the hiring technology has constant returns
1 We assume that only existing firms create vacancies. Empirical findings show that two 
thirds if all new jobs are created in existing firms (see Mortensen and Pissarides (1994).
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to scale in each firm. The assumptions about the matching function implies 
that p is increasing and q decreasing in 9. In addition we assume that p goes 
to zero and q to infinity when 9 goes to zero, and the opposite when 6 goes 
to infinity.
When a firm employs a worker, an amount is invested to make the worker 
productive. We assume that the investments are fully financed by the firm2. 
We also assume that the investment costs are increasing in the number of 
workers hired. More specifically, we assume that a firm’s hiring costs at 
any given time is K  = a[v{q)2/ 2, and consequently marginal hiring costs 
are k = aviq. Thus the hiring technology has decreasing returns to scale. 
If, for instance, the firm has a training department, this may have capacity 
constraints which give rise to decreasing returns3. When the investments are 
undertaken, production starts immediately, and continue until the worker 
and the job separates. This happens at a constant, exogenous rate s.
Firms announce a positive measure of vacancies, and the stream of new 
workers can be regarded as deterministic. We study the behaviour of a 
representative firm. Let N  denote the number of workers employed in the 
firm, y the productivity per worker, c search costs per vacancy, and r the 
interest rate. The representative firm’s maximization problem can then be 
written as
roo
max I e~rt[(y — w)N — cv — a(vq)2/2]dt (8.1)v(f) Jo
Subject to the differential equation
N  = vq{6) -  sN  (8.2)
2This can be because workers are credit constrained.
3Since we have decreasing returns, each firm earns profit. Following Diamond we 
assume that the entry of firms (not vacancies ) play a minor role in the short run.
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and an initial condition of the form N (t0) = No. Let H  be the associated 
current-value Hamiltonian and J  the adjoint variable. H  can then be written 
as
H  =  (y — w)N — cv — a(vq)2 /  2 +  J(vq — sN ) (8.3)
Necessary conditions are given by (remembering that the firm regards 9 as 
exogenous):
n r /—— = 0 => «V =  c/q +  aqv
ov
= r J - j = * J ( r  + s)  = y - w  + j  (8.4)
Since the firm in question is a representative firm we can write vq = Oqu =  up 
(since p = 9q(0)). We know that the dynamics of the aggregate unemploy­
ment are given by u =  sN  — pu — (1 — u)s — pu. The equilibrium of the 
economy is thus defined by the following set of equations:
u = s(l — u ) —pu 
j  = J  - { y - w )
J  =  apu + c/q (8.5)
Steady state
The model is in steady state when J  = u =  0. The steady state is thus 
characterized by the equations (from equation (8.5)):
u =
r
s + p 
y - w
r + s
j* =  apu +  -  (8 -6 )
We now prove the following lemma:
164
Lem m a 2 1  Suppose y > w. Then the steady state equilibrium given by (8.6) 
exists and is unique.
Proof: Substituting the two first equations into the third gives
y - w  _  asp($) [ _ 
r +  s s +  p(0)
The right-hand side is strictly increasing in 0, and goes to zero when 9 goes 
to zero and to infinity when 6 goes to infinity. Hence the equation has a 
unique solution. Given 6, the first equation determines 0 uniquely.
□
From the second and the third equation in (8 .6 ) we get that
y /(r  + s) = c/q + apu (8.7)
The equation defines 0 = /(u ,y ), where 9 is falling in u. We call this the 
vacancy supply curve. Hence there is a falling relationship between the labour 
market tightness and the unemployment rate in steady state, which implies 
that if the Beveridge curve shifts out, the steady state value of 9 falls. This 
contrasts Pissarides (1990), where the labour market tightness is independent 
of u.
Productiv ity  shocks
In this section, we want to study the dynamic behaviour of the model after 
a productivity shock. We start out showing the following lemma:
Lem m a 2 2  The steady state equilibrium defined by (8.6) is a saddlepoint.
Proof. First note that the only non-exploding path for J  is the one where J  =  
0 almost everywhere. Hence we must have that J  =  y /(r  s). Substituting
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this into the last equation in (8.5) gives (8.7), and we know from above that 
6 is a decreasing function of u. Rearranging (8.7) gives
apu = y /(r  +  s) — c/q
Thus pu decreases in 6, and we can write pu =  g(u), g'(u) > 0 (since 6 is 
increasing in it). Inserted into the expression for u this gives
u =  u(u) = (1 — u)s — g'(u)
Obviously, the right-hand side is decreasing in u.
□
Note that since J  is constant, the relationship between 0 and it, f (u ;y ), also 
holds outside the steady state.
The effects of an aggregate productivity shock are now easy to analyze. 
Suppose y shifts up. Then the vacancy supply curve shifts up as well. Hence 6 
shifts up, and the unemployment rate starts to fall. The labour maxket tight­
ness 0 increases smoothly along the adjustment path towards the new steady 
state. If the aggregate productivity shock is negative, the process is reversed. 
Thus the adjustment costs implies that 6 undershoots (overshoots) the new 
equilibrium value after a positive (negative) shock, and the counter-clockwise 
movements around the Beveridge curve become smoother. Whether or not 
the vacancy rate overshoots depends on the parameter values.
8.3 Endogenous W ages
In this section we endogenize the wages. First we analyze the baxgaining 
game, then we incorporate the solution in the model from the last section.
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8.3.1 Wage determ ination
We assume that a firm bargains with each of its employees separately, and 
that the match-surplus is shared according to the Nash sharing rule. From 
optimal control theory we know that the adjoint variable J  expresses the 
shadow value, or the expected discounted income to the firm, of each occupied 
job (see Seierstad and Sydsaeter (1987)). We assume that the hiring costs are 
mostly training costs, and are sunk when the bargaining takes place. The 
firm’s disagreement point is therefore equal to the value of a vacancy, which 
is zero.
We assume that the investments in training only gives the worker firm- 
specific skills, in another job he must be retrained at the same cost. Let U and 
E  denote the expected discounted incomes (asset values) for an unemployed 
and an employed (E) worker respectively. Then
r U - U  =  b + p ( E - U )
rE  — E  =  w — s(E — U) (8 -8 )
where b is the unemployment benefit. Subtracting the first of the equations 
from the second gives
(r +  s)(E  -  U) = w -  b + p(E -  U) + E -  U (8.9)
The Nash sharing rule implies that the worker gets a share f} and the firm 
a share 1 — /3 of the surplus, where j3 is a constant (the worker’s bargaining 
power). Hence (1 — /?)J =  /3(E — f7), or
E ~ v - r h J
Since continuous renegotiations require that this holds for all t we must also
Inserted into (8.9) this gives
Y ^ [ ( r  +  s )J - j ]  =  w - b - p Y ^ J  (8 .10)
Note that J  is both on the left-hand and right-hand side of the equation. We 
know from (8.4) that (r +  s) J  = y — w + J , and substitute this in on the 
left-hand side. We also know that in other firms, J  =  c/q +  k. We insert this 
into the right-hand side, and rearranging to get
w =  fiy +  (1 -  /?)6 +  +  fipk (8 .1 1 )
Since k represents the marginal hiring cost in other firms, all the variables 
on the right-hand side of the wage equation are exogenous to the firm. We 
have thus proved the following lemma:
Lem m a 23 The wages a firm pay is exogenous to the firm in the sense that 
it is independent of the firm ’s behaviour.
8.3.2 The m odel w ith  endogenous wages
In this chapter, we introduce the wage equation (8.11) into the matching 
model presented above. As we will see, this does not qualitatively change the 
results obtained in the previous section. Since the wages are independent of 
the firms’ hiring policy, the solution to the representative firm’s maximization 
problem is still given by (8.4). As in the last section, we know that k =  avq 
for the representative firm. In equilibrium we can therefore write k = aup. 
When we substitute this and the expression for the wage into the equilibrium 
conditions (8.5), we get
The corresponding steady state equilibrium is given by the equations
s
r =
s + p
(1 — (3)(y — b) — (39c — (3ap2u*
r + s
J* =  -+ a p u  (8.13)
q
where of cause p and q depends on 6*. Analogous to the existence result in 
Lemma 21 we now get the following result:
P roposition  27 I f y > b ,a  unique steady state equilibrium exists.
Proof: From the first equation we find that u =  s/(s  +p). Substituting this 
into the second and the third equation yields
(1 " * ’ -  £ r .  -  P) -  * + + r i  («•»)r +  s r-f-s r-f-s
The left-hand side is decreasing in 6, is strictly positive for 6 — 0 (since 
y > b), and is negative for sufficiently large values of 6. The right-hand side 
is strictly increasing in 9, and goes to zero when 9 goes to zero. Hence the 
equation has a unique solution for 9, and the result follows
How does an increase in y influence the steady state equilibrium? First 
note that since the left-hand side of (8.14) is increasing in y, and it follows 
that 9 increases with y as well. From the beveridge curve (the first equation 
in (8.13)) we know that u falls when 9 increases. Since pu =  ps/(s  +  p), 
which increases in 9, the last equation in (8.13) tells us that J  increases as 
well. Since pu (the number of hirings) increases, so do A;, and hence we know 
from (8 .1 1) that wages increases.
To summarize, an increase in y decreases the unemployment rate, and 
increases the labour market tightness, the wages, and the marginal value of 
a job.
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P rod u ctiv ity  shocks
In this section, we want to study the dynamic properties of the model after a 
productivity shock. First we start out by showing the following proposition:
P roposition  28 The steady state equilibrium defined by (8.12) is a saddle- 
point.
Proof: If we substitute the third equation in (8.12) into the second we get 
that
j  =z (r +  s)J  -  P(y -  b) +  /30c +  f3p( J  -  - )
<1
= (r H- s)J  -  /3{y -  b) +  (3pJ (8.15)
Linearising this equation and the first and third equation in (8 .12) around 
the steady state values yields
j  =  (r + s + /3P)(J -  J ')  + /3JP' (0 -  0*)
u = —(s +  p)(u — u*) — u*p'(0 — 6*)
(J  — J*) =  (cq +  ap'u*)(0 — 0*) +  o,p{u — ti* )
d-where q = ~fjr > 0. Re-arranging the last equation gives
(8 -  r )  =  {J J ' \  -  , , (u -  u*) (8.16)cq +  apu* cq +  ap'u*
Inserts this into the other two equations:
j  =  (r +  « + <Sp + ■ -){J -  r) -  . , '(" -  «*)cq + apfu* cq -f u*p!a
u = - ( s + p - p ( - ^ ± - ) ) ( u - u ' ) - P' u { J - r )  (8.17)
cq +  apus I. ^  ✓
<1
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Thus the sign pattern is 
and the proposition follows.
In a phase diagram in the u — J  space, the lines representing j  — 0 and 
u =  0 are given by
j  = r +  -L (u ~ u *) (g -18)r -f s +  pp +  ppK 
t* s +  p - p u V a K .J  = J  , — (u - t t* )  (8.19)
p'u
respectively, where « =  l/(cq + u*p'a). The first equation (given by J  = 0) 
is increasing, and the second (given by u =  0) is decreasing in u. It follows 
that J  is increasing above the curve given by (8.18), while u is increasing 
below the curve given by (8.19).
Suppose now that we are in the steady state equilibrium initially, and that 
y shifts up. From a phase diagram it is clear that the only convergent path 
implies that both u and J  are decreasing during the adjustment towards the 
new steady state. Since the new steady state value of J  is higher than the old, 
this means that J  immediately jumps upwards. Furthermore, J  overshoots 
its new steady state value.
Also the wages w and the labour market tightness 9 jumps up immedi­
ately. To see this, note first that 6 must jump up since the unemployment 
rate starts to fall. From (8.11) we know that we can write
w =  (3y +  (1 — P)b +  pJ  
Since both p and J  jumps, so do w.
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(8 .20)
Figure 8.1: The Phase Diagram
Furthermore, the same variables continue to increase on the adjustment 
path To see this, first note that since J  is falling, it follows that w must 
be increasing4. But since u falls it then follows from (8.11) that 9 increases 
(since k = apu). Note also that since and since both w and 6 first jumps up, 
and then continue to increase, it follows from the asset value equations that 
U does the same.
Hence the results from the model with exogenous wages still go through 
qualitatively. In addition, we obtain a similar result for the wage rate, which 
first jumps up, and then increases smoothly along the adjustment path to 
its new steady state value. The intuition for this is straight-forward: Since 
the marginal hiring costs are increasing in the number of hirings, firms do
4Strictly speaking, the argument holds only locally around the new steady state equi­
librium, where the signs of the derivatives do not change.
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not want to increase their stock of workers too quickly. Hence they do not 
open as many vacancies initially as in the original model, but instead try to 
smooth out the adjustment. However, since all firms behave like this, the 
labour market tightness and thus also the search costs increases along the 
adjustment path, and the firms face a trade-off between search costs and hir­
ing costs. Furthermore, since the workers’ bargaining position are influenced 
by the conditions in the labour market (the labour market tightness), their 
wages also increases as the model converges towards its new steady state 
equilibrium.
8.4 Sim ulations
In this section, we parameterize the model from section (8 .2 ), to study nu­
merically the effects of introducing hiring costs. We pay special attention to 
the trajectory of the number of vacancies. For simplicity we use the model 
with exogenous wages.
The analysis goes like this. First we parameterize the equations in ques­
tion. Then we calibrate the model, choosing parameters in such a way that 
we get a suitable equilibrium point as a reference point. Finally we compare 
the adjustment paths after productivity shocks with varying levels of adjust­
ment costs. We combine the parameters so that the steady state equilibria 
are (almost) the same in all the simulations.
We assume that the matching function is Cobb-Douglas, and that x =  
A (uvf> \ p(6) = A tf)1' 2 and q{6) = A{0)~^2. Thus
A2
p =  —
q
Without reference to any dataset we choose s =  0.2 and r =  0.05. Inserted 
into (8.5) this gives (with p =  A2/q  substituted in for q):
p
4 y = aup +  — c 
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where y now denotes productivity net of wages. Note that 6 only influences 
the system via p. We therefore solve the system with respect to this variable 
initially, and then in the end calculate 0.
The parameters are chosen such that the following holds in the initial steady 
state equilibrium:
1. The unemployment rate is around five percent
2. Labour market tightness 0 is 1 .
3. The average matching time is a quarter of a period for both workers 
and firms.
The first two items on the list are satisfied when A — 4, which gives p =  4 
when 0 =  1. From (8.21) we then find that u* =  4.8 percent. We normalize 
c/A2 to be 1. Furthermore, we define k — pu*. Thus k denotes the ratio of 
hiring costs to search costs in the initial equilibrium.
In the different scenarios we want to vary k. If k =  0 there are no hiring 
costs, and we are back in the original model. As k increases, so do the 
relative importance of the hiring costs. To prevent different values of k to 
yield different initial equilibria, we let y =  1 +  k. Finally, we let e denote a 
shift parameter for the productivity, e =  0 initially. The system of equations 
can then be written as
u — (1 — u)s — up 
4(1 + k +  e) = kup +  p (8.22)
The last equation defines v as a function of u. This function, for is plotted 
below for e =  0 and for different values of k: for k =  1, the vacancy rate is
0 . 1 4
0 . 1 2  ■
0 . 0 8
0 . 0 6
K -  I
k=30 . 0 4
0 . 0 2
0 . 0 2  0 . 0 4  0 . 0 6  0 . 0 8 0 . 1 2  0 . 1 4
Figure 8.2: The vacancy rate plotted against the unemployment rate.
only slightly increasing in it, around the steady state equilibrium, while it is 
decreasing in it for k >  2. Solving for p in the last equation gives p =  ,
which inserted into the first equation yields
*  =  ( l _ u > + M l ± A ± f )  (8 .2 3)
1 +  ku
This is a first order nonlinear difference equation in u, and has a unique 
solution given the initial value of it. we have solved the equation numerically 
with Mathematica for e =  ±0.5 for various values of k. As the figure above 
indicates, the vacancy rate undershoots (overshoots) when k >  2. Already 
for k =  1 , the initial jump in theta only count for one half of the total 
change before the new equilibrium is reached, and the speed of the adjustment 
process is considerably reduced.
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8.5 Conclusion
In this paper we have shown that the dynamics of a standard matching model 
changes considerably when convex adjustment costs are introduced. Both 
the vacancy rate and wages become less jumpy, and adjust more gradually 
after a shock. Furthermore, adjustment of the unemployment rate becomes 
more sluggish. The model can therefore be viewed as a compromise between 
models with free entry, and models where the number of jobs is exogenous 
and constant.
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